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THESIS

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY
OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVES AS THEY APPLY TO
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

by

John T Haynes

December 1996

Thesis Advisors:

Dana P. Eyre
Christopher Layne
James C. McNaughton

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First, case studies on the US interventions in Somalia and Haiti provide a view of some of the questions and problems involved with intervening in the affairs of states for humanitarian or democratic enlargement reasons. Second, the study pits contending theories against each other to see if one better explains the outcomes. Finally, the study provides recommendations on the implications of democratic enlargement, including the need for a Department of Defense, Department of State and civilian relief organization synchronization in regard to the military's requirement to 1) intervene; 2) stabilize the situation; and, 3) extract itself so that other agencies may consolidate democracy.

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John T Haynes
Captain, United States Army
B.A., North Carolina State University, 1981, 1982
M.A., University of Oklahoma, 1992


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
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
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

John T Haynes

Approved by:


Dana P. Eyre, Thesis Advisor


Christopher Layne, Thesis Advisor


James C. McNaughton, Thesis Advisor


Frank C. Petho, Acting Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

The post-Cold War world has been marked by the United Nations approval and participation in the intervention into the affairs of sovereign states, often labeling them Peace Support Operations. American interventions have been studied in terms of chain of command, firepower and rules of engagement problems, but Civil-Military Operations have not been analyzed in a comparative fashion. Given that future interventions are likely to occur, it is the responsibility of policy analysts and leaders to consider both the costs and benefits of democratic enlargement and the applicability of current doctrine. To do this, tools are needed. This study provides three such tools.

First, case studies on the US interventions in Somalia and Haiti provide a view of some of the questions and problems involved with intervening in the affairs of states for humanitarian or democratic enlargement reasons. Second, the study pits contending theories against each other to see if one better explains the outcomes. Finally, the study provides recommendations on the implications of democratic enlargement, including the need for a Department of Defense, Department of State and civilian relief organization synchronization in regard to the military's requirement to 1) intervene; 2) stabilize the situation; and, 3) extract itself so that other agencies may consolidate democracy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Post-Cold War political pressures are likely to continue to cause the US government to intervene in the domestic affairs of states, generally as a component of a United Nations force. In the two cases examined, Somalia and Haiti, the United States led the interventions. With the end of superpower rivalry there no longer exists the need for one superpower to intervene in the affairs of states to deny the influence of its rival. Interventions are now undertaken for humanitarian, democratic and world leadership reasons. If the past five years are an indicator of the future, there is a greater likelihood of engagement in small wars to enlarge democracy rather than in big wars to safeguard it -- at least for the time being. With this in mind, the transition perspective, advanced in this study, offers a model for change.

Peace support operations (PSOs) are those small wars. Recent small wars have been studied in terms of chain of command, firepower and rules of engagement problems. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) have not been analyzed in a comparative fashion. The question guiding this research asks: Is the current CMO planning framework capable of handling PSOs? The answer is that current CMO doctrine does not consider the military's requirement in small wars to: 1) intervene; 2) stabilize the situation; and 3) extract itself, allowing other agencies to consolidate democracy. What current doctrine does consider is the aftermath of a big war when a military government would impose the will of the victor on the defeated country. The contrasts between big and small wars are used throughout the paper. A key element has been left out of CMO planning: working toward the

transition to civilian control from the outset of intervention planning. In order for this ideal to be realized, an unprecedented level of communication between government agencies and elites in the subject country must occur.

The second question addressed is: If current doctrine cannot handle PSOs, what is a planning framework which can handle them? This question calls for theory building, or, at least, looking for another perspective. A model of transitions to civilian control has been constructed from a foundation of the literature on the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and additional components derived from case studies of two failed states, Somalia and Haiti. First the literature state that two necessary conditions must exist: 1) the negotiation of rules, and 2) popular elections. For PSOs in failed states, I argue that four other conditions favor transition to civilian control. These are: 1) social terrain; 2) positive public opinion; 3) building economic capabilities; and, 4) legitimate government structures. These six conditions are independent variables which are guaranteed by an external monitor. The dependent variable is the transition to democracy, or at a local level, cooperation.

There are three issues in the process of transition to civilian control: 1) the previous system; 2) the transition system; and, 3) the democratic consolidation system. See Appendix F for a graphic representation of the transition to civilian control. The transition system is our area of interest. In it I apply the state-level theory to the local level. In the transition phase of the process, we encounter two possibilities. In some cases, the intervening force may be accepted, in others it will not. When the intervening force is not accepted, the environment is categorized as non-cooperative. When the force

is accepted, the environment is categorized as cooperative. These conditions are analogous to current doctrine's occupations in friendly or enemy regions.

Next, the centerpiece of the paper is pitting the two perspectives -- current CMO doctrine and the transition perspective -- against one another. To do this I follow a four-step process: 1) I explain current doctrine and infer an hypothesis for each of its five mission activities; 2) I develop an alternative theory and derive an hypothesis for each of its six mission activities; 3) I employ these hypotheses to "structure" the case studies; and, 4) I use "focused" comparisons to show the relative explanatory power of each of the two theories, current CMO doctrine and my own transition perspective. The comparative case studies attempt to provide four things. First, they strive ^{to} provide a deeper understanding of the individual situations of the countries examined. Second, the studies seek to identify patterns and trends across the cases. Third, the cases provide a vehicle to test the relative explanatory power of the competing theories. Lastly, the trends developed through comparative analysis are identified for future policy implications.

Given that future interventions are likely to occur, it is the responsibility of policy analysts, and CMO planners and operators to consider the applicability of CMO doctrine to the national strategy of democratic enlargement. To do this, tools are needed. This study provides three such tools: 1) an analysis of questions and problems involved with intervening in the domestic affairs of states for humanitarian or democratic enlargement reasons; 2) the study pits contending theories against each other to evaluate their explanatory and predictive power; 3) the study provides recommendations.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVES AS THEY APPLY TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Peace Support Operations are a continuation of politics by other means.¹

The Cold War is over, but peace is not at hand. -- Alan J. Vick, RAND, 1994

We must perceive the necessity of every war being looked upon as a whole from the very outset, and that at the very first step forward the commander should have the end in view to which every line must converge. -- Carl von Clausewitz

A. INTRODUCTION

Post-Cold War political pressures are likely to cause the US government to intervene in the domestic affairs of states, where prior to 1990 an intervention would have been undertaken only to block the influence of the Soviet Union. More conflict today occurs within states than between them. Politicians have discovered they cannot ignore such conflict, given the human suffering and refugee flows. The government's preferred instrument of intervention is the military.

The US military's involvement in interventions is reported by some analysts to be "inevitable." (Taw and Peters, 1995:1) The United States has a long history of intervening in the affairs of other countries. Among these episodes are: Vietnam, Dominican

¹ This statement is a modification of the Carl von Clausewitz maxim: war is a continuation of politics by other means. This statement points to the essence of war. Additionally, when the words *peace support operations* are substituted for *war*, the following statements are also relevant: [Policy] "is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse." "[T]he conduct of war, in its great factors, is policy itself." See Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, M. Howard and P. Paret, eds. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). This edition offers in its introduction a compelling defense of the continued efficacy of Clausewitz's theories.

Republic, Panama, Somalia and Haiti. US policy makers have always turned to the faithful servants of the nation -- the armed forces -- to supplement the solutions where diplomacy and sanctions have failed. The military must be ready to answer this call. How does the military prepare itself for these missions?

Current Civil-Military Operations (CMO) doctrine is designed to guide the US forces to win against a peer competitor. The underlying assumption is that if the force is trained to win the "big war", then all lesser included contingencies can also be won. With the end of superpower rivalry the world has changed. Consequently, there is a greater likelihood of engagement in small wars to enlarge democracy² rather than in big wars to safeguard it -- at least for the time being. With this in mind, doctrine should change accordingly.

Current CMO doctrine does not consider the military's requirement in small wars to: 1) intervene; 2) stabilize the situation; and, 3) extract itself, allowing other agencies to consolidate democracy. It does however, consider the aftermath of a big war when a military government would impose the victor's will on the defeated country. I propose that the US military has learned lessons from the big and small wars in which it has been engaged, some of which is applicable to peace support operations (PSOs). This thesis addresses the CMO planning for PSOs with emphasis on getting the military back to the barracks as soon as possible. I attempt to answer the following question: Is the current CMO planning framework capable of handling PSOs, or should another one be

²The *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (White House, February 1996), explains that the "active and selective" promotion of democracy "does more than foster our ideals. It advances our interests because we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we are."

developed? My argument is that current doctrine is in need of change. Several lesser arguments support the main argument. First, the world security environment has changed. Next, all components of the intervention plan must be integrated from the beginning. Next, the literature on transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule is a model to be followed to facilitate CMO planning. Additionally, lessons from the past offer valuable guidelines; and, finally, imprecise use of Civil Affairs definitions contributes to the problem of adequate planning.

The opening chapter introduces the perceived problem of less than adequate civil-military operations planning for the PSOs in Somalia and Haiti. It describes the centerpiece of the study, a comparison of two theories of CMO planning, and describes the paper's methodology. Chapter II discusses the first of the two competing theories, current doctrine. I provide an overview of US Army Civil Affairs (CA) history, I explain the five mission activities of current CMO doctrine, and deduce hypotheses from each of them. In Chapter III, I propose an alternative theory, which I call the transition approach. Its most important feature is the transition to civilian control, called the end state or exit strategy.³ I assume that the United States' desired end state is the self-sufficiency of the supported country and that the country aspires to democracy. The conditions favoring a

³ According to the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995), the "military end state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state." In the peace operations context, the end state is the political and military conditions described as the objective of the peace operation by the authorizing power. Meeting objectives is also how success is defined. This is discussed further in the definitions section of this chapter. Whether a PSO succeeds or fails depends largely upon the political and military objectives. If success is important, then it is necessary to define the end states in finite, achievable and long-term dimensions. Otherwise, exit strategies will simply be exfiltrations touted as successes.

The conditions favoring a transition to civilian control are: 1) the society and the supported country's history of democracy; 2) public opinion; 3) negotiations of the rules for transition; 4) democratic elections; 5) economic capabilities; and, 6) legitimate government structures. I address these conditions with the six mission activities of the transition approach and I deduce hypotheses for each of them. To test the two theories I employ two focused, tightly structured case studies of recent US peace support operations and their possible transitions to democracy,⁴ Somalia and Haiti, discussed in Chapters IV and V, respectively. The hypotheses inferred from current doctrine and derived from the transition perspective are used to test the explanatory powers of the two theories. The final chapter is both a summary and an integration of earlier chapters to evaluate the two perspectives and derive a set of recommendations.

For 40 years US defense planners have focused on one overriding challenge: to deter and if necessary defeat an invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union. When the United States faced smaller diplomatic and military challenges in the developing world, policy makers tended to see them as lesser components of the larger struggle against the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, is the United States really safer? Without a doubt, the threat of nuclear war is greatly reduced. Nonetheless, other challenges to the interests of the United States are arising. US defense planners must prepare for conflicts which span the spectrum from big war against a major peer competitor, such as China or

⁴ Transition to civilian control and transition to democracy are for all intents and purposes the same phenomena.

Russia, to small wars involving the complex challenges of peace support operations.⁵ Is the United States prepared for small wars?

First, we must determine whether PSOs are small wars. Simply said, peace support operations are about deterrence and compellence and this is why the military is used. Approaching the use of military force from a position other than that of the fundamental nature of war, and its idea of combat, risks failure. Failure to see PSOs as deterrence and compellence operations will cause decision makers to derive false cost/benefit analyses. These misguided analyses will cause a skewing of end states and will affect successes and failures.

In *The American Way of War*, Russell Weigley explains that American war is big war. Military doctrine reflects the methods the Allies used to win World War II -- through manpower, firepower and industrial power. Weigley (1973) traces the American Army's propensity to conduct annihilatory warfare to the Union Army's experiences in the War Between the States. The Army organization institutionalized the lessons of how to win wars and the tenets of manpower, firepower and industrial power were complimented by victories in the two World Wars. Then came the "aberrations" of Korea and Vietnam and the birth of the "Never-Again school."

The Never-Again school argued that wars should never be conducted as they had been in Korea and Vietnam. Weigley (1973:479) explains that in these limited wars, the

⁵ Alan J. Vick, *Challenges to US Security in the 1990s and Beyond* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1994), explains that challenges in the post-Cold War world include counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, missile proliferation and various non-combat operations. This thesis is concerned with a sub-set of small war called peace support operations.

military was unable to bring them to a decisive conclusion through the use of overwhelming power. The conventional military downplayed missions not resembling those appropriate to big war, such as counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and civil-military operations. Consequently, the military inferred a primary lesson from the Korea and Vietnam experiences: it would attempt to avoid small wars where overwhelming manpower, firepower and industrial power could not be brought to bear.

A second set of lessons which were derived from a small war⁶ perspective were subsumed by the conventional Army culture. These lessons were: 1) using military force in areas not of vital interest to the United States will occur; 2) military operations cannot be conducted in isolation from political guidance; 3) winning the hearts and minds⁷ of the foreign population is essential to effectiveness in small wars; and 4) understanding the culture of the foreign population is essential for effectiveness in small wars. The argument reached the national political level in the late 1980s.

⁶ See W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977) and Stephen Mariano, *Peacekeepers Attend the Never-Again School* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995) for a thorough discussion of the American way of war and the lessons of small war.

⁷ The term "hearts and minds" needs to be defined. It is a construct made of several concepts. Following the conventional, big-war styled intervention by the United States into the Republic of South Vietnam after the Tonkin Gulf incident, it entered into the "other war," one of ideas attempting to create a strong anti-communist nationalism by winning the people's loyalty for the Republic. Both protagonists tried to win the loyalty of the people and the people generally remained ambivalent, waiting for the battlefield to determine the victor before choosing sides. The American Pacification and Rural Development Program was the sum total of the political, economic, social, security and psychological measures taken to enlist and retain popular support. According to the MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam] CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Support], *Guide for Province and District Advisors* (Saigon: US Army, 1 February 1968), this was seen as an important first step in "nation-building," that is, the creation of a modern central government.

The debates between Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Secretary of State George Schultz were essentially an argument over the use of military force to secure the national objectives of the United States. Weinberger's position is the Never-Again school. The work of both Harry G. Summers⁸ and Weinberger was designed to keep the United States out of ill-defined, limited wars. Weinberger's doctrine is made of six tests: 1) use force when vital interests are at stake; 2) use sufficient numbers to win; 3) have clearly defined political and military objectives; 4) insure domestic support; 5) use force as a last resort; and, 6) continually reassess objectives and means. On the other hand, Schultz represents the limited, or small war, school. Although, this school is opposed to the Weinberger-Summers thesis, it does not call for ill-defined, limited wars, but argues that the US military can be used to further the national interests. This doctrine also has six tests: 1) interests may be "important;" 2) lesser challenges need to be tackled; 3) adapt the force to meet the circumstance; 4) the United States cannot tie policy to public opinion; 5) use force as a last resort; and 6) continually reassess objectives and means.

The current administration is influenced by the Weinberger Doctrine. In Presidential Decision Directive 25, President Clinton established guidelines determining when US military force would be used. The new doctrine is variation on Weinberger's.

⁸ Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). Summers describes the war as one of North Vietnamese aggression and determines that the application of overwhelming US force was the solution. Andrew F. Krepenivich, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), on the other hand, describes the war as basically one of insurgency where the optimal application of force was to use US Special Forces in a counterinsurgency role to assist the South Vietnamese government. Summers is a proponent of big war, Krepenivich one of small war.

modifier.⁹ National Security Advisor Anthony Lake (White House, 1994:1-2) explains that, "some of these internal conflicts challenge our interests, and some of them do not." He further declares that "we cannot often solve other people's problems; we can never build their nations for them." His statement assumes that even before the first plans are drawn up politicians have already determined the nation's priorities. There are three problems with this assumption. First, there is a nagging definitional imprecision. Second, there is a presumption among both policy makers and soldiers alike that the use of force is an end in itself. Lastly, nation-building, from the point of view of military occupation, does not necessarily entail long-term military involvement.¹⁰

How does the United States get involved in intrastate conflicts? One plausible explanation, as the last four years have shown, is that the news media shows the American public foreign humanitarian disasters, and the public becomes outraged, thus creating a political exigence. The President then orders the military to deploy. Working within the framework of current doctrine, the military diligently buries the dead and distributes the bread. Casualties may be incurred, which causes a build-up of security forces. The humanitarian disaster may be further reaching than at first thought and the troops become

⁹ See *A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement* (The White House: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), for a detailed discussion on the promotion of democracy and development abroad. The Clinton administration's stand on the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad brings into question when American forces should intervene. The American people generally require a clear statement of national interest before they will support a prolonged and costly intervention. Americans must believe themselves to be directly threatened before they will act. Human rights, democracy and capitalism may be trampled anywhere in the world, but lacking a rationale for action spelled out in national security terms, Americans are reluctant to engage in anything beyond short-term humanitarian operations.

¹⁰ What is nation-building? As used in this paper the term means the employment of US military or US government personnel to repair, restore or build the physical infrastructure, or any of the basic facilities required of a functioning government.

involved in a welfare program with no end in sight. Several months later the public wonders why the military is "over there" and, spurred on by the media, asks, "When are they coming home?" Success is declared if the force has been effective in any way, and the troops return to their barracks. Regardless of the explanation for the intervention, the ideas of a lack of focus and of action rather than planning come to mind. With the National Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, the ultimate reason for interventions seems clear: to promote self-sufficient democracies.

The literature on transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy proves useful in this exercise. As professed in the national strategy, building an environment conducive to more self-sufficient democracies is the long-term goal. Alfred Stepan (1986:65) describes eight possible paths leading to the termination of authoritarian regimes and the process of democratization. These eight paths are dispersed over three categories: 1) internal restoration after external conquest; 2) internal reformation; and, 3) externally monitored installation. Since we are examining interventions, the third category is the one we focus on.¹¹ With the end of the Cold War, the United States and its coalition partners once again

¹¹Externally monitored installation includes cases in which democratic powers defeat an authoritarian regime or intervene at the trailing edge of a collapsing authoritarian regime. Here, the intervening power plays a major role in the formulation and installation of a democratic regime. Some analysts assert that the Allied occupation of the Axis powers in 1945, in today's jargon, would be a peace support operation (PSO). Stepan (1986:71) explains that the major political weakness of this path seems to be foreign imposition. Several circumstances mediate this weakness. The first evolves from the actions of the previous regime. "If the authoritarian regime has been severely discredited," Stepan (1986:71) explains, "nationalistic reaction against foreign imposition might be dampened." The second mediating circumstance also revolves around legitimacy. John T. Fishel (1988:37) says legitimacy is the public perception of the moral rightness of the regime. Fishel suggests there are four measures of legitimacy. They are: 1) the degree of popular support for the government; 2) the perception of corruption (civil and military) within the government; 3) the perception of the government's ability to govern; and, 4) the existence of alternatives to political violence. Fishel's frame of reference for these measures is the small war in El Salvador.

have the influence to guarantee the installation of democratic regimes. The military is the instrument which can: 1) provide the organizational capabilities to facilitate democratic enlargement and, 2) serve as a guarantor of democracy.

Traditionally, there multiple titles have been given to forces that intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries: peacekeepers, peacemakers and observers. These terms are often used interchangeably, causing confusion. I will shortly offer a more structured definition of peace support operations (PSOs). Involved with every PSO is the exit strategy. In this paper, I call this the transition to civilian control. From the standpoint of understanding civil-military operations (CMO) planning and their necessary connection to PSOs, the key question of this thesis is: "Is the current US civil-military operations planning framework capable of adequately supporting the PSO in which we are engaged?" The centerpiece of this paper is the testing of two competing methods of CMO planning. They are current doctrine, as outlined in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs*, and a transition approach, which I am developing. The frameworks of the competing theories are presented in the following chapters.¹²

¹² Regardless of the planning framework from which planners depart, the volume, pace or "optempo" of PSO commitments will ultimately affect the outcomes of such operations. This is not to say that engaging in multiple PSOs will lead to failure. Rather, priorities must be set. Recognizing this, the National Security Council has devised a criteria for intervention, Presidential Decision Directive 25, which asks essential questions concerning the situation's importance to the United States. For more information see *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: National Security Council, May 1994). This thesis, as is described in the statement of scope is not concerned with whether the United States should or should not engage in PSOs. It is concerned with how to plan for them.

B. METHODOLOGY

1. Abstract

The main assumption of this thesis is that if CMO planners approach the planning for PSO in terms of transition to civilian control, then their plans will adequately support the CINC. In order to prove it, I: 1) explain current doctrine and infer an hypothesis for each of its five mission activities; 2) develop an alternate theory and derive an hypothesis for each of its six mission activities; 3) employ the hypotheses to "structure" the case studies; and, 4) use "focused" comparisons to show the relative explanatory power of each of the theories. Powerful tests of the perspectives are first, to pit them against one another and second, to subject them to tough cases. Hopefully, the comparative case studies will provide four things. First, they will provide a deeper understanding of the individual situations of the countries examined; Second, the studies will seek to identify patterns and trends across the cases. Third, the cases will provide a vehicle to test the relative explanatory power of the competing theories. Lastly, the trends which develop through comparative analysis will identify future policy implications. This said, the following sections state the aim, scope, definitions, design and execution of this qualitative study.

2. Aim of the Report

The objective of this paper is theory building. Science has two objectives -- understanding and prediction. I am primarily concerned with understanding. Eugene Meehan (1968) considers the pervasive purpose of all social science to be "control," and the desire for social control necessitates explanation. Explanation aids in understanding,

which has the objective of allowing us to acquire knowledge about the relationships between the variables in a system. With understanding as the objective, we focus on two areas of concern: first, the current CMO planning doctrine and how it operates, and second, CMO planning from the transition outlook.

3. Scope

This thesis is concerned with the adequacy of US Civil Affairs planning tools. Although, it does not establish criteria for PSO engagements, and only makes a vague prediction on their frequency, the thesis addresses the lessons learned from past experiences which have implications on future civil-military operations planning for PSOs. Within this context, I look at the tools which are available for CMO planners and attempt to provide the variables favoring adequate planning. If the recent past is an indication of future requirements, then appropriate CMO planning will contribute to the success of PSOs.

4. Definitions

Definitions and terminology can compound the problems associated with discussions concerning the use of American troops. These definitions establish the meaning for words, titles and phrases used throughout the paper.

a. Peace Support Operations (PSO)

The NATO terms defined below are a convenient method of differentiating among the ways the United States can approach PSOs. Allied Command Europe (ACE) Directive No. 80-62 (1995) defines Peace Support Operations (PSO) with individual

definitions of the six distinct NATO Peace Support Operations and their missions. (See Figure 1-1.)

CONFLICT PREVENTION	PEACEMAKING
PEACEKEEPING	PEACE ENFORCEMENT
PEACE-BUILDING	HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Figure 1-1 NATO Peace Support Operations

The definitions of the two PSOs applying to the case studies of this paper are:

- Peace Enforcement. "Action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed." (ACE, 1995:3-6)
- Humanitarian Operations. "Missions conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate service support to the population. Humanitarian aid missions may be conducted in the context of a peace support operation, or as an independent task." (ACE, 1995:3-8)

Additionally, several PSOs can be conducted concurrently. For example, humanitarian operations may be conducted as a component of any other PSO. Moreover, any of the six may transition from one form of PSO to another. Definitions for all the PSOs are available at Appendix A. Additional discussion of the two PSOs which relate to the case studies analyzed in this thesis appears in later chapters.

b. Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

Definitions of Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations are often used imprecisely. For example, the term CMO is popularly used in referring to all civil affairs activities. Moreover, the term is used by conventional warfighters to describe almost anything not involved with the strike plan. I suggest the term civil-military operations

(CMO) be used to refer to all civil affairs activities. The confusion does not end with popular idiom. Official Army doctrine for CA Operations, FM 41-10 (1993), employs several descriptions of CMO which vary in usage and scope. This is discussed in the following chapter. My definition is consistent with official joint doctrine which does not differentiate between CMO and CA missions. CMO is a:

Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and population which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups (Joint Pub 3-57: GL 3-4).

c. Failed State

According to Joseph Tainter (1988:19), the failed state is one exhibiting the total breakdown of authority and control.¹³ "Small, petty states emerge in the formerly unified territory, of which the previous capital may be one." Quite often these petty states contend for domination, so that a period of perpetual conflict ensues. The center no longer has prestige, power, or political clout. The collapse of authority means that no revenues come to the center and external threats cannot be met.

The following conditions characterize failed states.

- There is generalized lawlessness and no legal protection for the citizens.
- Populations remaining in the cities fail to maintain them. Additionally, there are no efforts at new construction.
- Subsistence and material needs come to be met largely on the basis of local self-sufficiency.
- Technologies revert to simpler forms which can be maintained at local level.

¹³For information on how failed states are "the problem" for a strategy of "democratization" see Robert H. Dorff's "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability," *Parameters* (Summer 1996).

d. The Conflict Spectrum.

Theorists of political and military science generally agree that there are three broad categories of warfare: low intensity conflict, limited war and total war. Joint Pub 1-02 (1995:GL5) defines low intensity conflict as "Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among states." Low intensity conflict (LIC) is small war. At the other end of the spectrum is big war, or High-intensity conflict. Between the two is Mid-intensity conflict. The difference between the two can be reduced to the following: big war employs the rhetoric of power and small war employs the tools of increased awareness and understanding to implement change with the limited use of force. For a continuation of the discussion of the conflict spectrum, see Appendix B.

e. Success, Effectiveness and Failure

The term success is used in this paper to mean the achievement of something attempted; the attainment of the objective according to one's desire. Success in PSOs is defined by the strategic determination of the end state. But the integration and determination of the termination of operations, exit strategies and end states during interventions are not well communicated from the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Staff to the operational commanders.¹⁴ Simply said, the managers or manipulators of violence, as well as the public, need to know how the war should end.

¹⁴ For a discussion of this problem see Lt. Col. Robert R. Soucy, II, USAF, et al, *War Termination Criteria and JOPES* [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System]: *A Dangerous Omission in US Crisis Action Planning* (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, 1994). The authors recognize a gap in current planning and recommend a six phase process be added to the JOPES crisis action planning system. Their recommendations are designed to ensure that termination criteria are considered throughout the crisis planning process.

When the end state is not continually reassessed, success becomes more fuzzy, allowing definitions of success to be made so limited as to mean whatever their authors want them to mean. The definition of success used in this paper is based on the short-term use of the military to occupy the country, initiate economic and public opinion programs with long-term follow-on programs by other agencies. Success is defined as the consolidation of democracy and economic self-sufficiency. This introduces two other terms: effectiveness and failure.

Effectiveness means to accomplish, to bring about, or cause something to happen. The synonyms influential, functional and operational may be used. Success and effectiveness are not synonymous. Many people falsely assume that when one is effectual one will succeed. In other words, when an endeavor is planned from the beginning to achieve the effect aimed at, it will succeed. This is not always the case -- especially when the end state is not adequately communicated. One might be successful without being effective. Conversely, one can be effective without being successful. The case studies will demonstrate this distinction. This introduces the curious condition where an operation may be effective and still fail. Failure is the opposite of success; the desired outcome is not accomplished. Further definitions of concepts and vocabulary are made as needed throughout the paper.

5. Research Design

Each of the cases is composed of six sections: 1) introduction; 2) methodology; 3) the situation overview; 4) an examination of how current doctrine was employed; 5) an exercise in speculation which allows us to translate the transition perspective into practice;

and, 6) a summary and conclusions. The following discussion addresses the question: if it is hazardous to draw lessons from a small sample of case studies, then how can historical experience serve in dealing with contemporary situations?

According to Alexander George (1979:43) the answer lies stating lessons in a systematic and differentiated method which captures the lessons of history in comprehensive theory. The contributions of both historians and political scientists are needed in the development of policy-relevant theory. The methodological framework for this paper is the comparative method. I systematically compare two case studies to confirm/infirm theories. For a discussion on the comparative method see Appendix C.

As explained earlier, the centerpiece of this paper is the comparison of two competing theories. A theory can be tested by logically deducing from it a series of empirical statements. If it turns out the statements are true, then the theory appears credible. The more times one can accomplish this, the more credible a given theory becomes. The hypotheses introduced in the following chapter are empirical statements of this kind. To the extent that an hypothesis is confirmed or denied by the cases examined, the theory from which it is deduced gains or loses credibility. I infer hypotheses from current doctrine and deduce them from my transition perspective, testing these hypotheses in a structured, focused comparison. Speculative thinking is needed to transpose the transition perspective from the theoretical to the practical level in order to provide specific information to help planners. The intent of this theoretical framework is to provide tough tests. The goal of this study is to compare the explanatory powers of the competing perspectives.

I employ the elements of George's (1979:54-55) model for developing a "structured, focused comparison." This method is a composite approach utilizing the historian's in-depth case studies and the political scientist's strategy of controlled comparison for theory development. The approach is "focused" because it deals selectively with only aspects of the historical case and "structured" because it uses a standardized set of hypotheses and questions to assure the collection of comparable data. The approach is comprised of four tasks: 1) specification of the research problem and research objectives of the study, 2) specification of the variables to be used during the controlled comparison, 3) selection of appropriate cases for comparison; and, 4) consideration of how to measure variance of the variable.

a. The Research Problem

As stated previously, this paper is concerned with conflict within countries rather than between them. This paper's centerpiece is a test of two competing methods of CMO planning -- current doctrine as outlined in FM 41-10 and Joint Pub 3-57, and a transition approach. I propose that the conditions favoring the transition to civilian control are: 1) the supported country's society and its history of democracy; 2) public opinion; 3) negotiations on the rules for transition; 4) democratic elections; 5) economic capabilities; and, 6) legitimate government structures. An in depth discussion of these variables is in Chapter III. A considerable body of existing literature implies that proper application of rules of engagement (ROE), command and control, logistics or impartiality will ultimately lead to success in the PSO arena. Although few of these authors would discount the utility of a combined perspective, they generally do not consider CMO as key

to the success of PSOs. I choose to identify critical variables both within and outside the current civil-military operations planning framework to help explain the cases where ROE, command and control, logistics and impartiality have failed or have been characterized as such.

b. Specification of Variables

In the spirit of Harry Eckstein's (1975:79-138) "critical case study," I employ the case study in all stages of theory building -- from hypotheses formation through hypotheses testing. For each of the missions activities explained in current doctrine and for the transition approach, an hypothesis has been proposed. As George (1979:50) explains, these hypotheses serve as general variables which both describe and explain the phenomena under observation.

c. Case Selection

Clausewitz (1984:173) explains that once one accepts the difficulties in using historical examples, one will come to the most obvious conclusion that examples should be drawn from modern military history. This said, I analyze the CMO planning for PSO in two failed states: Somalia and Haiti. I chose these operations for four primary reasons: 1) these cases are modern military history which provide examples at the most probable end of the conflict spectrum, 2) these cases are complete, or sufficiently mature for conclusions to be drawn from them; 3) information for the cases is available; and, 4) the cases are instances of the same class or universe. Nonetheless, the processes described in the case studies will never be repeated according to the same script, largely because the

participants in future PSOs, rightly or wrongly, are liable to take into account what they think are the lessons of the past.

Central to the investigation is the condition of “failed” states and intervention by the United States. I begin with the older, and in many ways, the watershed case, Somalia. The US intervention in Somalia represents a humanitarian operations PSO undertaken during low intensity conflict. The second case is the US-led UN peace enforcement PSO in Haiti, also categorized as taking place in a low intensity conflict scenario. Of course, the selected cases are not the universe of cases which could have been included in this study. An argument could be made that the US interventions in Panama and Bosnia should be added. Unfortunately, the choice is one of resources. There is simply not enough time for the systematic study of all cases.

d. Measurement of Variables

The following section discusses two concerns on measurement: 1) the characteristics of generalization; and, 2) the coding scheme. First, the cases chosen offer a hard test to both current doctrine and the transition perspective. On the other hand, the cases chosen should favor current CMO doctrine since doctrine has proved flexible enough to allow some operational innovations in both cases. In this way, the harder test is applied to the transition perspective. Additionally, a variable on Civil Administration has been added to the CMO variables with the intent of balancing the number of variables which are measured for each perspective. Imperfect evidence and quirks of history make these tests less than decisive. However, I argue that the generalizations derived from the tests are valid. The generalizations, however, are not precise. Precision would require the

use of experimental or statistical methods. Recognizing that these methods are not appropriate for this application, the following section discusses the type of generalization derivable from this study.

George (1994:7) explains that empirical theory which explains conditional generalizations is more utilitarian than deterministic or probabilistic generalizations. Deterministic relationships rest on the simple logic: whenever A is present, B will occur. Or, A is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of B. The stronger form of a deterministic relationship holds that while A is not a sufficient condition for B, it is nonetheless a necessary condition -- that is, B will not occur in the absence of A. George (1994:8) says that in many situations, A is neither sufficient nor necessary. There exists only a probabilistic relationship between the independent and the dependent (outcome) variable. He characterizes the relationship with this equation: "A *favors* the occurrence of B." The presence or absence of the individual mission activities *favors* the CINC's chances of success. Now we turn to the coding scheme.

For the case studies a value was assigned to each hypothesis based on whether the case confirmed the hypothesis (value = Yes), or refuted the hypothesis (value = No). The basis for this scale is simple. A theory gains credibility when its hypotheses are able to predict or explain an outcome. Therefore, this coding scheme stresses positive responses. Confirmation of a hypothesis raises the score of a perspective. The greater number of positive responses, the better. Conversely, refutation of an hypothesis indicates that a perspective is unable to explain or predict an outcome. When all the variables for each case are assessed, the values assigned are summed.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The US interventions in Somalia and Haiti are not the abject failures the media and opposition politicians have often painted. They do, however, offer object lessons for peacekeepers of the future. Debates in news magazines, political science journals and academic literature explain the reasons of the perceived failures of the PSOs in which the United States has most recently been involved. The literature offers four principal explanations, all of which assume inadequacies in military planning. The first argues that the decisive factor is the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). In 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin denied requests for armor in Somalia. The media pointed out that this denial and the lack of AC-130 gunships was restrictive to the military and was responsible for the deaths of 18 soldiers in a raid to capture clan leader Mohamed Farah Aideed (Gordon and Cushman, 1993:A1 and DeLong and Tuckey, 1994).

The second explanation focuses on the effects of command and control. Harold Bullock (1995) argues that dual lines of control, structural problems and the lack of direct US military leadership caused the failure in Somalia. The third explanation keys on the logistic abilities of the United States military. Camille Nichols (1995) reinforces this position by arguing that what the military cannot handle can be contracted out. The fourth explanation stresses the inability of military and civilian agencies to function in concert. Key points in this argument are, first, the lack of priorities for support -- all Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) must be treated equally; and second, the fallacy of impartiality. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (1996:70-86) explain that no large intervention can remain neutral in a strife-torn, failed state. "In the future," the

authors say, "the United States, the United Nations and other intervenors should be able to declare a state 'bankrupt' and go in to restore civic order and foster reconciliation."

However compelling these various explanations may be, the utility of these perspectives emerges in their differing emphases. They do not represent mutually exclusive categories, as dimensions of all four perspectives can be incorporated into synthesized versions. The principal implication of these arguments is that American military power is capable of successfully performing PSOs if we learn the right lessons from the experiences. Moreover, none of the explanations, by itself, is consistent with the facts. First, the argument that restrictive ROE cause failure is questioned by retired Army colonel, Korean War veteran and syndicated columnist David Hackworth (1993:43) who says about the ROE in Somalia: the "rules of engagement were sledgehammer simple and as loose as I have ever seen: fire if threatened." The most common complaint among the military was that the mission changed. The US government was concerned with getting out of Somalia quickly. And this effectively dumped the long-term process of reordering Somali society on the UN.

The second argument about command and control is only partially correct. It is concerned with the US command of US troops and the efficiency of UN peace support operations. Lt. Gen. Wesley Clarke, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, explained that American involvement with foreign commanders is nothing new. "In World War I, World War II, throughout our experience with NATO, in Operation Desert Storm, we've always had the ability to task organize and place some US units under foreign operational control (White House, 1994:4)." To address the other portion of the

concern, presidential urging for the reduction of UN bureaucracy indicates that there are still problem areas. In response, the UN has established yet another bureau, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This department, however, has addressed inadequacies in UN methods of operations, such as lack of 24-hour responsiveness and convoluted requesting processes.

The third argument basically touts US strategic mobility and material wealth and suggests the oversimplification that we can solve the world's problems by airlifting food to trouble spots. Furthermore, should the military not be able to accomplish the mission, the US government can "hire the mission out" to a US contractor. The fourth argument is closely tied to the second. One of the functions of command and control is establishing priorities of effort, to include priorities of support. Setting priorities means exercising partiality. The UN and the United States effectively sided with the warlords in Somalia when they failed to disarm them. The illusion of neutrality and impartiality in Somalia was broken when Aideed's forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistanis on 5 June 1993.

All of the preceding explanations have validity, but none by itself is the lesson learned which will guarantee success in future PSO. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch (1991) explain that the failure to integrate readily accessible lessons from recent history is one of the causes of military misfortunes. With this in mind, I argue that another explanation should be considered. Civil-military operations are the component of PSOs which will ultimately allow the intervenor to achieve its goals -- for the assisted state to provide for itself. First, the planner must remember what Lake said, "we can never build their nations for them," but as the lessons of World War II have shown, we can teach

them. FM 100-20 *Low Intensity Conflict* explains that "the CA effort is the linchpin of the military role in national development." And, as the cases will show, CMO, an essential component for repairing failed states, was often overlooked. In this thesis I propose that CMO planning for peace support operations should be founded on the lessons the US military has already learned.

Despite the apparent new outlook of the strategic landscape, the US military has a rich tradition of dealing with the "emerging" challenges of ethnic conflict, failed states, humanitarian assistance and other peaceful uses of the military. The first skill available for use is experience. The second is the ability of US forces to adopt to changing situations. My proposal on how US forces can adopt to the changing world situation is described in Chapter III.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is composed of six chapters with appendices. This chapter introduced the perceived problem of less than adequate civil-military operations planning for the PSOs in Somalia and Haiti. It described the centerpiece of the study, a comparison of two theories of CMO planning, and described the structured, focused comparisons which are used to determine which planning method has greater utility. The second chapter will discuss the first of two competing theories, current doctrine. The third chapter describes the transition perspective. The fourth chapter is the first of two comparisons, which attempt to indicate the theory exhibiting the greater utility. The first case is Somalia. Chapter V investigates Haiti. Chapter VI states conclusions and offers recommendations.

II. CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

Before anything else, getting ready is the secret to success. -- Henry Ford

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I lay out current CMO doctrine and infer hypotheses for each of the five mission activities. From the beginning, current doctrine can be seen to have the advantages of: 1) years of experience, 2) a proven record, 3) a position of familiarity among commanders and, 4) the fact that it is the *approved* solution. The social terrain approach, on the other hand, is a newcomer which challenges the status quo. According to Webster, doctrine is theory based on carefully worked out principles. The principles of Civil Affairs doctrine have been worked out through its history.

B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

Throughout its history, the US Army has been involved in a large amount of what may be termed civil affairs and civic action. US forces have provided civil affairs assistance to the people of many countries. In the occupied areas of World War II, civil affairs soldiers provided services which comprised the two missions of the civil affairs, civil administration and civil-military operations. The case studies demonstrate that US forces actually performed nation assistance tasks rather than simply teaching them and that during civil administration missions, the civil affairs soldiers were teachers. In the early parts of the country's history, the Army performed tasks other organizations were incapable of accomplishing.

To begin with, the Army built roads for the fledgling country. The US military employed civil affairs techniques in the Revolutionary War, the Mexican War and the Civil War to prevent civilian problems from becoming military problems. The lesson learned in this period were recently echoed by chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Gen. John Shalikashvili: "We always think of military forces as going to war, and, that's our primary mission. Military forces can do a great deal of good because they bring with them an organization and structure that no civilian organization can match" (Samak, 1994:4-6).

In the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the US military was involved in Caribbean and Mexican interventions. According to Stan Sandler (1996), an Army Special Operations Command historian, the most important case of the period was the American intervention in Cuba. This is a story of progressivism and dynamic leadership.¹⁵ General Leonard Wood established a government run by disinterested experts. The lesson learned was: if the US military accomplished projects by itself for the good of the people of a foreign land, then that country's elites would resent its presence. The long-term effect of these experiences is the legacy of progressivism. American politicians believe in the "regulatory" power of the US government both at home and abroad. A progressive approach to intervening in the affairs of other states is: the United States is doing what it is doing for the good of the subject country.

¹⁵ According to Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), the best-known progressive was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt's "progressivism, [was] a mixture of nationalism, moralism, racism, social Darwinism, uplift and social planning." Progressivism is still alive in American politics. Like Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, many American politicians believe in the power of the US government to regulate both at home and abroad. As nationalists, they consider the United States superior to its rivals.

World War I brought the first occupation of a friendly nation. The citizens of Luxembourg welcomed the American military government since their own government was unable to provide basic public services. Sandler explains that both the occupations of Luxembourg and of the former-enemy Rhineland were considered successful operations. In the Rhineland the "dynamic personality" of Gen. Henry Allen, a former governor of the Philippines, was largely responsible for the operation's success. Relations between the Germans and Americans were considered "cordial." Problems came from the French, who wanted to annex the Rhineland. Lessons learned were: 1) leaders with civil affairs experience facilitate operations; and, 2) the parties of coalition warfare may not have the same objectives in peace operations.

The Civil Affairs activities most remembered during and after World War II are the military governments. There are two perspectives on the American experience. Harry L. Coles and Albert Weinberg (1964) consider the Civil Affairs Division to have an outstanding record largely because of planning. The largest problem encountered by CA during the period of military government of the Axis Powers was rebuilding destroyed infrastructures. Sandler (1996), on the other hand, explains the largest problem was manning. The occupation was performed by regular line troops who were not trained in civil affairs. "Although organization was good, there was corruption, looting and living high on the hog, generally attributed to the collapse of the German economy." The currency reform of 1948 ended the "poor house conditions." The occupation of Japan was similar to that of Germany but to compound problems, in Japan the occupation suffered from poor organization. Economic improvement occurred with the Korean War

and the urgent need for contracts to support the repair of vehicles and ships, to provide food for troops and refugees, and for other goods and services. The lesson learned for both experiences are the same: 1) dedicated CA troops are required for occupation and, 2) good leadership matters.

The experience in Korea (1945-50) was not so outstanding. Sandler categorizes the experience in Korea as “probably the least favorable example of CA operations (1996).” Here, for the first time in post-World War II history, the US forces intervened in a subsistence agrarian economy. The idea that Third World countries should become more like Western industrial societies became a critical issue. It was tempting to replace Korean traditional practices with “modern” ones in wholesale fashion, rather than building on or incorporating the indigenous knowledge in helping to bring about change. “A people may get by with inadequate solutions to their problems even judging by their own standards” (Hatch, 1988:357-361). For example, if the people are genuinely interested in ensuring the productivity of their fields, they will adopt techniques of crop rotation and fertilization and determine that these are more effective than traditional methods. Additionally, the leadership under Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge was inept. According to William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews (1961:397), Hodge chose a dozen officers from his previous command -- none with civil affairs training and all lacking knowledge about Korea -- and planned the Korean military government. Korea was seen as of secondary importance in a “Europe first policy.” Ultimately, the United States failed to improve the country economically, causing support for the communists. Despite this rather negative review, the US forces managed to repatriate the Japanese. The lessons

learned were: 1) that it may be preferable to define development differently for each society according to the interests of the people and the nature of their economic and ecological conditions; 2) good leadership is indispensable; and, 3) diffusing authority for civil affairs is neither efficient nor effective. (Daugherty, 1961:418)

According to Francis Kelly (1991:41), the CA experience in Vietnam began in June 1963, as two-man CA/PSYOP teams¹⁶ augmented Special Forces B detachments in planning such civic action projects as constructing roads, schools and drainage systems. Beginning in 1967, CA teams from the 41st CA Company worked with and through Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS), which determined what projects needed to be accomplished. Sandler explains that there was a tendency to impose a high-tech solution to problems where low-tech ones would suffice. Additionally, CA programs were scattered rather than concentrated. He says they were "hit and miss," as was much of the war. Lessons learned were: 1) a reenforcement of the value of defining development according to the interests of the people and the nature of their economic and ecological conditions; and, 2) a reminder that concentration of effort is required.

The Dominican Republic Intervention in 1965-66 was largely perceived as a success. During Operation Power Pack, daily coordination between humanitarian relief organization (HRO) and the military was accomplished by civil affairs teams from the 42d CA Company. These teams worked with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and CARE to open elementary schools and with private

¹⁶ Considering the current distribution plan and relatively few qualified CA and PSYOP officers, these two-man teams, composed of Civil Affairs/PSYOP Officers (CAPOs), may have economy of force implications for the downsizing Army.

organizations and USAID to coordinate food distribution points. According to Lawrence Yates (1988:38) the primary lesson was to turn over operations to "normal welfare agencies" as soon as possible. As with the experience with Cuba, Sandler says that another consideration was the resentment of the country's elites.

More recent CA actions include Grenada, where, according to 96th CA Battalion Lessons Learned (1986:7), the most important lesson was that "CA planning must start *prior* to deployment and be continuous (emphasis in the original)." In Panama, much of the CA work upgraded the infrastructure. CA forces professionalized the police, established a displaced persons camp and set up a new government. In Kuwait, CA forces conducted host nation support, worked to restore the economy and the devastated infrastructure. The lesson learned, drawing from the lessons learned in Grenada, was: planning and involvement from early in the operation facilitated CA efforts.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

A discussion of CMO must begin with an overview of theory and strategy. According to John T. Fishel (1988:37) interventions are actions for moral legitimacy, or "the popular perception of relative moral rightness of the competing forces."¹⁷ The US strategy has evolved over the past fifteen years from a singular emphasis on human rights to the "four Ds" -- democracy, development, defense and dialogue. Current strategy calls for morally legitimate, democratic governments. Fishel (1988:38) explains that the methods available to achieve the morally legitimate objectives of the Host Nation (HN)

¹⁷ For more information on the moral perspective of US foreign policy see Schulzinger's, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*.

and the Intervening Power (IP) are found primarily in the area of CMO: In this section I describe the five mission activities of CMO. They are: 1) Population and Resource Control, 2) Foreign Nation Support, 3) Humanitarian Assistance, 4) Military Civic Action and, 5) Civil Defense. I begin each description with an hypothesis I have inferred, which is used to test the explanatory power of the theory through the case studies. Table 2-1 lays out the mission activities of CMO and the hypotheses derived from them.

CMO Mission Activities	Hypotheses
Humanitarian Assistance	If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his goals are increased.
Population and Resource Control (PRC)	If the US military is able to control displaced civilians (DCs) and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of obtain his/her objectives.
Foreign Nation Support	If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's Combat Service Support (CSS) shortfalls by using host country service and supply, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance of success.
Military Civic Action	If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host nation will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.
Civil Defense	If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance of attaining his/her goals.
Civil Administration	If civil administration is employed to support the host government by the US military, the legitimacy of the government will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased.

Table 2-1 CMO Mission Hypotheses

It is useful to begin with a terminological concern. As stated previously, my definition of CMO is consistent with the Joint Publication definition. However, official Army doctrine for CA Operations, FM 41-10 (1993), employs several descriptions of CMO which basically vary in usage and scope. Among them are:

- “Commanders use CMO to influence, control, or develop civilian activities and civil organizations. CMO provide CSS [Combat Service Support] extending from liaison with appropriate local civilian agencies to assistance and support to local officials and the civilian populace.” (1993:3-1)
- “CMO normally support military forces but may be directed by the DOD because of emergency situations or unique capabilities of the military. In all situations, a positive, progressive CMO plan is the best action to achieve military objectives. CMO are conducted to: 1) Enhance military effectiveness; 2) Support national objectives; and, 3) Reduce the negative aspects of military operations on civilians (1993:10-1).”
- CMO are, “The complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.” (1993:GL-5)

Moreover, many planners, including those involved with one of the case studies of this paper, consider almost everything not directly involved with the strike plan as CMO. First, civil-military operations is only one of the two Civil Affairs missions. The other is civil administration. Much confusion about the appropriate role of CMO can be traced to its lack of definitional clarity. Consistent with Joint Pub 3-57 (1995:II-14), the definition of CMO used in this paper implies inclusion of both CA and psychological operations (PSYOP). The concept in this definition which takes precedence is the notion of *a planned group of activities*. With this in mind, the three core objectives of CMO are to 1) enhance military effectiveness, 2) support national objectives and, 3) reduce the negative aspects of military operations on civilians. Of course, the commander must observe all international obligations, to include the laws of war while in pursuit of the above stated

objectives. A description of the five mission activities which compose current CMO doctrine and hypotheses or empirical statements on each one follow:

a. Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

Hypothesis 1. If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his goals are increased.

The nation's highest decision makers, as well as a broad segment of American citizens, have determined that assisting populations affected by disasters, both natural and manmade, is important for two reasons: 1) because Americans have the *moral* obligation to assist when required and, 2) because HA is required for the maintenance of the world's peace and security. Consequently, humanitarian assistance missions are to be an essential capability of US forces for the twenty-first century. (National, 1993:14) Humanitarian Assistance (HA) is a group of programs which authorize the use of DOD resources to conduct military acts and operations of a humanitarian nature. HA includes Humanitarian/Civic Action (H/CA), foreign disaster relief, NEO and support to foreign displaced civilians. According to FM 41-10 (1993:3-2), H/CA must promote the security interests of both the United States and the foreign country involved.

The US military is involved in numerous HA programs around the world. Currently, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Sarah Sewall, oversees five humanitarian programs. See Appendix D, Humanitarian Programs, for a table.

b. Population and Resource Control (PRC)

Hypothesis 2. If the US military is able to control displaced civilians (DCs) and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives.

CA personnel assist in the planning and conduct of PRC programs employed during most military operations. According to Col. Bryan Golden (1996), "People are a dimension of the battlefield." The authors of FM 41-10 consider displaced civilian (DC) operations as the most basic collective task performed by CA. Simply said, the goal is to minimize civilian interference in military operations. These programs consist of curfews, movement restrictions, resettlement of DC, licensing, rationing and inspection of facilities. PRC operations provide security for the populace, deny personnel and material to the enemy, mobilize the populace and material resources, detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. (Joint Pub 3-57, 1995:II-11) DC and Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) are specialized PRC. (FM 41-10:10-6)

c. Foreign Nation Support (FNS)

Hypothesis 3. If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's Combat Service Support (CSS) shortfalls by using host country service and supply, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance of success.

According to FM 41-10 (1993:10-2), the preferred means for closing the gap in CSS requirements is to secure goods and services locally. The term FNS includes both Host Nation Support (HNS) and third nation support. Depending upon the support available, CA personnel identify resources and assist other staff agencies in procurement. There are two types of support: 1) preplanned and, 2) ad hoc. Preplanned HNS is negotiated during peace and culminates in a formal, signed document. Ad hoc requests

are anything outside the signed document. FNS is generally considered to be a short-term fix to a supply problem which will be corrected when the logistics tail catches up. FM 41-10 (1993:10-3) identifies three requirements for FNS. They are: 1) logistics planners to identify projected shortfalls, 2) CA planners to determine available goods and services within the theater and, 3) negotiations for such support.

d. Military Civic Action (MCA)

Hypothesis 4. If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host nation will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.

MCA projects are designed to produce popular support for the host government's programs. According to FM 41-10 (1993:3-2) MCA projects are undertaken to promote the legitimacy¹⁸ image and to enhance the effectiveness of the government and/or military. John De Pauw (1990:9) explains that there is a problem with the term MCA, which stems from a lack of definition. The definition for MCA used in this thesis is consistent with FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* and JCS Pub 1:

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportations, communications, health, sanitation, and other contributing to economic and social development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population (JCS Pub 1, 1987: 230).

This definition distinguishes MCA from the larger arena of civic action conducted by USAID. Agency for International Development projects are undertaken by personnel

¹⁸ Although not defined in doctrine, the minimal definition of legitimacy used in this paper is a relative one: a legitimate government or authority is one considered by the host country's population to be the less evil of the potential forms of government or authority. Legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular historical juncture, no other regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals. For more on this perspective see Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

from other agencies of the host nation government, by civilian relief organizations, by contractors and from the populace itself rather than by military or paramilitary forces. There are two general categories of MCA: 1) mitigating, or those projects undertaken because of extenuating circumstances; and, 2) developmental, or those projects specifically designed to expand a country's infrastructure.

e. Civil Defense

Hypothesis 5. If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance for attaining his/her goals.

Civil defense deals with the immediate emergency conditions created by an attack or natural and manmade disasters. Initially, CA personnel determine the status of local civil defense planning and organization in the host country. Then, CA personnel coordinate planning for: 1) government, 2) industry, 3) public utilities, 4) public health and, 5) emergency situations. According to FM 41-10 (1993:10-2), support to civil defense may be conducted as MCA or HA.

f. Civil Administration

Hypothesis 6. If civil administration is employed to support the host government by the US military, the legitimacy of the government will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased.

Finally, we arrive at civil administration. First, Support to Civil Administration is not a CMO mission activity under current doctrine. It is, however, a Civil Affairs mission. Civil administration support is "assistance to stabilize a foreign government." (FM 41-10, 1993:11-1) There are three types of civil administration: 1) civil assistance; 2) civil administration in a friendly territory; and, 3) civil administration in an occupied territory.

In theory, when the US military performs civil administration in a friendly territory, it performs basic government functions and as the situation stabilizes, the functions are turned over to civilian agencies.¹⁹ Now that we have discussed the mission activities of CMO, we will discuss the planning process.

D. THE PLANNING PROCESS

Some 97 percent of the 5,000 authorized positions for CA personnel are in the Army Reserve. As discussed later in this section, the critical planning teams as well as policy and programs are located in Reserve commands. Col. Eric Doerrer (1996:73) explains in a recent article that the CA planners were not involved in the initial planning and execution of at least one of the PSO studied in this paper. Col. Bryan Golden (1996), operations officer for the 351st Civil Affairs Command amplifies, "CA planning is generally an afterthought. Sometimes we don't get involved until after forces are on the ground."

I identify several impediments to adequate CA planning. They are: 1) lack of prior planning, 2) the filling of planner requirements on an available-fill basis, and 3) the format fallacy. To begin with, CA Commands have an area of responsibility in which they support the Unified Combatant commander (UCC) for that region. The CINC of this UCC develops various campaign plans at the direction of the National Command Authority. These plans are outlined in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

¹⁹Willis Hintz, chief of Civil Affairs Doctrine, explains the difference between Civil Administration and Civil-Military Operations with these statements: "Civil Administration means that we are the mayors. In Civil-Military Operations, we are the teachers (Hintz, 1996)." In reality, however, there is quite a bit of overlap. The case studies in this paper illustrate how US forces actually performed nation assistance tasks rather than simply teaching them. And, the Ministerial Assistance Teams (MATs) employed by the 358th CA Brigade in Haiti did not function as the ministers but taught the ministries how to operate.

(JOPES), but since there are no full-time CA officers on the UCC staff, the CA annexes to the campaign plans don't get adequate attention. The CINC may request to the JCS for a CA planner from his region's CA brigade to develop Annex G.

Meanwhile, back at the reserve station, the operations shop receives a tasking for a planning officer for the UCC. Not having a joint-qualified officer, and perhaps, not even a CA-qualified planner, the CA brigade sends, in their estimation, the most qualified officer available for the amount of time he can stay. Once in theater, the officer receives his tasking from the J5 and he finds a copy of Annex G and fills in the blanks as best he can.

John De Pauw (1990:100) explains that the CMO planner should be able to produce a list of success criteria by "culling through all the guidance (NCA, JCS and CINC)." The list he derives is composed of nine tasks: Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Direct Action (DA); Training; Security Forces; Psychological Operations; Intelligence; Synchronization, Coordination; Regional Cooperation; and US Public Opinion/Will. Doubtlessly, force protection is essential to mission success. As Clausewitz (1984:95) says, "Whenever armed forces, that is armed individuals, are used, the idea of combat must be present." However, FID, DA and security forces generally are not CMO tasks. If the resulting plan is in the correct format, it will have few of De Pauw's tasks, but it may be sufficient, nonetheless. To make matters worse, the staff of the UCC who read the plan wouldn't know if it were good or bad since they may have no training or experience with civil-military operations.

Generally speaking, the warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination rather than post-conflict restoration. CINCs see their task as conducting the

strike force operation and getting out. As we will see in the case studies, the CINCs devise great warfighting plans but insufficient post-conflict or other PSO plans. To make matters worse, Lt. Col. Dennis Barlow (Schultz, 1992:39) explains that it is widely known that the Department of the Army does not have a high opinion of its Civil Affairs component, the soldiers most involved with post-conflict and PSO restoration missions.

So, the question arises: is a CA annex the correct format for planning PSOs? To answer this question an understanding of where the civil affairs mission originates is necessary. The civil affairs mission is derived from the objectives of the regional CINC. CA plans are developed and maintained based on policy guidance from the JCS, found in Annex L (Civil Affairs) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

Civil Affairs plans include the following elements as appropriate: 1) CMO, 2) civil administration in an area where the United States will not assume full legislative, judicial and executive authority, and 3) civil administration where full authority is assumed. Planners utilize a five-paragraph operations order format to express the civil affairs plan. The paragraphs are: 1) situation, 2) mission, 3) execution, 4) service support, and 5) command and signal. FM 41-10 (1993:C-6) gives the planner several hints on how to fill in the blanks on the annex. Once here, the manual requires the planner to include "items of information affecting CA support not included in paragraph one of the operations order or which need to be expanded." Additionally, under the enemy and friendly forces subparagraphs, the manual requires the planner to address the enemy threat in rear areas including sabotage and guerrilla activities and to outline higher and adjacent CA plans as well as to note CA resources supporting the unit. The mission paragraph is a "clear,

concise statement of the CA task.” And the execution paragraph includes a brief statement of the CA operation to be carried out, tasks to subordinate units and coordinating instructions. Assistance beyond this is not available. The CA planner requires more tools to assist him or her in adequately supporting the commander.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter introduced the current doctrine for planning CA missions. It provided an historical overview of US Army Civil Affairs, to include the lessons learned in various operations. The chapter explained the five Civil Military Operations mission activities and it provided hypotheses for each of them. The current planning process was explained and possible deficiencies were identified. In themselves, the constraints regarding the planning process pose serious problems. The challenge is to influence how the basic concept of the operation is written. Everything else is just checking the box. Civil Affairs has to break out of the what Lt. Col. James McNaughton has called the “Annex G ghetto.” What I offer through the model presented in the following chapter is a perspective from which both the UCC staff and the planners at the CA Command can engage the problem of transition to civilian control.

III. THE TRANSITION PERSPECTIVE

International law recognizes that, having overthrown the pre-existing government and deprived the people of the protection that government afforded, it becomes not only the right, but the obligation of the invader to give the vanquished people a new government adequate to the protection of their personal and property rights.... It is decidedly to the military advantage of the invader to establish a strong and just government, such as will preserve order and, as far as possible, pacify the inhabitants. -- General Service Schools, 1925.

Before you build a better mouse trap, you better know if there are any more rats out there. -- Anonymous

A. INTRODUCTION

Current doctrine does not consider all the essential elements which are required of CMO in peace support operations. This derives from doctrine's current orientation on big wars and the lack of attention placed on the military's requirements in small wars to: begin preparation for the hand off of control from the outset of an intervention; stabilize the situation; and, extract itself, leaving the consolidation of democracy to other agencies. Current doctrine considers the aftermath of a big war when a military government imposes the will of the victor on the defeated country. I propose that the US military has learned lessons from small wars in which it has been engaged and that some may be appropriate in peace support operations (PSOs): 1) using military force in areas not of vital interest to the United States will occur; 2) military operations cannot be conducted in isolation from political guidance; 3) winning the hearts and minds of the foreign population is essential to effectiveness in small wars; and, 4) understanding the culture of the foreign population contributes to effectiveness in small wars. Because the current framework does not

appear to adequately address PSOs, I have devised an alternative perspective which is tested, along with current doctrine, in two case studies. This perspective suggests dimensions of PSOs that the CMO planner and operator should consider. The chapter follows this outline: first, it offers an analogy which provides another perspective from which CMO planners can approach their planning. Next, it describes the transition perspective and derives hypotheses from established theory to test the value of the perspective.²⁰

According to Samuel Huntington (1991:255), before we can talk about democratization or nation-building, a country's most serious problem -- be it hunger, insurgency or anarchy -- has to be solved. Once the military stabilizes the situation, it must extract itself and transition to civilian control. A list of the conditions favoring the transition to civilian control are: 1) understanding the social terrain; 2) positive public opinion; 3) negotiations on the rules for transition; 4) democratic elections; 5) building economic capabilities; and 6) legitimate government structures. The transition perspective is based in the realist tradition. It calls for a coordination of military power, economic power and power over public opinion.

B. TERRAIN ANALYSIS

A commander's understanding of the physical attributes of the battlefield has long been considered a key to success. "Geography on the ground," Clausewitz (1984:348) says "can affect military operations in three ways: as an obstacle to the approach, as an

²⁰For this paper the term perspective is more appropriate than theory since the combined proposals have not been worked out over an extended test period.

impediment to visibility, and as cover from fire. All other properties can be traced back to these three.” He further explains that the planner should look at the terrain’s salient features from the points of view of both the attacker and the defender. Likewise, the “social terrain” affects CMO planning in three ways: as obstacles to cultural understanding, impediments to coordination, and opportunities for public suasion. The CMO planner should look at the social terrain from the points of view of both the intervenor and the subject country.²¹

Peace support operations are not big wars. The use of overwhelming manpower, firepower and industrial power are not appropriate for this type of figurative terrain. In this thesis I argue that each PSO has a unique social terrain about which the civil-military operations planner must be aware and prepared to utilize in support of the regional commander in chief’s (CINC) overall plan. With this in mind, the social terrain of a country or area is more than just a cultural overview.

Description requires relation to a frame of assumption as to what is to be attempted by whom, when and where. With this in mind, let’s begin to think of the societal information which a CMO planner requires to map the territory. Three statements need to be made from the outset. They are: 1) the map which the planner uses is not the

²¹ From this perspective the term intervention and occupation are synonymous. Consider the arrival of troops in your hometown from a mirror-image perspective. If they stayed for 179 days and were the center of economic, political, social and military activity, would you feel that your town was occupied? Whenever a foreign military force controls an area of a country it has “occupied” that area. Occupation need not be a dirty word. An occupying force may be a peaceful force. By taking possession of an area, however, the intervening force is obligated by law to protect the personal and property rights of those people whose government has been displaced. The quotation at the beginning of this chapter from the General Services Schools indicates an understanding of this principle as applied to big war. I argue that the same thing is basically true for today’s small wars: for an intervention to be truly successful, a strong and just government and economy must be established.

territory itself, 2) the map does not represent all the territory, and 3) the map is self-reflexive -- the ideal map would be made of many insets, that is, maps within maps.

Adequate description of the terrain in which the CMO plans are to be executed assists in properly understanding how to deal with capabilities and intentions of the subject state or group.

C. TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN CONTROL

According to Col. Allen W. O'Dell (1996), planners should think about the exit strategy or the transition to civilian control from the beginning. The political decision to commit forces to a PSO is based on many considerations, among them the scope of the military effort, what it can realistically accomplish, and an exit strategy. The National Command Authority (NCA) determines the criteria for exiting a PSO. "The military end state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state." (JTF Handbook, 1995:GL-6) With this in mind, the two approaches the United States brings to the issue are short-cycle and long-cycle solutions. (See Appendix E.) The military is generally concerned with the short-cycle approach. By employing the mission activities of the transition perspective, the commander prepares to pass the main effort to long-cycle agencies. Aid agencies such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USAID favor a long-term approach. They are ultimately concerned with the self-sufficiency of the subject area. As the lesson learned from the Dominican Republic intervention suggests, the military needs to hand over responsibilities

to these types of agencies as soon as possible. Fortunately, these short- and long-term approaches are not mutually exclusive. The challenge lies in bridging the gap.

The CMO planner must consider information, coordination and other groups in the AOR in planning for transition to civilian control. This "eye to the future" is one of the 12 Special Operations Imperatives: Consider Long-term effects.²² Likewise, the long-term oriented agencies both governmental and civilian must have information on how the military operates and coordinate for continuation or phasing out of projects started by the military. The proper "hand off" is key to transitions -- the transfer of responsibilities from the US military to the United Nations, regional organizations, or civilian relief organizations cannot be fumbled.²³ Considering this, the literature on transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule is employed. Huntington (1991:210) defines the transition phase as the changeover period between two systems. A transfer of authority may be viewed as a process moving through a series of changes in the balance of power between friendly supported nation groups, unfriendly host nation groups, civilian relief organizations and the intervening force. Transfers of authority involve more than competing elites. Competing groups combine in coalitions or act as neutrals. The underlying principles of such coalitions are reciprocity and mutual commitment. The

²²The 12 Special Operations (SO) Imperatives are: 1) understand the operational environment; 2) recognize the political implications; 3) facilitate interagency activities; 4) engage the threat discriminately; 5) consider long-term effects; 6) ensure legitimacy and credibility of SO; 7) anticipate and control psychological effects; 8) apply capabilities indirectly; 9) develop multiple options; 10) ensure long-term sustainment; 11) provide sufficient intelligence; and, 12) balance security and synchronization.

²³ For simplicity, the designation civilian relief organization is used in this thesis to mean Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) international organizations (IOs) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). For accuracy, I use proper names of civilian organizations in specific historical situations.

upshot of this condition is that competing groups with similar objectives tend to find a middle ground.

Giuseppe Di Palma, who studied the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in Italy, and Edward Malefakis, who writes on the Spanish case, independently concluded in 1982 that the formation of a "moderate" coalition, composed of the adherents of the previous regime and democratizers, is the best arrangement. This arrangement will preclude far-reaching purges and, according to John Herz (1982:280), "is the best social arrangement for a budding democracy." This is the central theme of this section. According to Dankwart Rustow (1970), democratic transitions from authoritarian rule in one-party states were not a function of the "social correlates;" modernization, urbanization and the spread of literacy, as was generally thought, but a function of democratic compromise. Rustow determined that the transition process consisted of a series of "improvisations under pressure," through which the composition and objectives of the authoritarian coalition were shifted toward cooperation. Following this line of reasoning, theorists have determined the necessary conditions for democratic transitions.

First, we must discuss some assumptions. An underlying assumption of US policy is that democracy is the form of government to which all nations aspire.²⁴

²⁴ I choose to use a derivation of O'Donnell and Schmitter's definition of democracy for this paper. Democracy's guiding principle is citizenship. It involves both the right to be treated as an equal and the obligation to treat others in this way. Those who implement the policy are also accountable for their actions and are accessible by the people. Other definitions of democracy range from the common saying, "one man, one vote," to the communist ideal of central democracy where the party elite determine policy. See the discussion on the democratic elections variable later in this chapter for more information. Second, as Huntington writes, "The futures of liberty, stability, peace and the United States depend, in some measure, on the future of democracy." (1991:30) This is democratic peace theory. Its main proposition is that democracies don't fight democracies.

Additionally, Americans have a special interest in the development of a global environment congenial to democracy and capitalism. This established, Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter (1993) argue that transitions to democracy may occur in many different ways, but two necessary conditions must exist: 1) the negotiation of rules, and 2) popular elections. The implication is that all other elements of political evolution derive from these two conditions. For cases of PSOs in failed states, I argue that the four other conditions favor transition to civilian control. They are: 1) social terrain; 2) positive public opinion; 3) building economic capabilities; and, 4) legitimate government structures.

There are three phases in the process of transition to civilian control: 1) the previous system; 2) the transition system; and, 3) the democratic consolidation system. See Appendix E for a graphic representation of the transition to civilian control. The transition phase is our area of interest. In the transition phase of the process, we encounter two conditions. The intervening force will be accepted or not. This depends on the legitimacy of the regime. When the intervening force is not accepted, the environment is categorized as non-cooperative. When the force is accepted, the environment is categorized as cooperative. These conditions are analogous to current doctrine's occupations in friendly or enemy regions. During occupations, the chief Civil Affairs mission is Civil Administration. It is the performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. (JTF Handbook, 1995:GL-5)

Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," *International Security* (Fall 1994), criticizes the democratic peace hypothesis as "wishful thinking" and unproven.

Its objective is to provide civil stability through assistance to the subject country government. If the country has no local government, a military government becomes necessary. If a country has no adequate infrastructure, civil action is necessary. In the cases of failed states, infrastructure restoration is an essential component in building economic capabilities. Figure 3-1 shows how Civil Administration functions in peace support operation.

Condition of Infrastructure	Cooperative (Mission Activities)	Non-cooperative (Mission Activities)
Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Civil Administration o Construction o Public Safety o Public Works o Governmental Structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Civil Administration o Construction o Public Safety o Public Works o Governmental Structures
High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Civil Assistance o Public Safety o Governmental Structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Civil Administration o Public Safety o Governmental Structures

Figure 3-1 Civil Administration Mission Activities in PSO.

The column labeled "condition of infrastructure" represents a scale from low, which means the area's basic public works are destroyed or underdeveloped, to high, describing a public works apparatus which is adequate and operational. The higher degree of shading represents the higher extent of civil action and administration required. The bullets indicate the types of missions which must be accomplished for each of the conditions charted. An essential element in accomplishing these missions is determining the points of contact.

The CMO planner or operator should consider lessons learned in Cuba (1898) and the Dominican Republic (1965-66) on the alienation of elites. Key players will be the country's political, economic and intellectual elites, its military, and the church. The exact

recipe for determining the points of influence in a specific country must be determined through intelligence. I discuss this further in the sections on social terrain and negotiations for rules of transition.

D. CONDITIONS FAVORING TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE

In this section I describe the six mission activities of the transition perspective. I begin each description with an hypothesis I have derived. Table 3-1 displays the transition perspective mission activities and their accompanying hypotheses:

Transition Perspective Mission Activities	Hypotheses
Social terrain	If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.
Public opinion	If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.
Negotiations on the rules for transition	If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.
Democratic elections	If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian control are increased.
Economic capabilities	If a significant sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.
Legitimate government structures	If government institutions address the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

Table 3-1 Transition Perspective Mission Activities and hypotheses.

1. The Social Terrain

Hypothesis 6. If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.

Critical portions of the planner's perceptual map are filled in when he determines the answers to three questions: 1) what is the basic conflict cleavage between the

competing groups?; 2) what are the area's democratic traditions?; and, 3) what groups are in the area of responsibility (AOR)? With this in mind, two secondary hypotheses can be derived: 1) if the CMO planner has information on the sources and patterns of the particular conflict, then his or her plan will offer the commander a greater chance at success; and, 2) if the CMO planner has information on the capabilities and intents of the groups in a particular conflict, then his or her plan will offer the commander a greater chance at success. The intercultural expertise which these propositions assume entails several considerations: 1) historically, intercultural communication has employed the rhetoric of force rather than reason; and, 2) that increased cultural awareness and understanding will allow intervening forces to function as change agents, with the limited use of force, among those who do not share their background and beliefs. The general questions on when and what types of intelligence available to CMO planners also apply to this variable. Additionally, these two points return to the big/small war comparison. Controlling the overt use of force, that is avoiding the big war paradigm, is essential for the successful completion of PSOs.

a. The Basic Conflict Cleavage

Determining the basic conflict between members of a society is a difficult proposition.²⁵ According to Stephen Blank, et al. (1993:230-258) advocates of historical and cultural determinism argue that the reason for conflict and its accompanying social disruption, which serves as the catalyst for intervention, is the display of historical and

²⁵ For more information on the origins of war see Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

cultural attitudes toward conflict. Adda Bozeman (1976:46-47) explains that it is a mistake to limit the study of conflict to its overt phase and that the implication that all conflicts are essentially similar and essentially solvable with the same techniques is false. Researchers, she says, should think of conflict as existing in latent forms for many years. Historical patterns of conflict are therefore important elements of social information. Often, conflict is distinguishable along ethnic lines.²⁶ Deeply held ethnic beliefs are ingrained in the psychological makeup of people and are not easily transcended. Donald Horowitz (1985:6) reduces ethnic rhetoric to the terminology of competition and equality. Certain indicators can be implied from these characteristics. First, those from outside the group offered greater opportunities for alliances and for more technologically advanced weapons. And, following from the notions of equality and self-determination, a process which was universalized by the termination of colonial rule in Asia and Africa after World War II, *separate* polities became recognized as the core of political organization.

b. History of Democracy

Analysts such as Samuel Huntington (1991:270) and John Herz (1982) explain that it is reasonable to conclude that prior democratic experience is more conducive than none to the stabilization of democracies. Following Huntington's lead, the hypothesis derived for the transition perspective is: if the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased. The assumption is that the return to democracy is the return to a better form of rule. How can a country

²⁶ See Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics* 20 (Oct. 1967): pp 30-53, and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1995).

become democratic without a history of democracy? The answer lies in the ability of competing groups to compromise. The political culture of a country must be considered. The Army's Foreign Area Officer Program, PSYOP intelligence analysts, the State Department and civilian relief organizations can help with the information needed to answer questions appropriate to CMO planning. Identifying the "agents" who will interact in the transition process is another piece of information needed for the planner's perceptual map.

c. Other Groups in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)

By knowing who is in the area, their objectives and capabilities, the planner can employ, avoid, or neutralize the groups to contribute to the commander's overall efforts. The Military Intelligence (MI) community already has a model for determining this type of information. They describe it as "Order of Battle." Order of Battle basically describes opposing forces. In the CMO context, other groups in the area include those elements of the supported society which are for, against or uncaring about US efforts, but the general meaning of this term concerns relief organizations, members of the media, and, the most important group on the social terrain, refugees and displaced persons. Not only does the commander have specific international legal obligations to them, but refugees and displaced civilians and the actions of civilian relief organizations helping them can disrupt the commander's military maneuvers. Additionally, disregard for them will generate adverse public opinion. The locations, and the population densities of various groups is essential information because of their implications to initial humanitarian efforts, population and resource control and legitimate government structures. This information

should be collected during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The CMO planner needs to know who and what needs to be supported and what is available to support a transition. With this in mind, the relationships between the military and civilian relief organizations should be based on a mutual appreciation of how each one conducts its missions. This will be discussed later.

2. Public Opinion

Hypothesis 7. If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.

Edward Hallett Carr (1964:143) explained that there is a close connection between military power, economic power and power over public opinion. Attempts to change public opinion will have little effect until they are linked to military and economic power. Opinion is conditioned by status and interests. It evolves through the imposition of military and economic power. Because of this relationship, I will use the term perception management to describe power over public opinion. There are three target audiences of perception management. They are: 1) local public opinion, 2) US public opinion and, 3) international public opinion. Military perception management has two major components: PSYOP and Public Affairs. PSYOP operates to persuade the host nation populace, including its military and other groups in the area of responsibility, to cooperate with US efforts. Public affairs works to present, in a positive light, the US efforts in the area of operations to the media. From the start of any intervention, planners and operators must recognize that public opinion is an integral component of the situation. The integration of Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and PSYOP with Civil Affairs operations evolves from this fact: regardless of however self-confident, independent, or even anti-military a journalist

is, he or she still needs help in constructing the stories. Because journalists must rely upon others for information, they are subject to influence.²⁷ Perception management is concerned with public opinion and mass communication theory.

The view that communication was a means of social influence, or persuasion, was recognized by Aristotle more than 2,000 years ago. Stanley Schachter (1951:91) wrote that communication is "the mechanism by which power is exerted." A competing view says that communication is "informational social influence" and is explicitly non-manipulative. (King, 1975:27) I hold that we communicate to affect with intent.

Joshua Meyrowitz (1985:57), a student of both Marshall McLuhan and Irving Goffman,²⁸ argues that the electronic media change the "situational geography" of social life. The availability of information and the media's selection of what information is available to the public as well as how it is delivered affects public opinion. The "objectively reported" news broadcast is framed by a society's or individual's perceptions and experiences. (Fisher, 1978:45-46) These generated images direct the individual's perceptual organization and are, in effect, the leaders of social opinion. Despite how subversive to the First Amendment this may sound, the information which the PAO, CA

²⁷ A. J. Bacevich, et al. *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), are quick to point out that insurgents, guerrillas and competing factions are never slow to exploit the journalist's situation. They are motivated to provide the facts necessary to understand the situation from the guerrilla, or opposition, point of view.

²⁸ McLuhan, the father of the medium theorists, describes how media reshapes large cultural environments and institutional situations. Situationists, such as Goffman, are more concerned with describing situations and situational behaviors as they exist in society. For more information see: Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Media and Political Violence* (London: Macmillan Press, 1983).

and PSYOP officers provide media representatives can have distinct benefits for the overall mission.

3. Negotiations on the Rules for Transition

Hypothesis 8. If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

There are two broad contexts in which cooperation can take place with the central guidance of an intervening power. First, any interaction takes place within the context of norms that are shared by the participants. In the case of failed states where another country or set of countries has intervened, the indigenous people recognize that the intervenors will set the conditions for their withdrawal. In other words, the end state is determined by the intervening power (s).²⁹ However, since the elites of the subject country have been asked to participate, the elites are empowered to make decisions regarding their country's future. Second, interactions also take place within the context of institutions. National institutions, such as clan affiliations, alliances and the church, as well as international institutions, such as the United Nations and regimes, such as the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) alter the payoff structures facing actors.

²⁹The underlying assumption for this condition is that externally monitored installation of a democracy, or at least a stable, friendly government, is systemically and historically plausible. Additionally, Alfred Stepan (1986:71) explains that there is a major political weakness to the externally monitored installation of democracy: foreign imposition. This weakness in the World War II cases employed in the case studies was overcome through: 1) the discrediting of the previous regime; and, 2) the employment of an army of occupation. The Nazi regime had been so discredited and defeated that it had lost practical value and the people were willing to accept imposition. The weakness of foreign imposition in Post-Cold War cases may be overcome through similar measures: 1) discrediting the regime, or lack thereof, which caused the intervention; 2) employment of the military to guarantee the transition to political stability; and, 3) employment of the military to guarantee the consolidation of democracy.

International and national institutions lengthen the shadow of the future or they increase the number of actors involved in a conflict. At the tactical and strategic levels CMO operators will have to interact with organizations. ACE (1995:K-1) points out that there are fundamental differences between civilian relief organizations and the military. Becoming familiar with some of the basic concepts common to organization will yield a more "harmonious and efficient interaction." Moreover, Bonnie Cordes (1984:50) reports that organizations as diverse as business corporations and terrorist groups are dedicated to survival; their immediate objective is to continue operations. The general questions on available intelligence bear directly on this variable.

With these concepts in mind, several subordinate propositions follow the main hypothesis. They are: 1) if the country's elites are willing to cooperate with the intervenor, then there is a greater chance of mission success; 2) if clear roles and responsibilities for civilian relief organizations and the military are outlined at the Civil-Military Operations center (CMOC), then the plan will offer the commander a greater chance for success; 3) if the coordination efforts of the military help the individual civilian relief organizations to continue their operations, there is a greater chance for mission success; and, the final proposition involves prioritization, 4) if a priority of support for civilian organizations is established, then the hierarchy established (or supported) by the intervening force will be accepted since the individual groups desire to continue operations. The coordination implied by these propositions is orchestrated by the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). It is the center of gravity for civil-military

coordination. The CMOC³⁰ is the military organization whose function is to ensure that the efforts of civilian organizations or other groups in the area of operations help the military operation, or at least don't detract from it. The concept is a revitalization of a World War II structure whose mission was to harmonize civil, humanitarian and military operations in the same theater. The CMOC is a joint commission where political, military and other interested parties (host nation and civilian organization) meet to ensure the various campaigns are focused on the same objectives. The CMOC: 1) serves as the focal point for all political, military, civil and humanitarian agencies operating in the theater; 2) provides liaison with the object of harmonizing and deconflict operations between agencies; 3) aids in the transparency of operations at all levels; 4) works toward unity of effort in the absence of unity of command; and, 5) establishes itself as the center of gravity in the theater (ACE, 1995).

4. Democratic Elections

Hypothesis 9. If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian control are increased.

The ultimate goal of the transition perspective is the democratization of the country. Free elections are the means to that end. Democratic elections are the preferred method of selecting officeholders. But, universal suffrage does not mean universal

³⁰ The term "CMOC" had another meaning. According to Lt. Col. James McNaughton (1996), in the 1980s the CMOC was the operations center for the CA battalion or brigade. Prior to Somalia, a new organization was invented using the same name. "This new organization could meet with representatives of groups doing humanitarian assistance in the area. In Somalia the purpose was to coordinate daily convoy security and transportation where the US military was supporting the PVO/NGO." According to Willis Hintz (1996), Gen. Gordon Sullivan directed the CA doctrine branch in November 1994 to publicize the common meaning for CMOC as the coordination center between civilian organizations and the military. The 96th CA Battalion now employs the term OPCEN, or operations center, to identify the battalion plans and operations office.

participation. By error, neglect or conspiracy some names do not appear on voter rosters. Additionally, a country may have no history of regular, invariable intervals between elections. As intimated in the first variable of this perspective, a history of democracy favors political stability and democratization. Without this history, institutions may be brought into play to foster compromises. The first compromise is setting the definition of "free and fair" in an occupied country, as will be seen in the Haiti case study. Free and fair elections are the first step. Continued support to the elected official is the next.

5. Building Economic Capabilities

Hypothesis 10. If a significant sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.

If we accept that peace support operations are a continuation of politics by other means, then as E. H. Carr (1964:117) observed, "the science of economics presupposes a given political order, and cannot be profitably studied in isolation from politics." Peace support operations must include an economic dimension. According to Robert Gilpin (1992:231), throughout history the larger configurations of world politics and state interests have determined the framework of the international economy. World powers have sought to organize and maintain the international economy in favor of their economic and security interests. From this perspective, the center of the world's economic and military power is the United States. The military's propensity to engage in big war is therefore no surprise: generally organizations tend to employ their strengths. Although manpower, firepower and industrial power are not necessarily required in successfully

transitioning from military to civilian rule, building economic capabilities certainly favors the process.

Generally speaking, the underdeveloped economies characteristic of failed states are largely based on subsistence agriculture. Farmers tend to consume what they produce and there is little need for markets. The most important economic concern is the control of land. Land is often controlled by tribes, villages or elites and allotted to individuals. The specific lesson from Vietnam on land reform is applicable to PSOs in such underdeveloped countries. Nowhere among these lessons learned in small wars is it said that building a country's economy is the military's job. However, initial economic stability can be strengthened through a robust foreign nation support (FNS) campaign.

Army doctrine (FM 41-10: 10-2) describes FNS as the augmentation of the commander's Combat Service Support (CSS) by local procurement. FNS is concerned with filling the commander's short-term CSS shortage until his logistics "tail" can fully sustain the force. From the perspective of this paper, FNS works toward the transition to civilian control. Instead of simply supporting the US force, FNS can increase local economic viability when the US force taps the host nation's strengths. For example, should the country possess a strong agricultural sector, then the CINC should plan to procure a larger portion of his agricultural requirements from the subject country. The revenues generated from this action can spur greater economic expansion and serve as an element in the US exit strategy. Of course, there is always the risk that the economic stimulus is temporary. In Cambodia, the departure of UN peacekeepers translated into the departure of the country's economic well being.

Huntington (1991:271) explains that a high correlation exists between level of economic development and the existence of democratic regimes. With this in mind, the CA planner must consider the viability of the supported country's economy after the forces leave. The intervening force cannot be the essential component of the supported country's economy. Planners must consider the paths which foster an adequate level of sustainable economic activity to support the indigenous population with subsistence, jobs and income.

6. Legitimate Government Structures

Hypothesis 11. If government institutions address the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

The variable of legitimate government structures is anchored in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Maslow (1968) describes a range of needs beginning with the most basic, or physiological, and culminating with self-actualization. When basic needs such as hunger are satisfied, the next level is engaged. This level is safety. It requires security and protection, and, until realized, it is a person's most important consideration. In this case we may consider the role of government as reducing the relative level of violence. When these needs are satisfied, the next level (social needs), requiring belongingness and society, is engaged.

The purposes of all governments include the advancement of its citizens' welfare and the maintenance of public order. Functioning governments provide for the first three levels in Maslow's hierarchy. The three governmental functions related to Maslow's hierarchy are: 1) public works; 2) public safety; and, 3) governmental structures. One of

current doctrine's strong points is engineering, doctrinally known as Military-Civic Action. The long-term goal is the building of the socio-economic infrastructure. Its immediate objectives are clean water, sanitation, sewage. Public works addresses the citizen's basic physiological needs.

Public safety is theoretically more complicated than public works. It has a legal basis. Analyst Roy Licklider (1996:3) explains that the three steps for establishing the rule of law are: 1) selection of the appropriate system of law (traditional, regional, or international); 2) creation of a police force; and, 3) separation of police functions from the military. An additional two steps are: 1) providing for the local control of police forces; and, 2) separating the police forces from the judiciary. The separation of the police from the military and from the judiciary must be maintained. When a government disregards this separation, it not only violates the principles of international human rights, it will ultimately fail because it loses both justification and credibility.

From a United States perspective, governments are made of three components: 1) the legislature, whose members are elected by qualified citizens; 2) the executive, chosen by the people or the legislature; and, 3) the judicial, either elected or appointed, but maintained separate from the other two. The basic assumption underlying the hypothesis used to test the condition of legitimate government structures is that the intervener is committed to facilitating a self-sufficient democracy. In this way it is similar to the MCA projects of current doctrine. The hypothesis derived for the transition perspective is: if the government addresses the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for smooth transition to civilian control are increased. In the short term, this hypothesis may

be confirmed, but speculation on this subject assumes a long-term process which has a central goal the changing of a subject country's political culture. An historical example is valuable here. Following World War II the US government considered German public education essential to its goal of changing Germany's political culture so that occupation could end.³¹ In the post-Cold War world the guarantor force could withdraw after the first two levels of government, as explained by Maslow's hierarchy of needs, are raised to a sufficient level and the third level, governmental structures, is initiated. Under the transition approach, the period of transition ends and the period of consolidation begins with the first democratic election, rather than after a set time period. As explained previously, when the guarantor, or externally monitoring force does extract itself, it has the capability to re-introduce itself.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I identified the concerns with current CMO doctrine which are evaluated in the case studies which follow. Considered out of context the ideas of managing the media, occupying countries and the setting of priorities affecting another country represent the disregard of sovereignty at best and subversion at worst. But, considering the national security strategy and the likelihood of continued engagement in PSOs, a doctrine which will ensure the self-sufficiency of failed states is required.

³¹ Dr. Stan Sandler (1996) explained that the education programs, such as the German Youth Association, as well as economic and institutional service programs set up by the military government in Germany after the war were affected by the rise of the Soviet threat and the need for a rearmed Germany. For more information on the occupations of Germany and Japan see Franklin M. Davis, Jr., *Comes as a Conqueror: The US Army's Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967).

Current doctrine does not consider all the elements which are required of CMO in peace support operations. This condition derives from doctrine's current orientation on big wars and the lack of attention placed on the military's requirements in small wars to:

- 1) begin initiating hand off preparation from the start of an intervention;
- 2) assist in stabilizing the situation; and,
- 3) assist the commander in extracting the force, handing off the consolidation of democracy mission to other agencies.

Following a description of the transition perspective, I outlined the mission activities of this perspective, and derived hypotheses from established theory which will be tested in later chapters to establish the value of the perspective. Although the list of key elements for transition perspective may appear complete, I don't assume that these six variables are the only possible areas a CMO planner should look at in developing a plan to support the CINC. The map which I have constructed may not have all the detail needed to accurately represent the territory.

IV. SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run attacks. They will not be able to stop the convoys from getting through, but they will inflict -- and take -- casualties. There will be an abduction or two. A sniper will occasionally knock off one of our sentries. If you loved Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu...think once, think twice and three times before you embrace the Somali tarbaby -- Smith Hempstone, US Ambassador to Kenya, 1 December 1992.

There are three things important to a Somali male -- his wife, his camel and his weapon -- F. M. Lorenz.

A. INTRODUCTION

The international community successfully cooperated in its first attempt to maintain peace in the post-Cold War period. However, despite Iraq's clear aggression with the crossing of international borders and the real threat to the world's oil supplies, there was still a debate on the type of appropriate response. Confronting the challenge, the United States led a United Nations response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Beginning with economic sanctions and progressing to coalition military action, the international community agreed that Saddam Hussein was a serious threat to security and stability in the region. Despite the fact that the coalition did not defeat Saddam's regime or install a coalition military government, the Gulf War was an example of the big war paradigm. Kuwait struggled for its national existence, coalition forces employed big war's three key ingredients, firepower, manpower and industrial power, and Civil Affairs soldiers provided humanitarian relief for Shiites and Kurds, as well as civil assistance and infrastructure rebuilding in Kuwait. The international community became involved in Iraq's internal

affairs, dismantling its war fighting capabilities, forbidding the military overflight of its northern and southern regions and disallowing the sale of oil.

According to some observers the United States entered into the next small war, the peace support operation (PSO) in Somalia, with overconfidence stemming from a big win in the Gulf War. Col. Vladimir Sobichevsky (1996) suggests that Americans may have arrogantly entered into Somalia following the Gulf War, thinking that the PSO in Somalia could be dealt with through the application of force. American big war doctrine had once again been confirmed. Moreover, the precedent had been set for the intervention in the internal affairs of states.

This study characterizes the UNITAF mission, Operation Restore Hope, as effective in the short term, but as an overall failure. It was effective because its basic aims were achieved by dedicated individual operators backed by overwhelming force. Unfortunately, the humanitarian mandate and the 45-day time frame under which the US military operated prevented it from creating the conditions for a long-term rehabilitation. UNOSOM II addressed state-building and the conditions of long-term rehabilitation. This study characterizes it as a failure. The intervention in Somalia failed because of a poor understanding of the nature of the problem. Somalia was a failed state and addressing the symptom of human suffering only masked the real malady. The US intervention in Somalia represents a humanitarian operations PSO undertaken during low intensity conflict. In many ways Operation Restore Hope was a watershed event in US Peace Support Operations. With this in mind, I analyze the CMO plans and actions of the US-led UNITAF (United Task Force, December 1992 - April 1993), which relieved

UNOSOM I (United Nations Operations, Somalia I, April - December 1992) and, which in turn, was relieved by UNOSOM II (United Nations Operations, Somalia II, May 1993 - March 1995). (See Appendix F for background information and a map of Somalia.) The following case study on Somalia is divided into four sections: 1) methodology; 2) an examination of current doctrine and how it was employed; 3) an exercise in speculation which allows us to translate the social terrain perspective into practice; and, 4) a summary and conclusions.

B. METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

This section seeks to determine which of the theories does a more consistent job of predicting and explaining the mission activities required of PSOs. From the beginning it is necessary to explain that this is a difficult task. The process is made difficult by two factors: 1) the determination of relative explanatory power is based on a comparison of how well the inferred or deduced hypotheses held up over the case study; and, 2) a two-part subjective concern. First, not every hypothesis is created equal. Some have greater weight in affecting the behavior of decision makers. Second, how a variable's importance is assessed depends on the observer. Two problems become clear from the outset: 1) absolute control of the variables is impossible; and, 2) there is no guarantee that the variables examined are all the ones which affect the transition to civilian control.

2. Coding Scheme

I assigned a value to each hypothesis applied to the case based on a dichotomous scale. When the case confirmed the hypothesis, a positive value (Yes) was assessed.

When the case refuted the hypothesis, a negative value (No) was assessed. In the final analysis, the theory with more positive than negative assessments has the greater explanatory power for the case. In order to avoid the problem of unequal numbers of hypotheses between the theories, an additional hypothesis was inferred from an applicable civil administration mission. This additional hypothesis performs two functions: 1) it balances the number of hypotheses between the two theories; and, 2) it points to the applicability of civil administration in PSOs.

C. CURRENT DOCTRINE

According to Col. Allen W. O'Dell (1996), who worked in the Current Plans and Operations Office for the JCS during the planning of Operation Restore Hope, "Somalia was screwed up from the get go. Somalia was a classic CA mission; a restoration mission. But, we were told to shut up." O'Dell explains that the NCA determined that 25,000 military would be employed for a period of 45 days, or until 19 January, the day before the Presidential Inauguration. "There would be no deviation from the local security mission. [It was] a political call. We [the Joint Staff] did two plans for Somalia; each concerned with rebuilding the country. But neither one left the building. There was no CMO perspective until well after the fact." In other words, the military was unable to implement CMO doctrine.³²

³²O'Dell explained that "there was no real CA plan for Somalia. Civil Affairs personnel were on call in the TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data]. [US Army Special Operations Command CG] Gen. [Wayne A.] Downing provided two teams [from the 96th CA Battalion] to the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force -- about 4,000 Marines with armor and air support], and there may have been some interservice rivalry there, but at the bottom line, the security mission didn't validate a CA mission."

Once being thrown into the situation, commanders on the ground recognized that the complex mixture of a military humanitarian assistance operation with state-building being handled by the UN, an organization with slow decision-making processes and inadequate resources, forced them to make political decisions and initiate state-building programs to accomplish two tasks: 1) to get the relief supplies to the people who needed them and; 2) to prevent a slide into anarchy once the United States disengaged.

Considering the original objective of the mission -- ensuring that relief supplies get to those who need them, then hand off control to the UN -- the longer-term objectives to which commanders looked, and to which Washington acquiesced, constituted mission creep. That is, the environment required different missions from those the intervening force initially planned. The organizational perspective can be applied here. One principle of Joan Woodward's (1965) Contingency Theory³³ is that as departmental and organizational environments become more stable, the approach to management becomes more autocratic; employing greater role specialization. For example, the longer the period a force spends in theater, the more bureaucratic it becomes and the more specialists are needed to execute the mission. Despite this mission creep concern, Jennifer M. Taw and John Peters (1995:14) consider UNITAF to have been a successful operation for two reasons: 1) because there were good communications between the military and various

³³ The principles of Contingency Theory are: 1) differences in management are due to differences in departmental and organizational environments; 2) as departmental and organizational environments become more stable, the approach to management should become more autocratic, employing greater role specialization; and, 3) as departmental and organizational environments become more dynamic and uncertain, the approach to management should become more democratic, employing greater role exchange. See Joan Woodward, *Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

Somali leaders; and, 2) because the Somalis recognized that the troops were performing an actual military mission -- humanitarian assistance.

1. Humanitarian Assistance

Hypothesis 1. If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the legitimacy of the host nation will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.

The first hypothesis inferred from current doctrine is: if the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his/her goals are improved. If the hypothesis is confirmed by the case study, we expect to see mission success. Current doctrine would then be assessed with a Yes. Humanitarian Assistance (HA) needs to be defined. Humanitarian Assistance is a group of programs which authorize the use of DOD resources to conduct military acts and operations of a humanitarian nature. HA includes Humanitarian/Civic Action (H/CA), foreign disaster relief, Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and support to foreign displaced civilians. As has been stated in the situation overview, HA was the reason for US involvement in Somalia. However, the relatively small number of Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers assigned to a doctrinal CMO mission indicates an overestimation of the value of sending aid without adequate administration to a trouble spot. According to O'Dell (1996) only 12 CA soldiers of a force of some 28,000 US troops³⁴ were originally assigned to Operation Restore Hope. Nonetheless, Lt. Gen. Walter Clarke (1994:47) reports that UNITAF achieved the following results: 1) the daily death rate in Bardera fell

³⁴ According to Kenneth Allard. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington: Nation Defense University Press, 1995), at its peak UNITAF was comprised of 38,000 troops from 21 different countries.

from more than 300 in November 1992 to five or less in April 1993; and, 2) the price of a 50-pound bag of wheat fell from \$100 to about \$10.

Analysts (Taw and Peters, 1995; and, Hirsch and Oakley, 1995) consider UNITAF as a success largely because the HA mission was accomplished. The hypothesis: if the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his/her goals are improved, is confirmed. Despite the fact that US forces did not provide aid, they protected and facilitated the aid providers. Therefore current doctrine receives a positive assessment.

2. Population and Resource Control (PRC)

Hypothesis 2. If the US military is able to control displaced civilians (DCs) and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives.

The authors of FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, consider displaced civilian (DC) operations as the most basic collective task performed by CA soldiers. Population and Resource Control programs consist of curfews, movement restrictions, resettlement of DC, licensing, rationing and inspection of facilities. The goal of PRC is to minimize civilian interference in military operations.

According to Mark R. Walsh (1996), in Somalia military forces were employed in conventional security operations; civilian relief organizations with nutrition and health clinics; and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with displaced-person programs. The population and resource control mission seemed to have functioned well under UNITAF

largely because of the overwhelming force which had been applied to the overall mission.

But, with UNOSOM II the situation shifted.

The UN took over a relatively peaceful Somalia as Aideed had shown support for Oakley's request to end clan warfare. However, Jonathan Howe, who replaced Oakley as UN Special Envoy, agreed with the UN that Aideed was the cause of the fighting and was therefore to be eliminated. Aideed, who found himself the UN's target, reasserted control over territory and increased violence toward UN peacekeepers. Jonathan Stevenson (1995:90) reports that the violence peaked with the ambush 5 June 1993 of a Pakistani patrol, resulting in 24 killed, 54 wounded and 10 missing. The UN reacted by passing Resolution 887 which called for the arrest and detention for prosecution of those responsible for the ambush of the Pakistanis. Howe offered a \$25,000 bounty for Aideed. The stage was set for the Task Force Ranger failure which prompted the Clinton Administration to announce the imminent withdrawal of US troops.

The hypothesis, if the US military is able to control displaced civilians and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives, is refuted. Despite overwhelming force, UNITAF failed to successfully conduct the PRC mission, and then failed in its overall mission. The 4,500 US soldiers in UNOSOM II could not control DCs and refugees. Despite early success in PRC, the daily log of CA Direct Support Team (CADST) 34 for 20 September 1993 reveals that groups of Somalis could actually set up squatter camps between coalition force compounds. This situation implies a two-fold concern: 1) the squatters would be caught in a crossfire should hostile activity come from their direction; and, 2) the squatters could attain intelligence on

coalition force activities and intentions. The PRC situation illustrates the loss of control in the overall situation. The United States had placed its confidence for successfully concluding the Somali mission in overwhelming force.

A UNOSOM I example illustrates the value of overwhelming force, which was the hallmark of UNITAF, during an intervention into a failed state. According to Allard (1995:15), the Pakistanis were ineffective in delivering food and supplies within Somalia. Clans dominated the country side and continually looted food, extorted relief organizations and hijacked relief vehicles. The operational environment for the three missions in Somalia changed from uncooperative during UNOSOM I, to cooperative during UNITAF, then back to uncooperative in UNOSOM II. Somali clans exercised more force, the security situation for UN observers rose and fell, and refugees continued to suffer. Ultimately, Aideed directly challenged the United States with the force of arms and won. Since the hypothesis was refuted, a negative assessment (No) is given to current doctrine.

3. Foreign Nation Support (FNS)

Hypothesis 3. If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's CSS shortfalls by using host country goods and services, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance at success.

According to FM 41-10 (1993:10-2), the preferred means for closing the gap in the intervening force's Combat Service Support (CSS) requirements is to secure goods and services locally. The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that a demand for goods and services in a country will stimulate growth and development in both the sector from where the goods or services are derived and in other sectors of the economy. With

sustained growth and development there will be an emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial middle class and attempts to lessen the country's dependence on developed countries.³⁵

The CADST 34 Daily Log (1993) offers examples of local support, although it does not strictly fit the definition of FNS. Local hires were used as interpreters and the 15 September 1993 log reports that locals were illegally employed as security guards at Hunter Base for the stipend of two Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) per man, per day.³⁶

O'Dell (1996) explains, "We put more people out of work than we hired. Many of them had a pretty good business of extorting from civilian relief organizations until we came." Once again, the value of overwhelming force seems to be illustrated. Simply put, a superior force can establish and maintain security. But, upon investigation on what was accomplished behind the security shield, we find FNS not used. Since the hypothesis is refuted, a negative (No) rating is assessed to current doctrine.

4. Military Civic Action (MCA)

Hypothesis 4. If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host government will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.

MCA projects are designed to produce populace support for the host government's programs. According to FM 41-10 (1993:3-2) MCA projects are undertaken to promote the legitimacy, and to enhance the effectiveness of the government

³⁵ This position is derived from dependencia theory. For a statement on this economic model see Osvaldo Sunkel's, "Big Business and 'Dependencia': A Latin American View." *Foreign Affairs* (April 1972) pp 517-31.

³⁶ This practice is illegal and the senior officer from CADST 34 explained the limits of Title 10 USC to the local commander.

and/or military. Both US and German military engineers built roads and improved distribution points to facilitate relief supply distribution rather than in an attempt at state building.

XVIII Airborne Corps engineers scraped designated supply routes and responded to CADST 34's requests to repair other roads which had been damaged by heavy-vehicle traffic. The underlying assumption was that the US forces would not destroy what was remaining of the Somali infrastructure, but really would not build it up either. According to CADST 34's log for 16 November 1993, Maj. Robert Biller attended the ARFOR command briefing and updated the commander on the continued damage and failure to plan, coordinate or communicate Task Force 1-64's actions. But Biller's report went unanswered. The log states, "[Biller] was undermined by the Joint Task Force which had a conqueror/occupier mentality."

Because the projects undertaken by coalition forces engineers were done to facilitate the movement of supplies, to enhance security or to provide facilities for forces, they cannot be considered MCA projects. Moreover, the engineers accomplished these actions without Somali military help, an essential component and the reason for MCA projects. Military -Civil Action projects are designed to enhance the legitimacy of the supported military or government. In Somalia, there was no government to support. Therefore, current doctrine is assessed with a No.

5. Civil Defense

Hypothesis 5. If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance for attaining his/her goals.

Civil defense deals with the immediate emergency conditions created by an attack or natural and manmade disasters. Initially, CA personnel determine the status of local civil defense planning and organization in the host country. Then, CA personnel coordinate planning for: 1) government, 2) industry, 3) public utilities, 4) public health and, 5) emergency situations. According to FM 41-10 (1993:10-2), support to civil defense may be conducted as MCA or HA.

One great capability of CMO is medical support. Such support ranges from the care of combat casualties to the prevention of epidemics. The CADST 34 Daily Log (10 September 1993) reports that one of their first actions was to support an orphanage which doubled as a hospital. The support included, medical supplies, mechanical repair and sanitation engineering. Assistance from the non-existent Somali government was impossible, and, according the CADST 34's log, the orphanage received little help from civilian relief organizations. The question derived from understanding the CD mission is: was this support a coordinated action?

Despite the clear indications that Somalia met all of Tainter's (1988) conditions characterizing failed states (See Chapter I), neither the UN nor the United States planned for the civil defense needs of the Somalis. According to an Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Symposium transcript (1993:18), civilian relief organizations identified several problems with Operation Restore Hope. Problems reported as "needing to be addressed" included: 1) problems with understanding mutual roles -- that is, who does what and when; 2) military priorities determined without civilian relief organization participation; 3)

different agendas for civilian relief organizations, the United States and the UN; and, 4) lack of an apparent overall UN plan for Somalia. There is no evidence suggesting that CA planners or teams coordinated with any agency outside those in its immediate area of responsibility. Despite the absence of a host government, a coordinated support effort is still required. The local focus exhibited by US forces may have been the only way to get anything done. According to Seiple (1996:118) the CMOC was not an operations center where people solved problems at the same table, it had become a liaison center, as Seiple says, "twice removed from reality." The CMOC in Mogadishu did not coordinate directly with the Marines there and the civilian relief organizations had to deal with a chain-of-command with whom they had never seen. This lack of planning and coordinated prioritization of support indicates a fundamental failure. Therefore, a negative rating (No) is assessed for current doctrine.

6. Civil Administration

Hypothesis 6. If civil assistance is employed in the supported government by the US military, the legitimacy of the country will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased.

Current doctrine does not consider civil assistance among the list of CMO mission activities. It is, however, a Civil Affairs mission. One aspect of military support to civil administration is known as civil assistance, providing life-sustaining services, maintaining order and controlling the distribution of goods and services. Civil assistance differs from the other two basic activities of civil administration because it is based on the commander's decision. It provides short-term support to a government or a populace and does not incur a long-term commitment by the United States. Civil assistance supports a

government which is recognized by the United States by: 1) determining the capabilities of the existing civil administration; 2) developing plans to reinforce or restore civil administration; 3) coordinating civil assistance plans with the supported country and allied agencies; and, 4) arranging for the transfer of authority.

Not surprisingly, Annex L, Civil-Military Operations, to Task Force Mountain (10th Mountain Division) OPLAN 93-2 (Operation Restore Hope) does not consider civil assistance. It is concerned with: 1) "establishing a secure environment for ARFOR element to operate in;" 2) improving coordination and capabilities of civilian relief organizations; and, 3) building "battle books" which would serve as a database for follow-on peacekeeping forces. The CADST 34 team leader said 15 September 1993, what he considered to be the problems with operations in Somalia:

Since there is no objective, no courses of action, no recommended plan and no approved plan, there is little reason to send in assets. You don't bring in men and material to build your house before you figure out what you want your house to look like. The planning process is broken in this case and the bureaucracy is taking on a life of its own. (CADST 34, 1993)

Because civil assistance assumes the existence of a host country government to be supported, and because it is, in reality, short-term state-building, this appropriate CA mission was not considered in Somalia. Once again, as O'Dell says, "It was a political call. Nonetheless, this course of action was available in the military's bag of tools and its exclusion was a fundamental failure. One reason the operation failed in the long-term is because civil assistance was not applied. Therefore, the hypothesis is assessed a negative rating (No).

D. TRANSITION APPROACH

The observations of the changing nature of conflict and the study of how current Civil-Military Operations doctrine applies to PSOs indicates it is incomplete or in need of revision. The most striking inadequacy of current CMO doctrine is its lack of considerations for transition to civilian control. Indeed, as reported by Licklider (1996:20) even the transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II caused "considerable friction." An alternative theory, the transition approach, offers another way of looking at the problem of CMO planning for peace support operations.

According to Samuel Huntington (1991:255), a country's most serious problem -- be it hunger, insurgency or anarchy -- has to be solved first. Generally speaking, the reason the military is committed to an intervention in the first place is to solve a country's most serious problem. As stated previously, once committed the military must stabilize the situation, then extract itself, or transition to civilian control. A list of the conditions favoring the transition to civilian control are: 1) the supported country's society and its history of democracy; 2) public opinion; 3) negotiations on the rules for transition; 4) democratic elections; 5) economic capabilities; and 6) legitimate government structures. I address these conditions with the six mission activities of the transition approach.

1. The Social Terrain

Hypothesis 7. If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.

Huntington (1991:270) explains that it is reasonable to conclude that prior democratic experience is more conducive than none to the stabilization of democracies.

If, however, there is no history of democracy, the negotiations for the transition to civilian rule must build a moderate coalition. Two secondary hypotheses, both based on intelligence, also can be derived from this condition: Hypothesis 7.1, if the CMO planner has information on the sources and patterns of the particular conflict, then his or her plan will offer the commander a greater chance at success; and, Hypothesis 7.2, if the CMO planner has information on the intent of the groups in a particular conflict, then his or her plan will offer the commander a greater chance at success. These propositions are not new, but they do require appropriate information on the supported country's history and society. The intercultural expertise which these propositions assume entails several considerations: 1) historically, intercultural communication has employed the rhetoric of force, that is big war, rather than reason; and, 2) the ability, through increased awareness and understanding to affect change with only the limited use of force, with those who do not share our background and beliefs, is essential for the successful completion of PSOs. This is winning the hearts and minds of the people, a lesson learned in small war. In practice, neither of the secondary hypotheses was confirmed.

According to the Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report (1993:I-17), the strategic and operational Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process failed to provide commanders a proper focus of the factors which affected the mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time. However, consider the use of other sources of intelligence, such as the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program and PSYOP intelligence analysts, to help in producing the information needed to answer questions appropriate to Civil-Military Operations planning.

Understandably, the planners who wrote the Civil Affairs Annex to OPLAN 93-2 (1993) knew the value of the knowledge of Somali society and history. Civil-Military Operations activities during the 10th Mountain Division pre-deployment followed this priority: 1) Updating the Somalia area study; 2) preparing a CMO estimate; 3) preparing for deployment; 4) coordinating with Reserve Component CA assets and civilian relief organizations. The priority mission, updating the Somalia area study, may have been a fill-in-the-blanks operation. Area studies are constructed in a format which, although tested over many years, may simply not ask the right questions.

The questions which would affect a CMO plan for Somalia are: 1) do we understand the clan rivalries?; 2) do we understand the gun culture?; and, 3) do we understand the role of qat in the society? However, the CA plan at national level never left the drawing room. In country, the 10th Mountain Division employed the political-analytical factors study which had been taught in the Regional Studies Course at Fort Bragg's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. As described in Chapter II, such studies are based on peacetime research and confirmed by on-the-ground assessments. These studies have no set format. None of the analytical factors addresses clan rivalries, gun culture or qat. Is a set of standardized questions needed for regional studies? One word of warning: One must be careful with formats. Simply asking the right questions is not good enough -- one has to get the right answers. Since it can be argued that the goal of such studies is to draw an accurate map of the country's social terrain, both perspectives appear to be working toward the same goal. Ultimately, however, both current doctrine and the transition perspective are dependent on available intelligence --

and this means asking the right people the right questions and properly interpreting them.

The transition perspective is rated negatively (No) on this variable.

2. Public Opinion

Hypothesis 8. If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.

According to many analysts (Allard, 1995; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995) the United States may have become involved in Somalia partly because of the nightly images of starvation delivered to American living rooms. But the military is not at the mercy of the media.³⁷ The military has two major agencies which deal with public opinion: Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs. PSYOP operates to persuade the host nation populace, its elites and its military, to cooperate with US efforts. Public affairs works to present to the media, in a positive light, the US efforts in the area of operations to the media. The media, in turn, tell the story worldwide, as CNN advertises, "every 30 minutes." As explained in Chapter III, there are three publics which affect the outcome of military operations. They are: 1) local groups (both indigenous and foreign within the host nation), 2) US audiences; and, 3) international audiences.

In August 1992 President Bush announced that the United States would use military aircraft to deliver relief supplies to Somalia. Had President Bush stated from the outset of the intervention that the United States was committed to guaranteeing the democratic stability of Somalia, the American public would have had a greater

³⁷ See Timothy H. Ondracek's, *The Changing Relationship Between the Military and the Media* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1985), for a survey of the US military's experiences with the media since World War I.

commitment to the goal. With the President's statement, the media begins its stories from the starting point of commitment to democracy. Information provided to them by PAOs, soldiers and citizens might be framed in these terms. Considering this, and despite casualties, the long-term goal of building a self-sufficient Somalia might have been realized.



The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) suggests that PSYOP and Public Affairs be coordinated. O'Dell explains that there was no coordination between PSYOP and Public Affairs with the Marines. The Army coordinated these elements somewhat. The related proposition: Hypothesis 8.1, if the intervening force manages the information which reaches local and world audiences, the chances for favorably influencing local and world public opinion are increased, is examined here. In practice, a lesson on PSYOP and PAO coordination was pointed up when a CNN reporter explained the leaflets dropped on D-Day, 9 December 1992, onto Mogadishu, proclaimed "Adoonka Ciidanka" when it should have started with "Aduunka Ciidanka." Instead of "United Nations" the flyer read, "Slave Nations." Barton Gellman of the *Washington Post* (1992) allowed Col. Layton Dunbar, the 4th Psychological Operations Group commander to explain. "It's not easy to find a Somali native speaker with a security clearance."

The point of this illustration is that the media collected the PSYOP product and treated it as news. In the days following the Gellman article the *Washington Post* printed a photograph of a Somali boy, with out-stretched hand, greeting an American soldier. The flyer (at Figure 4-1) was printed before Operation Restore Hope was announced.



Figure 4-1(A) D-Day PSYOP Leaflet.

Adoonka Ciidanka (United Nations) Waxay
xagan uyimaaden in ayidin Caawiyaan dadka
idin Caawinaya Somalia dad. Waxaan u
isticmaalicarnaa Hubcayaga Si aanu u
caawino dadka idin Caawinaya iyo
ciidankayaga. Uma aan sugidoono
waxgalitaan cuntada ama ciidanka waxay
gabanayaan. Waxaan
xagon u Joog naa in
aanu idin Caawino.

United Nations forces are here to assist in the international relief effort for the Somali people. We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operation and our soldiers. We will not allow interference with food distribution or with our activities. We are here to help you.

Figure 4-1(B) D-Day PSYOP Leaflet.

The CADST 34 log (1993) relates incidents when its members escorted CNN, *Time Magazine*, and other correspondents. Despite a clear relationship between PSYOP and the media, and CA and the media, the hypothesis: if a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and

world opinion are increased, can be neither confirmed nor denied. The transition perspective is therefore assessed with a negative score (No).

3. Negotiations on the Rules for Transition

Hypothesis 9. If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

Huntington (1991:259) explains that the stability of democratic regimes depends first on the ability of the principal political elites to work together to deal with the problems confronting their society and to refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate political or material advantage. For the military, the immediate goal is political stability. Several subordinate propositions derive from the main hypothesis. They are: Hypothesis 9.1, if the country's elites are willing to cooperate with the intervenor, then there is a greater chance of mission success; Hypothesis 9.2, if clear roles and responsibilities for civilian relief organizations and the military are outlined at the Civil-Military Operations center (CMOC), then the plan will offer the commander a greater chance for success; Hypothesis 9.3, if the coordination efforts of the military help the individual civilian relief organizations to continue their operations, there is a greater chance for mission success; and, the final proposition involves prioritization, Hypothesis 9.4, if a priority of support for civilian organizations is established, then the hierarchy established (or supported) by the intervening force will be accepted since the individual groups desire to continue operations.

A discussion on Hypothesis 9 must include the legal basis for the intervention. With Resolution 751 in April 1992 the United Nations authorized an intervention into the

state of Somalia to aid starving Somalis and to attempt to end the hostilities between rival clans. In 1993, Resolution 814 established UNOSOM II as a peacekeeping force. Its objective was to re-establish the political and economic institutions of Somalia. This mission implies: 1) determining who is to blame; and 2) deciding what should be done about it. As already discussed, Aideed was marked as a criminal and American casualties triggered a US withdrawal. However, Aideed's clan-family was not the only source of political violence.

The primary hypothesis brings into question the definition of elite. If elite means being a member of the party, group or clan which is associated with the problem causing the intervention, this member can be considered for governmental position only if he/she is the only adequate candidate. The hypothesis can be verified through the historical illustration of the defeated Axis Powers. According to Stanley Sandler, an Army Special Operations Command historian (1996:22), CA teams found that their most difficult task was finding suitable German administrators. To remain in office, officials had to be: 1) anti-Nazi and, 2) competent. Administrators from before the Nazi era were difficult to find. Sandler reports that these administrators were either dead, too old, or unable to be found. Of course, there were exceptions. Gen. George Patton was criticized for retaining former-Nazis in governmental positions. His practical answer was that they answered the mail.

Somalia suffered from a somewhat different demographic problem than did Germany. Walsh (1996:41) reports that the three-year civil war seriously destabilized demographic patterns. The UN's plan to introduce the Transitional National Council

(TNC) met with disapproval. Local dignitaries of all clans joined in denouncing the UN's program. It had not taken the Somali view into consideration -- there were no negotiations. Through this illustration, we see that Hypothesis 9.1, if the country's elites are willing to cooperate with the intervenor, then there is a greater chance of mission success, is refuted. In another episode which shows an attitude of occupation, CADST 34 reports that Brown and Root began excavation for a military facility without consulting with the locals. In both cases the recovery strategy was to develop future operations with the full participation of local leaders.

Next, we test Hypothesis 9.2, if clear roles and responsibilities for civilian relief organizations and the military are outlined at the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), then the plan will offer the commander a greater chance for success. Col. Kevin Kennedy (1995) reports that on 11 December 1992 the UNITAF Civil-Military Operations Center was collocated with the mission's operations section. The CMOC's focus was civilian relief organization/UN relations. Kennedy explains the CMOC had four missions: 1) to serve as the UNITAF liaison between the civilian relief community and UNOSOM headquarters; 2) to validate and coordinate requests for military support; 3) to function as the UNITAF Civil Affairs Office; and, 4) to monitor military support in the Regional Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs³⁸).

The civilian relief organizations in Somalia organized themselves before the United States intervened. The body which was developed served as a sort of interagency

³⁸ When the CMOC was set up within the G3, or operations section, it was no longer accessible to non-military personnel. HOCs, on the other hand, were accessible to anyone with a humanitarian concern.

coordination group. When the HOC met to coordinate actions, the civilian relief organizations could "speak with one voice" to the Department of State and CMOC representatives. Without this coordinating body, Walsh (1996:42) explains that the local community would willingly play one agency off against the other.

For UNITAF the proposition is born out, with reservations. One of the reasons the commander succeeded was because clear roles and responsibilities -- or at least consensus on them -- were determined for the CMOC. O'Dell (1996) explains that when you combine the Operations Shop and the CMOC, you must have another organization where non-military can meet to prioritize the work load. Despite an added bureaucracy, the proposition is confirmed. However, under the UNOSOM II mission the CMOC was discontinued (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995:114), and the coordination of humanitarian assistance was affected. The proposition is refuted here and assessed with a No.

Next, we examine Hypothesis 9.3, if the coordination efforts of the military help the individual civilian relief organizations to continue their operations, there is a greater chance for mission success. As with the two previous propositions, this proposition, which is derived from organization theory, is confirmed with the UNITAF mission and refuted with the UNOSOM II case. The combined score is therefore negative.

Finally, we discuss Hypothesis 9.4, if a priority of support for civilian organizations is established, then the hierarchy established (or supported) by the intervening force will be accepted since the individual groups desire to continue operations. O'Dell explains that this proposition "is a no-brainer; we have to set a priority of support. There aren't enough assets otherwise." The civilian relief interagency coordination group, or "The

Consortium" (Seiple, 1996:115), set its own priorities based on a consensus of representatives. Of course, the group survived the closing of the CMOC, but the issue is that civilian relief organizations were less involved with the UNOSOM II than they were with UNITAF. The proposition is confirmed for UNITAF and refuted for UNOSOM II, making its combined assessment negative. Since the main hypothesis has been confirmed and the propositions remained balanced by historical illustration, the transition perspective is assessed with a positive rating, indicating that the presence of negotiations favors the transition to civilian rule.

4. Democratic Elections

Hypothesis 10. If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian rule are increased.

The ultimate goal of the transition perspective is the democratization of the country. A history of democracy favors political stability and democratization. Metz (1993:23-28) reports that British Somaliland received its independence 26 June 1960, and was united with the former-Italian southern territory to form the Somali Republic on 1 July 1960. Despite a history of democracy, free and fair elections never occurred.

But, as an exercise in speculation, had President Bush stated from the outset of the intervention that the United States was committed to guaranteeing the democratic stability of Somalia, and the American public showed a commitment to the goal, popular elections could have occurred. The real issue is: to what extent do the elites and publics believe in the value of the democratic system? To answer the question one must look to education and the changing of political culture. Several conditions also apply to the changing of

political culture. Among them are: 1) a history of democracy; 2) a demonstration of the inadequacies of the current form of rule; and, 3) a change agent willing to invest in a long-term program.

Examples from Germany, Italy, Austria and Japan would seem to confirm the hypothesis that democratic elections favor transition to democratic rule. These cases involved often extensive political re-education programs.³⁹ Despite the fact that the former-Axis powers were all industrialized and defeated in war, they represent examples of change in political culture. Somalia, the case at hand, is an agrarian economy which succumbed to a civil war. It is logical to assume that any education program required for democratization is a long-term proposition. Because this question has been answered with the former-Axis examples but not for Somalia, the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor refuted. A negative rating (No) is therefore assessed to the transition perspective.

5. Building Economic Capabilities

Hypothesis 11. If a substantial sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.

Huntington (1991:271) explains that a high correlation exists between the level of economic development and the existence of democratic regimes. With this in mind, the CA planner must consider the viability of the supported country's economy after the

³⁹ See John Gimbel's *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), and John H. Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

forces leave. The intervening force cannot be the essential component of the supported country's economy. Planners must consider the paths which foster an adequate level of sustainable economic activity to support the indigenous population with subsistence, jobs and income. In other words, the economy cannot be dependent on the presence of intervening troops. Industries to consider in the developed world are: 1) agriculture; 2) utility; 3) heavy industry; 4) transportation. However, each unique country will have different ways to achieve self-sufficiency. To determine the appropriate path, once again, information from FAOs, other US government agencies and civilian relief organizations can prove invaluable.

Metz (1993:122-124) suggests the appropriate path toward economic self-sufficiency might be a derivation of Somalia's historic economy: industrial agriculture. Once again, the underlying assumption is that growth in one sector of the economy will spur growth in other sectors.

Because Somalia was wracked by famine during the period of US intervention no agricultural activity was utilized to support the US forces. However, small numbers of the local service sector personnel were used to support the intervening force. CADST 34 (1993) reports the employment of local interpreters, day laborers and security guards. But, as an exercise in speculation, let us consider the US intervention force purchased a substantial portion of bananas, Somalia's largest export crop. This would perform two functions: 1) the local commander might "close the gap" between the demand and supply of fresh fruit for his troops; and, 2) the demand for bananas would spur growth over the entire agricultural sector. This eventual increase in exports to Italy, which may have

insufficient demand, could address a supply shortfall in Central Europe. Most importantly, the growth of the agricultural sector would spur growth in other economic sectors. This goal is long-term and requires the engagement of commerce and agriculture advisors. Although the hypothesis appears sound, it can neither be confirmed nor refuted. The transition perspective is therefore rated negatively (No).

6. Legitimate Government Structures

Hypothesis 12. If the government addresses the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

The condition of legitimate government structures is anchored in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Maslow (1968) describes a range of needs beginning with the most basic, or physiological, and culminating with self-actualization. When basic needs such as hunger are satisfied, the next level is engaged. This level is safety. It requires security and protection, and, until realized, it is a person's most important consideration. In this case we may consider the role of government as reducing the relative level of violence. When these needs are satisfied, the next level (social needs), requiring belongingness and society, is engaged.

The purposes of all governments include the advancement of its citizens' welfare and the maintenance of public order. Functioning governments provide for the first three levels in Maslow's hierarchy. The three governmental functions related to Maslow's hierarchy are: 1) public works; 2) public safety; and, 3) governmental structures.

One of current doctrine's strong points is engineering, doctrinally known as Military-Civic Action. The long-term goal is the building of the socio-economic

infrastructure. Its immediate objectives are clean water, sanitation, sewage. Public works address the citizen's basic physiological needs.

Public safety is theoretically more complicated than public works. It has a legal basis. Licklider (1996:3) explains that the three steps for establishing the rule of law are: 1) selection of the appropriate system of law (traditional, regional, or international); 2) creation of a police force; 3) separation of police functions from the military. An additional two steps are: 1) providing for the local control of police forces; and, 2) separating the police forces from the judiciary. The separation of the police from the military and from the judiciary must be maintained. When a government disregards this separation, it not only violates the principles of international human rights, it will ultimately fail because it loses both justification and credibility. The way the US forces handled the police functions in Somalia tells us two things: 1) localized and divergent efforts indicate a failure in unity of command; and, 2) that UNITAF was, in fact, an occupying force.

The problem of public safety, that is, the inability of civilian relief organizations to deliver relief supplies in Somalia, contributed to the US intervention. The problem was most severe in Mogadishu where the relief organizations paid large sums of money to men driving small trucks with heavy weapons mounted on them. As explained earlier, these "technical" routinely looted the convoys they were hired to protect. Some of the technical were affiliated with rival clans while others were simply bandits.

Disarming the population was the UN's solution, but not until Sahnoun brought Aideed and Ali Mahdi together in January 1993 and the leaders endorsed a national

disarmament plan. According to Hirsch and Oakley (1995:87-95) when Lt. Gen. Johnston told Kittani that the United States was prepared to begin the disarmament process if the UN would accept formal responsibility, Kittani refused and explained that UNITAF was responsible until the US mission was handed over to UNOSOM II. Since the UN failed to accept responsibility, UNITAF enacted a policy of confiscating heavy weapons and raiding arms caches. But, the program stopped short of sending US troops to patrol the streets of the cities. The situation on the ground demanded increased public safety. According to Matthew Bryden (1995:148), more civilian relief workers were killed in the first three months of the intervention than had been killed in the past two years. A police force was required. Licklider (1996:22) reports that a UNITAF team with UNOSOM representation set up a method by which a force of some 2,500 Somali policemen, with UNITAF forces as support, was patrolling the streets by mid-January 1993. With the transition to UNOSOM II the police force withered since it received little or no support from the UN.

In other areas of Somalia, US soldiers patrolled the streets. To illustrate how a police force can diminish its justification and credibility a passage from CADST 34's log (2 December 1993) is valuable. The established speed limit for the area of operation was 25 miles per hour. Task Force (TF) 1-64 soldiers habitually "drive 40-50 mph down the road with horn blaring." Two problems relating to a disregard for both order and Somalis are addressed: 1) first a six-year-old boy was killed when he was struck by a speeding military vehicle; and, 2) the Military Police from TF 1-64 "were caught playing a game they called 'trolling for Sammies'." The "game" entailed:

[T]ying an MRE [Meal, Ready to Eat] and a bottle of water to the line behind the HMMWV [High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle] and trying to bait kids to make a grab for it, when they do the MP either slam their brakes or floor the gas pedal.

This situation, which may be more a problem with the TF 1-64 command than with current doctrine, nonetheless suggests that current doctrine produces an occupier/conqueror mentality in soldiers and therefore strengthens the transition perspective, which strives not only to win the hearts and minds of the people but to produce a guarantor mentality.

Legitimate governmental structures relate to three central functions of government: 1) rule; 2) education; and, 3) taxation. From a United States perspective, governments are made of three components: 1) the legislature, whose members are elected by qualified citizens; 2) the executive, chosen by the people or the legislature; and, 3) the judicial, either elected or appointed, but maintained separate from the other two.

The basic assumption underlying the hypothesis used to test the condition of legitimate government structures is that the intervener is committed to facilitating a self-sufficient democracy. In this way it is similar to the MCA projects of current doctrine. The hypothesis derived for the transition perspective was, in the short term, confirmed, but speculation on this subject assumes a long-term process which has a central goal the changing of Somali political culture. The guarantor force could withdraw after the first two levels of government, as explained by Maslow's hierarchy of needs, are raised to a sufficient level and the third level, governmental structures, is initiated.

Setting up a judiciary in Somalia was problematic since it was not clear what law applied. Licklider (1996:22) reports that the Somalis decided to employ the criminal code

which had been used before the rule of Siad Barre. UNITAF reprinted manuals and recruited personnel. However, when UNOSOM II took over the mission, the program collapsed from lack of resources.

Under the transition approach, the period of transition ends and the period of consolidation begins with the first democratic election, rather than when the force is relieved. As explained previously, when the force does extract itself, it has the capability to re-introduce itself. Both speculation and illustration confirm the hypothesis and the transition perspective is assessed with a positive response.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter dealt with Operation Restore Hope. I analyzed the CMO plans and actions of the US-led UNITAF (United Task Force), which relieved UNOSOM I (United Nations Operations, Somalia I). The chapter was composed of five sections: 1) introduction; 2) methodology; 3) an examination of how current doctrine was employed; 4) an exercise in speculation which allowed us to translate the transition perspective into practice; and, 5) summary and conclusions.

The lack of CA/CMO planning for UNITAF, or the failure for it to be accepted at the national level, strikes at the heart of the planning problem. According to the Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report (1993:IX-9), both CENTCOM and UNITAF commanders realized the importance of CA assets to the success of the mission in Somalia. CA and PSYOP were specifically mentioned in the commander's intent portion of the operations plan, but the plan was published without a Civil Affairs Annex. Despite

the fact that there was no theater plan, local commanders established individual relationships, established priorities and executed missions based on local assessments.

Another question needs to be asked: did the CINC ask for a CA guidance from the JCS? O'Dell explains that Annex G to the operations plan was published based on mission. The US force's mission was to provide security for the civilian relief organizations, not to provide humanitarian assistance. O'Dell says the fact that there were no full-time CA planners on the CENTCOM staff may have contributed to the problem. "Even a generic Annex G," he explains, "would have been better than nothing."

2. Current Doctrine

Current doctrine did not fare well in this case, largely because it was not authorized at the highest levels. Local commanders, however, recognized the value of CMO missions and executed them. The initial shortfall in current doctrine was its failure to consider transitions to civilian control, a major requirement of intervenors in Small Wars. This failure is a reminder that the world situation has changed and that doctrine must change with it. This said, the case demonstrated two points: 1) both national and in-theater planning were poor; and, 2) individual leadership at the tactical level was good. Table 4-1, Outcome coding of CMO hypotheses, graphically describes the relative explanatory power of current Civil-Military Operations doctrine for the Somalia case. The cumulative score of measures was negative.

CMO Mission Activities	Hypotheses	Measure
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)	If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his goals are increased.	Yes
Population and Resource Control (PRC)	If the US military is able to control displaced civilians (DCs) and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives.	No
Foreign Nation Support (FNS)	If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's CSS shortfalls by using host country service and supply, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance of success.	No
Military Civic Action (MCA)	If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host nation will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.	No
Civil Defense (CD)	If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance for attaining his/her goals.	No
Civil Assistance	If civil assistance is employed in the supported country by the US military, the legitimacy of the country will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased.	No Negative

Table 4-1 Outcome coding of CMO hypotheses.

3. Transition Perspective

The transition perspective assumes the following conditions: 1) the country which is supported aspires to democracy; 2) prioritizing is essential; and, 3) guaranteeing democratic expansion is this nation's ultimate goal. Despite the fact that Civil Administration was never employed, the perspective characterizes the transition phase, the change from military administration or assistance to continuing assistance by other agencies, as taking place in a cooperative environment with low infrastructure which

evolved into an uncooperative environment. Based on speculation and historical illustration, the results of the analysis of the hypotheses derived from the transition approach indicate that three of the six hypotheses were confirmed. The results are displayed below:

Transition Approach	Hypotheses	Measure
The social terrain	If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.	No
Public opinion	If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.	No
Negotiations on the rules for transition	If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.	Yes
Democratic elections	If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian control are increased.	No
Economic capabilities	If a significant sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.	Yes
Legitimate government structures	If government institutions address the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.	Yes — Negative

Table 4-2 Outcome coding of Transition Approach hypotheses.

4. Conclusions

The transition perspective has only been tested on paper. However, it allows us to apply another lens to the US intervention in Somalia. By using it as a vantage point certain features of Operation Restore Hope come into focus.

- First, the competing paradigms present us with two choices: short-term welfare or long-term self sufficiency. The planners from the 10th Mountain Division understood the value of CMO planning at the operational and tactical levels, but in the absence of political guidance, efforts were reduced to local band aids. Two lessons from small war are applicable: 1) US forces will be committed when interests are less than vital to the United

States; and, 2) political guidance is needed for the successful conclusion of an operation. Next, the study revealed there were no formal guidelines for the Johnston/Oakley relationship. The transition perspective advocates the setting of a chain of command and priorities. In organizational terms this means defining a hierarchy.

- The next lesson is somewhat related to the first. Both deal with organization and communication. The deletion of the CMOC seems to have struck hard at military/civilian relief organization coordination and may have contributed to the UNOSOM II failure. As long as the military and civilian relief organizations must interface, the CMOC is needed.
- Next, the case study indicates that there may be a false lesson to be learned from the application of overwhelming force. The big war tenets of firepower, manpower and industrial power cannot correct a failed state. A strong arm may keep the lid on a situation in the short run but, when its lifted the underlying problems will resurface. Examples show that the intervention took on the worst characteristics of "ugly occupier mentality"⁴⁰ -- arrogance and disregard for the country's citizens. The hearts and minds lesson drawn from Vietnam was not applied to the Somali case.
- This lesson regards planning. Taw and Peters (1995:22) suggest that mission creep, the requirement of different missions from those the intervening force initially planned, and mission swing, mission changes to met the deterioration or improvement of the operational environment, are situations that planners should plan for. In other words, planners should continually update the perceptual map they are drawing. The FAO will prove a valuable asset in suggesting courses of action. As has been demonstrated, the FAO regional expertise is essential to the conduct of small war.

⁴⁰ William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1958), springs to mind. This statement cuts to the core, not only of American foreign policy but, of the big war, small war debate: "We do not need the horde of 1,500,000 American -- mostly amateurs -- who are now working for the United States overseas. What we need is a small force of well-trained, well-chosen, hard-working, and dedicated professionals. They must be willing to risk their comforts and -- in some lands -- their health. They must go equipped to apply a positive policy promulgated by a clear-thinking government. They must speak the language of the land of their assignment, and they must be more expert in its problems than are the natives." (1958:284)

V. HAITI: OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

[T]he pattern of Haitian history -- periods of instability and periods of dictatorial rule.-- National Security Decision Directive No. 220 (1986)

United Nations Resolution 940 is clear. It authorizes "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership...and...the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities in Haiti." -- Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Secretary for Latin America and the Caribbean, US Agency for International Development (USAID), 1994

A. INTRODUCTION

If the employment of overwhelming force in Somalia was responsible for the limited effectiveness of UNITAF, then the threat of overwhelming force was responsible for the tactical success of Operation Uphold Democracy. Secretary of Defense William Perry spoke with pride of the operations in Haiti on 19 September 1994, in an interview on the *MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour*. Perry called the landing of American troops a "textbook example of coercive diplomacy." From Perry's account, the forced entry of US troops was averted on 18 September 1994 when word of the launching of American aircraft reached the Haitian military at the end of long, tense and unresolved negotiations. As late as August Haitian leaders could watch Congressmen debate the deployment of American troops on satellite TV. The message was unmistakable: The United States was indecisive. If the American public thought of Haiti as another Somalia, the Clinton administration would decide to back down.

The airborne troops provided the military nudge that brought the diplomatic negotiations to their climax. Without the credible military threat that paratroopers from

the 82d Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment were en route, the mission led by former President Jimmy Carter with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn might not have reached a negotiated settlement with Haitian General and de facto President Raoul Cedras. Had the peaceful entry prevented the United States from destroying the *Forces Armees d'Haiti* (FAdH), the instrument of state repression? Was there a need for the Clinton administration to build a foreign policy success in the wake of a perceived failure in Somalia? As explained previously, the dynamics of US interventions have changed since the end of the Cold War. Donald E. Schulz (1996:20) writes that domestic politics was at the root of Operation Uphold Democracy. He lists three factors involved with the decision to intervene: 1) the need to placate the Congressional Black Caucus and other interests groups; 2) the need to defuse the Haitian and Cuban immigration crises; and 3) the need to salvage the credibility of American foreign policy.

The US-led UN peace enforcement PSO in Haiti is categorized as taking place in a low intensity conflict scenario. Planning for Uphold Democracy began in 1992 with the object of restoring democracy to Haiti. There is debate, however, as to whether democracy can be “upheld” or “restored” where it has never existed. Nonetheless, the stated objectives for the mission included the “professionalization” of the Haitian armed forces and police and humanitarian assistance, both civil affairs missions. Once again, I analyze the US civil-military operations plans and actions which supported Admiral Paul Miller, commander-in-chief (CINC) of US Atlantic Command, and compare them with the transition perspective. This study characterizes Operation Uphold Democracy and the

United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) as effective in the short term, but a probable overall failure. Like the UNITAF case, it was effective because its basic aims were achieved by dedicated individual operators backed by overwhelming force. Like the UNOSOM case, it appears to lack the required follow through actions. In both cases the essential efforts needed to consolidate democracy were lacking. The following case study on Haiti is divided into four sections: 1) methodology; 2) an examination of current doctrine and how it was employed; 3) an exercise in speculation which allows us to translate the transition perspective into practice; and, 4) a summary and conclusions.

B. METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

This section seeks to determine which of the theories does a more consistent job of predicting and explaining the mission activities required of PSOs. As with the previous case study, the independent variables are the mission activities of the two perspectives. The dependent variable is mission success which is assessed on two levels, the short-term and the long-term. The same methodological concerns raised in the Somalia chapter (pp. 69-70) apply here.

2. Coding scheme

This case study applies the same coding scheme used in the Somalia chapter (pp. 69-70).

C. CURRENT DOCTRINE

According to Col. Allen W. O'Dell (1996) Civil Affairs planning for Haiti had been underway for two years. The Department of State had the lead and re-establishing a

functional government was a key element in the plans. Over the winter of 1993-94 USACOM considered hiring a contractor to prepare the CMO plans for Haiti, but, according to Lt. Col. James McNaughton (1996:19), the command turned to its regionally-oriented Civil Affairs Brigade, the 358th. Because USACOM did not have a full-time Civil Affairs staff, Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Bingham and Col. Robert D. Norton, the 358th CA Brigade commander and executive officer, worked closely with the USACOM Staff and Brig. Gen. Richard A. Potter of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Bingham and Norton produced a civil-military operations estimate which recommended the employment of both humanitarian assistance and civil administration. The plan Bingham and Norton devised, however, was not coordinated with the plans that were made at other commands involved with the operation. Bingham explained (1996:5) that "what happened early on was a forced merger of at least three different components of civil affairs, each with mutually exclusive agendas."⁴¹

1. Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

Hypothesis 1. If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his/her goals are improved.

Unlike the Somalia case, the humanitarian assistance efforts in Haiti were designed, coordinated and managed by Civil Affairs soldiers. And, regardless of the plan, 2370 or 2380, USAID and civilian relief organizations were to be providing humanitarian

⁴¹ The three "components" to which Bingham refers are: 1) the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which is the only active duty CA unit, and what Bingham calls "the quick-reaction guys"; 2) the 360th CA Brigade, which Bingham calls a "combat, kick-the-door-down and keep-the-civilians out-of-the-way" outfit; and, 3) The 358th CA Brigade, "a non-combat CA element, more used to the permissive entry scenario." From the general's perspective, the three CA units worked well together despite an inadequate structure. (Bingham, 1996:5-6)

assistance in the third phase of the five-phase mission concept.⁴² But money for these operations was needed from the time US forces came ashore. As Boyatt said (1994) "Whoever owns an area is the authority for everything. You own that area in their [the Haitians] eyes." He continued in an interview with Fischer (Boyatt, 1994:26) that Special Forces soldiers were "involved in doing a lot of other people's jobs, because there's a vacuum and there's nobody else there."

Both special and general forces soldiers engaged in Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA) projects. Such projects were intended to create small but sustainable improvements in the lives of the Haitian people. HCA projects included the teaching of health and sanitation classes by SF and CA soldiers. The best examples of humanitarian assistance in Haiti, however, involve the distribution of food. It is largely accepted that there was enough food in Haiti but the threat of mass starvation lay in the poor distribution of it. This can be attributed to the poor state of roads. In one situation, the Army employed helicopters to deliver 21,000 pounds of food donated by the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee from Port-au-Prince to Pignon. In another, the Marines began using their vehicles to deliver food and medical supplies for the Catholic relief service around Cap Haitien. (Anderson, 1994:310)

⁴² The ARSOTF's mission was designed as a five-step process. The steps are: 1) Phase I, alert and reposition to staging bases; 2) Phase II, deployment and start of security and psychological operations; 3) Phase III, ODAs and CADSTs begin the assessment process for later civil-military operations, also, Special Forces teams begin to vet and professionalize Haiti's military; 4) Phase IV, driven by the assessments of Phase III, government agencies and civilian relief organizations would begin the process of building the country; and, 5) Phase V, redeployment of the majority of US forces, based on a fully operational UNMIH. (Fischer, 1996:5)

Operation Uphold Democracy was considered a success largely because the HA mission was accomplished -- hundreds of thousands of people did not starve.⁴³ US forces provided aid, protected it and facilitated relief workers. Therefore a positive rating (Yes) is assigned to current doctrine.

2. Population and Resource Control (PRC)

Hypothesis 2. If the US military is able to control displaced civilians and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives.

The goal of PRC under current doctrine is to minimize civilian interference in military operations. During Operation Uphold Democracy military operations were undertaken to minimize human suffering. There were at least two major PRC activities executed in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. The first is briefly explained in Appendix G and begins this discussion. The second involves land reform in the Artibonite region of Haiti known as the "Rice Bowl."

Operation GTMO (the abbreviation for Guantanamo Bay) captured media attention as the holding area where thousands of Haitians fleeing the Cedras regime were kept. Elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed 27 November 1991 to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to assist the US Navy and Marine Corps in coping with migrants⁴⁴ who flooded from Haiti. Along with a composite unit from the Army Reserve, the 96th established and administered six tent camps for more than 37,000 migrants. Using translators and indigenous leaders, CA and SF soldiers established order in the

⁴³Analysts (McNaughton, 1996; Schulz, 1996) argue that the general population was at no great risk of starvation and that HA was secondary to the main mission of restoring democracy.

⁴⁴The mission of establishing migrant camps was given the code name Operation Safe Harbor and was later changed by CINC ACOM to Operation GTMO.

camps through administering sanitation and messing procedures and separating the discordant elements from peaceful families. The majority of the migrants were repatriated in early 1992. (McNaughton, 1995:13)

The second PRC operation, code-named Operation Rice Bowl I and II, employed control tactics learned in Vietnam. According to Maj. Dan Daoust (1996), the PRC operation in the "Rice Bowl" was undertaken to control people who were trying to grab some of the most productive land in Haiti. The Artibonite valley, along the western coast of Haiti, has for centuries been known as Haiti's rice bowl. The low-lying marshland is ideal for rice production, and accounts for the majority of Haiti's rice crop. Nearly 200 years ago following the Haitian Revolution in 1804, the land was divided among the newly-freed slaves. "It was like a patch-work quilt. The land was divided into small family plots along the lines of traditional French peasant land ownership," explained Daoust. "Deeds for each parcel were issued to each small holder who handed down the property to his children." While this allowed for a relatively equal distribution among the peasants, the small holders were basically subsistence farmers. Consequently, overall production was greater during Haiti's colonial period.

Daoust (1996) explained that the ownership of the small holdings remained unchanged for nearly 100 years until a rapid turnover of regimes led to the issuance of multiple deeds for the same parcel of land. "With the coming of a new regime, came new deeds," Daoust said. "At one point the repository for the 'original deeds' burned to the ground. New deeds continued to be issued, and most land disputes were settled by 'the law of the machete'."

In February 1995 two task forces each consisting of an SFODB (Special Forces Operational Detachment B) command and control element; a company of light infantry; a troop of light cavalry (HMMWV), four SFODAs, one CA team; one PSYOP team and Haitian lawyers from the Ministry of Justice occupied the major towns of the Rice Bowl. According to Daoust, the US forces were well received by the population since they saw the operation as a security enforcement measure. Outsiders had begun to infiltrate the Rice Bowl and disputed the ownership of lands. According to Daoust, when the operation started there were two or three murders per day. As a result of these two operations, there was an immediate reduction in violence in the area. "For a period of several weeks, there were no murders," Daoust explained. The Americans planned future operations to implement automated PRC measures to control outside access, but these were preempted by the Haitian government.

As history had shown the hoe-farmers of the area, when a new regime took power, land also would be taken. The Aristide government issued a decree that all land under ownership dispute reverted to the control of the government to be used as collective farms until the rightful ownership could be proven. The deed issue was slow and convoluted. "Ownership can't be proven," explained Daoust. He suggested that the *Lavalas* party will maintain control of the lands since it has little interest in reparable land and communal farms have been a long-time goal of the party.

Although data on land holdings in the rice bowl are unavailable, Daoust explained that Operation Rice Bowl was considered effective in the short term because violence was reduced. However, the long-term problem of land reform proved too large to be

influenced by the US actions. In the final analysis, both Operation GTMO and Rice Bowl controlled population flows in the short run. Therefore, current doctrine is assessed with a positive mark.

3. Foreign Nation Support (FNS)

Hypothesis 3. If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's CSS shortfalls by using host country goods and services, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance at success.

According to FM 41-10 (1993:10-2), the preferred means for closing the gap in the intervening force's Combat Service Support (CSS) requirements is to secure goods and services locally. The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that a demand for goods and services in a country will stimulate growth and development in both the sector from where the goods or services are derived and in other sectors of the economy.

McNaughton (1996:30) explains that FNS, a civil-military operations mission activity, was contracted to Brown and Root because they were able to organize support and hire locals more easily as a private business than CA soldiers would have been able to do. Despite, Brown and Root's relative value in this area, they were not read into the plans for Haiti. Moreover, three conditions must be met before Brown and Root can be used. According to Col. James B. Stafford, J4, JTF 180 (1994:274) these are: 1) a safe environment; 2) funding; and, 3) an interim solution. As the interim solution, the XVIII Airborne Corps Support Command, 1st COSCOM, provided the required combat service support (CSS) until Brown and Root could accept the mission. Stafford (1994:280) explained that 1st COSCOM provided logistics support to the multi-national forces "at least until the United Nations took over."

Nonetheless, according to Stafford (1994:276), JTF 180 had contracting officers who went ashore and worked for JTF 190. “[W]ithin the first 10 days they had 80 contracts, about \$1.2 million worth of contracts that were available right here that we didn’t have to bring from the United States.” Stafford reports that contracts were let for lumber, fans and services, to include “finding the one Haitian truck that could service latrines.” As in Somalia, the logistics capabilities of the United States military had proven superior. But, a question arises: if, as Stafford (1994:286) expects and Brown and Root “works out,” will the Haitian economy benefit? Because the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor refuted, current doctrine is assessed with a negative mark (No).

4. Military Civic Action (MCA)

Hypothesis 4. If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host government will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.

This mission activity is exactly what was called for by a Foreign Internal Defense definition of the mission, but, the FAdH had never required legitimacy to obtain the compliance of the Haitian population. This is not to say that what have been called military civic action projects did not occur.

From the start, the White House had declared that the United States would not get involved with nation building. But Anderson (1994:308) recalls that during the interagency rock drill at Fort Drum, New York, the weekend prior to the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State said, “Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could go in and get all the power ready to turn on, and when Aristide

comes back he walks in and symbolically turns on the light switch and all the lights come on in the country?" Simply put, this is nation building.

According to Dr. Joseph Fischer (1995:108) the soldier to whom the JSOTF commander delegated responsibility for accomplishing Operation Light Switch was a first sergeant from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, First Sergeant Ronald Johnson. He coordinated for transportation, fuel and repair parts. The first real problem was funding. Despite his best efforts at innovation and scrounging Johnson could not secure the needed money. General officers, including Bingham and Potter, worked at securing Title 10 monies⁴⁵ for this and other projects. Bingham (1996) explained:

"[T]he soldiers didn't like to just hold their weapons at port arms. This was an opportunity to show that the Army could do more than just break things. There was the urge to help. Soldiers wanted to do some good. Calls came up the chain of command with proposals to do something for these people. A lot of rationalization went into 'restoring Haiti to its pre-invasion status' [since there was no invasion] there was really nothing to do. Then we looked at Title 10 and defined '*de minimus*'⁴⁶ as the amount of work a squad of soldiers could do in one day at a cost of \$1,000. The JAG guys who made it happen were Captain Jackson and Navy Captain Rose, of the ACOM staff." However, this project easily exceeded the \$1,000 cap and would take a number of days just to get started.

Fischer reports (1995:109) that the ACOM Judge Advocate requested Department of State approval for Operation Light Switch. "In less than six hours ACOM approved the request and JCS and Department of State concurrence soon followed." By 30 September 1996, after the movement of thousands of gallons of diesel fuel by convoy and

⁴⁵ Simply said, Title 10 monies may be used for military project of direct military relevance, or to accomplish projects considered essential to the performance of the MNF mission, that is "to provide a safe and secure environment." DOD funds could be used when they were within the scope of a day's work for a squad of soldiers and the cost was no more than \$1,000, according to the Joint Staff Message to CINCUSACOM, dated 2013311Z October 1994.

⁴⁶ The phrase means "minimal" or so small as to be inconsequential. See FM 41-10:10-18 for a doctrinal explanation. Bingham describes the method for arriving at the dollar amount allowed by dominus as "trying to find some fuzzy, weasel wording..." (Bingham, 1996:17).

repairs to generators, the first flickers of electric light returned to towns which had been without electricity for almost a year. The Americans continued delivering fuel and repairing the generators until mid-January 1995 when the reluctant Aristide government finally paid Haitian electrical workers and assumed responsibility for Haitian public works.

From a psychological perspective Operation Light Switch provided the Haitian population with a clear example of improving conditions. US forces had demonstrated to the Haitians what a democracy could do.

Tracy Kidder (1995:73-74) reporting in *The New Yorker*, explained that when Capt. Jonathan Carroll, the commander of ODA 323, entered the village of Coudgoye, the people, through an interpreter, told the captain what they expected from his soldiers. They wanted a new school, schoolbooks, teachers' salaries, a new road and a dam for their irrigation system and for electricity. Carroll told the crowd that he was there to secure the peace without taking sides with either Aristide's *Lavalas* party or the FRAPH (the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti). His men would help the people of Coudgoye help themselves. Coudgoye like many other Haitian towns had no potable water, no electricity, no functioning market, no clinic and no school. The main problem seemed to be the lack of navigable roads. Carroll's team joined with ODA 376 to continue their program of gathering volunteers to work on roads barely passable by an Army tactical vehicle. To start with the volunteers worked with picks and shovels. Later, abandoned vehicles were collected, repaired and used in the road-building effort. Daoust, who was Carroll's commander, says it was hard to find someone to "pin the rose on. We used local volunteers and experts who were not connected with the government." In

Hinche, for example, one of the "Top 10 Civil Affairs Projects" was the repair of the water system. Civilian relief organizations and civilian volunteers helped soldiers rebuild the system. Only one Haitian water works employee contributed to the effort. (Fischer, 1996:117) Because neither the Haitian government nor its military were involved in the civic action projects, the legitimacy of the government was not enhanced. The US forces accomplished many infrastructure rehabilitating tasks with the help of Haitian civilians and civilian relief organizations. Bingham (1996) explains that the operations in Haiti "were more like neighborhood assistance than nation building. They were '*de minimus*' projects like well digging, pump repair and getting the generators running. But, as the JTF 180, J5 said (Anderson, 1994:308), "restoring electricity; giving them temporary sources of water; doing things for them and, in effect, demonstrating that you are more efficient than their leadership, is hardly a format for success."

Because MCA is predicated on enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation government, host government participation is required. When the supported government is unwilling or unable to accept the legitimacy which is offered to it by an occupying power, the projects which are accomplished cannot be considered MCA projects in the traditional sense. They may, however, be considered as humanitarian action or civil assistance. Because these projects may be categorized as other CMO mission activities, the hypothesis is confirmed. Therefore, current doctrine is assessed with a positive mark.

5. Civil Defense (CD)

Hypothesis 5. If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance for attaining his/her goals.

Civil defense deals with the immediate emergency conditions created by an attack or natural and manmade disasters. Initially, CA personnel determine the status of local civil defense planning and organization in the host country. Then, CA personnel coordinate planning for: 1) government, 2) industry, 3) public utilities, 4) public health and, 5) emergency situations. According to FM 41-10 (1993:10-2), support to civil defense may be conducted as MCA or HA.

In November 1994 Tropical Storm Gordon swept over the island. More than 500 people were reported killed. Mud slides destroyed homes and crops. Again, the Haitian government was unable to help itself. US forces provided civil defense in the form of humanitarian assistance to the people of Jacmel and Leogane. The relief effort in Jacmel began 18 November with assessments. By 20 November an LCU (Landing Craft Utility) loaded with 18 vehicles of humanitarian supplies arrived in the town. The lead agency distributing the supplies was Catholic Relief Services with soldiers from ODB 320 providing the labor. In Leogane, a town of more than 22,000 where some 800 homes were destroyed and the water system was contaminated, the agency assuming the lead was UNICEF. It coordinated the efforts of Catholic Relief Services, Concern, International Organization for Migration, Haitian Red Cross and local civic and religious leaders. US soldiers delivered water and food to outlying areas. (Fischer, 1995:121)

One great capability of CMO is medical support. Medical assistance in Haiti was intended to focus on providing training to health care providers rather than on treating patients. However, Ministry of Health officials proved unable to readily accept aid from American medical personnel. According to Brig. Gen. James Peake, commander of the

44th Medical Brigade (1995:343), "I've heard all kinds of things about the Haitian Health Care System. When we got there, one of the first guys I saw was the legitimate Minister of Health, Dr. Moliere [Jean], and he talked about his vision of turning a hotel into a hospital but he had no expertise to do that. So my guys went and did that." Outside Port-au-Prince the situation was little different.

Generally, CD medical support ranges from the care of combat casualties to the prevention of epidemics; however, during Operation Uphold Democracy US soldiers provided the bulk of health care for the island country. The hypothesis inferred from current doctrine is refuted. Current doctrine is negatively assessed since neither the government nor the military was involved with CD.

6. Civil Administration

Hypothesis 6. If civil administration is employed to support the host government by the US military, the legitimacy of the government will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives will be increased.

Current doctrine does not consider civil administration among the list of CMO mission activities. It is, however, a Civil Affairs mission. There are three types of civil administration: 1) civil assistance; 2) civil administration in a friendly territory; and, 3) civil administration in an occupied territory. US Army operations in Haiti fell into the second category.

Early in October 1994, Ambassador William Lacy Swing considered it necessary to help the Aristide government get on its feet. Swing saw the necessity of having the Haitian government involved in managing the flow of aid into the country. Civilian relief organizations and donor nations had yet to get their aid programs up and running and the

only available expertise was the military. According to Bingham (1996:22), when “Admiral Miller got the cable ... he said, ‘Bingham, this has your name written all over it.’ It was clearly a civil administration mission.”

The concept Bingham devised was the Ministerial Assistance Team (MAT).⁴⁷ The MAT was a group of professionals who would provide support to civil administration in a friendly territory to reinforce or restore a friendly government. The 358th identified 12 specific ministries of the GOH and allocated the most qualified soldiers to them. The MAT mission was to:

- Provide start-up assistance to new GOH ministries using civil affairs technical advisors to perform initial assessments and assist in organizing planning.
- Recommend strategies that will facilitate linkages with USAID and other long term providers of development assistance.

Each team was to coordinate with the American Embassy, USAID and with representatives of the Aristide government. Moreover, Bingham (1996) said, “There were things we could do and things we couldn’t do. We could provide basic assistance, prepare technical assessments, complete some interim tasks and show the ministries how to manage long-term projects effectively.” On the other hand, Bingham explained, “we couldn’t get involved in running the government. We could provide no funding. And, I told everyone to say we were only here for in the interim.” Appendix H shows the time line and function of the six iterations of MATs.

“This is the best example of civil administration since Korea [1950-53],” Bingham (1996) explained. “And here’s what is different: We were not there to run the

⁴⁷These were originally known as Ministerial Advisory Teams. Bingham (1996) explained the teams provided as much assistance as advice and corrected me several times when I used the term “advisory.”

government. We were there to advise.” The hypothesis, if civil administration is employed to support the host government by the US military, the legitimacy of the government will be enhanced and the commander’s chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased, is confirmed. Therefore, current doctrine receives a positive (Yes) assessment.

D. TRANSITION APPROACH

Although stated as national policy, democratic enlargement and engagement is not the goal of CMO planners. A more basic and attainable goal is the transition of the main effort from the military to other agencies. As discussed in Chapter III, other theories employed in this perspective include: organization, mass communication, balance of power, and motivation. These theories are employed to test how the military, once committed, can stabilize the situation, then extract itself, or transition to civilian control. The key component of this method is working the transition from the start. The conditions favoring the transition to civilian control are: 1) the supported country’s society and its history of democracy; 2) public opinion; 3) negotiations on the rules for transition; 4) democratic elections; 5) economic capabilities; and 6) legitimate government structures. I address these conditions with the six mission activities of the transition approach.

1. The Supported Country’s Society and Its History of Democracy

Hypothesis 7. If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.

Hypothesis 7 follows from Huntington’s assertion (1991:270) that it is reasonable to conclude that prior democratic experience is conducive to the stabilization of

democracies. Two secondary hypotheses, both based on intelligence, also can be derived from this condition. Hypothesis 7.1 is, if the CMO planner has information on the sources and patterns of the particular conflict, then his or her plan will offer the commander a greater chance at success. Hypothesis 7.2 is, if the CMO planner has information on the intent of the groups in a particular conflict, then his or her plan will offer the commander a greater chance at success.

According to Bingham (1996:2) the strategic and operational Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process failed to provide commanders a proper focus of the factors which affected the mission. "I think the military tends to focus on the adverse." He added, "They [military intelligence] were pretty well parallel track [with the media]." Other sources of intelligence, such as area studies from CA and FAO personnel and information from PSYOP intelligence analysts, might have helped to produce the perceptual map needed to answer questions appropriate to Civil-Military Operations planning. To prepare the appropriate CMO, the planner must understand Haiti. To understand Haiti, one has to understand its history.

Rotberg (1971:272) explains that unlike the governments of other colonies in the Caribbean which provided a stable administrative framework for development, Haiti's successive governments plundered the private sector and wasted resources, neglecting the provision of goods and services expected of governments. Inferring from R. A.

Humphreys' thesis⁴⁸ on Latin America's *caudillo*⁴⁹ tradition (1959:155), the Haitian experience, although French, not Spanish, fits the model. The Old World colonies in the New World were based on the principle of authority. Because of the distance from Europe, the colonials adjusted their relationship with European authority: They were used to authority but they were used to ignoring authority, as well. Authority became measured by the proximity of the threat and use of force and its camouflage of popular representation. Rotberg (1971:272) labels the Haitian brand of *caudillo* as predation. This is power politics -- where force plays the dominant role. Like his Spanish counterpart, the Haitian predator was usually a soldier and generally fell by force. With 22 changes in government from 1843 until 1915, Haiti experienced periods of intense political and economic disorder. Schulz and Marcella (1994:11) report that the Haitian society is an intolerant one. Political and class conflicts are so bitter that, regardless of who is at the top at any time, violence and terror are never far from the surface. John T. Fishel (1994) reports that Haiti's politics amounts to gang violence.

Viewing Haiti's political culture from this perspective, the 31-year dictatorship of the Duvalier family was remarkably only because of its longevity. Duvalier stressed the African heritage of the majority of Haitians, but essentially the urban, black bourgeoisie who supported him behaved as the ruling oligarchy always had, abusing those not in

⁴⁸Other cultural explanations for Haiti's political and economic underdevelopment center on racist interpretations. Rotberg (1971:271), for example, suggests that a backlash from slavery may be responsible for Haitian preference toward leisure and away from output.

⁴⁹G. I. Blanksten describes *caudillos* as "monarchs in republican dress," the "national leaders," those "men with a mission" in *Ecuador, Constitutions and Caudillos* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1951).

power. The dynamic of predation remained. Because the country's wealth passed through the hands of a few strong men, sufficient quantities of public goods and services are not provided to the public. Consequently, the Haitian private sector, including the church, provides a large share of educational service and private companies maintain public roads.

However, in 1987 a constitution was adopted which provided for an elected bicameral parliament, an elected President who serves as head of state, a prime minister, and a cabinet of ministers and supreme court appointed by the President. This was an attempt at establishing political democracy. In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67 percent of the vote in presidential elections. Aristide took office in February 1991, but was overthrown in September. Until September 1994 a series of parliamentary-approved and military-backed Presidents governed the country. Haiti's dysfunctional political culture is a product of socialization and experience of the predator state. The country has no real democratic history. Ultimately, there can be no political democracy without a measure of social democracy. Social democracy begins with the state providing for the progress of the people. For Haiti to be democratic, glaring social inequities, illiteracy and poverty must be addressed. Here, the two subordinate hypotheses come into play.

Both Hypothesis 7.1 and 7.2 are answered by asking appropriate historical questions. Some questions which would affect a CMO plan and operation for Haiti are: 1) do we understand the class rivalries?; 2) do we understand the *caudillo* culture, or the predator state?; and, 3) do we understand the role of gangs in the society? In country, the

three “components” of CA may have employed a political-analytical factors study, but none of the current analytical factors addresses class rivalries, the predator state or gang politics. Therefore, neither the main hypothesis nor its supporting hypotheses were addressed by current doctrine. These findings tend to diminish the explanatory power of current doctrine and strengthen the transition perspective. A positive assessment is therefore awarded to the transition perspective.

2. Positive Public Opinion

Hypothesis 8. If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.

We start with the first hypothesis and consider whether the American public really knew why the military was intervening in Haiti. This consideration is closely associated with the military’s questions on what it was involved in: upholding democracy, restoring an ousted leader, or providing a safe and secure environment. I propose that the media presentation of a distressed and abused Haitian population prompted the United States to execute a mission to “uphold democracy.”

But, as explained earlier, one cannot uphold democracy where there is none. Bingham (1996) suggested that the media may have had a hand in driving the Clinton administration on an idealistic operation. He explained that in the months prior to the intervention the *New York Times* printed stories of a corrupt, racist, disease-infested island where the people had no morals, no work ethic and no future under their military government. “Intelligence estimates [said] about the same,” Bingham said. “It took me only a couple of hours to see that these reports were off by about 179 degrees. Haiti is

probably the most color blind society I've ever seen. They had no chip on their shoulders. They had a work ethic. They had a love and appreciation for what his country was doing for them."

I propose that the United States missed an opportunity to present the intervention in a positive image early in the operation. The opportunity to bill Haiti as essentially a civil assistance or civil administration mission to a friendly government would have addressed by Hypothesis 8.1.

However, like the various levels of Civil Affairs, the military's primary agents for influencing public opinion, public affairs and PSYOP did not operate in a coordinated effort. According to Bingham (1996), "PSYOP was part of a worldwide effort⁵⁰ and it seemed the PAO guys came and went as they wanted. There was no effort to coordinate the two."⁵¹ To bring the theory back to a practical level, public affairs officers could have escorted the media along with PSYOP teams in Rice Bowl I and II as the teams worked the themes for a need to stop the violence and to spread peace and democracy.

⁵⁰According to Fischer (1996:51) PSYOP planning for Haiti began in March 1993 and was largely concerned with the flow of migrants from Haiti. The plan involved the broadcast of Radio Liberty on three FM bands and the dropping of 10,000 small radios on Haiti. The goal was to educate the people on the benefits of democracy. PSYOP campaigns involved three messages: 1) "help us help you," broadcasts and other products making clear the intentions of the United States; 2) "a hearts and minds" approach, publicizing the benefits of the intervention; and, 3) "cash for guns," appealing to the people to sale their firearms, a constitutionally guaranteed right.

⁵¹Fischer (1996:72) explained that an innovation to emerge from Operation Uphold Democracy was the creation of an Information Coordinating Committee (ICC) under the United States Information Service (USIS). Beginning in September 1995 the ICC served as the coordinating agency for all public affairs activities. Representatives involved with the ICC were: 1) JTF Operations Center; 2) Joint Information Bureau (JIB); 3) Joint Operations Psychological Task Force (JPOTF); 4) USAID; 5) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART); 6) Public Affairs Office (PAO); and, 7) Department of Justice Police Training Team (ICITAP). My point is that the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), or the JTF Operations Center, should have integrated the civil-military operations portion of the overall operation through the ICC.

The hypothesis can be neither confirmed nor denied. Because there was no clear statement of goals, one may only speculate that announcing one from the beginning would make a difference. Current debate at the national level on the value of the intervention does not bear on a clear statement of goals but rather on human rights. With this in mind, the transition perspective is assessed with a No.

Negotiations on the Rules for Transition

Hypothesis 9. If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

Several subordinate propositions are derived from the main hypothesis. They are: Hypothesis 9.1, if the country's elites are willing to cooperate with the intervenor, then there is a greater chance of mission success; Hypothesis 9.2, if clear roles and responsibilities for civilian relief organizations and the military are outlined at the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), then the plan will offer the commander a greater chance for success; Hypothesis 9.3, if the coordination efforts of the military help the individual civilian relief organizations to continue their operations, there is a greater chance for mission success; and, Hypothesis 9.4, if a priority of support for civilian organizations is established, then the hierarchy established (or supported) by the intervening force will be accepted since the individual groups desire to continue operations.

A discussion of the negotiations on the rules for transition must include the legal basis for the intervention. The first real negotiations between the Cedras regime, the Aristide government in exile and the international community occurred 3 July 1993 at

Governors Island, New York. When the terms of this agreement failed, the United Nations authorized an intervention into the state of Haiti, empowered under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. During the month of August, the United States sought coalition partners for the MNF as required by the Santiago Commitment to Democracy. UNSCR 940 implied the end of the US-led MNF was to come when it had achieved a "safe and secure environment." The resolution was also written to provide for a separate police force and the Haitian army would be "professionalized."⁵² However, to prevent another coup, Aristide dissolved the FAdH 28 April 1995. Their police duties would be assumed by a new internationally-trained body of civilian police beginning 4 June 1995. Already, we see that what was negotiated and what occurred did not match.⁵³

Next, UNSCR 940 carried with it at least two implied tasks: 1) as Ambassador Madeline Albright said, "there will be a substantial influx of technical and economic aid," and, 2) someone would have to provide the GOH with the know-how to accept this aid.

The military provided this expertise. Both OPLANs 2370 and 2380 mistakenly assumed that civilian relief organizations of all types would be capable of providing assistance to the Haitian people early in the operation. The aid alluded to by Albright was

⁵²For more information on the structure and corruption of the FAdH see Michel S. Laguerre, "Business and Corruption: Framing the Haitian Military Question," *California Management Review* (Spring 1994). Additionally, the coalescing of the military and the police was an American idea. The force was established, modernized and professionalized by the US Marines from 1915 through 1934 and served as both defender of the half-island state and as a police force. The differentiation of the police and army functions became obvious to the US military after World War II as the professionalization of the German police was undertaken.

⁵³One must ask whether the DOD and the DOS were working in a coordinated fashion. The implication is that the intervening power's plan should be well thought-out before it is put into operation. Col. Allen W. O'Dell explained, "the State Department had the lead on the Haiti operation. Re-establishing a functional government was a key element in the plans. The goal was to administer to the needs of the public and [the Department of] Justice failed to deliver."

slow to arrive. Fischer (1996) explained, "the plan was for the military to assess and the NGOs to fix. But, they [the civilian relief organizations] weren't prepared and the military picked up the shortfall." Fischer's comment addresses the tactical level: SFODAs and conventional units provided what Bingham called "community assistance." At the strategic level, as discussed in a previous section, the GOH received ministerial-level assistance from the MATs from the 358th CA Brigade. Both remedies to the problems of having neither donated aid nor structure to manage it were solved by the military despite its not having specifically planned for doing them.

Hypothesis 9 addresses the tactical level. The military's "community assistance" efforts were generally completed with the aid of Haitian volunteers and civilian relief organization workers. According to Daoust (1996), "local leaders were sometimes hard to find, but we tried to show the people the Aristide government was associated with progress." This condition seems to confirm the hypothesis. But the hypothesis calls into question whether members of the previous elite will have a seat in the new government. Political figures affiliated with both *Lavalas* and opposition parties have been assassinated.⁵⁴ Perhaps, this tit-for-tat phenomena is associated with Aristide's reversal on his promise to maintain the military. The opposition may see the *Lavalas* party as attempting to consolidate its hold on power by disallowing their access to government. Regardless of the reasons for the situation, the inclusion of both the former elite and the new elite in a coalition government, although possible, can be neither confirmed nor

⁵⁴Schulz (1996) reports that US military intelligence estimates that there have been more than 80 political killings since October 1994. The UN's International Civilian Mission, which monitors the human rights condition reports that there have been some 20 commando-styled assassinations since Aristide's return.

refuted. The democratic experiment is not yet mature enough to make a call. The primary hypothesis is therefore rated negatively.

Hypothesis 9.1 states that if the country's elites, both new and old, are willing to cooperate with the intervenor, then there is a greater chance of mission success. This proposition assumes impartiality. In contrast to UNITAF, Operation Uphold Democracy was not completely impartial but the operation could afford to be so for two reasons: 1) the overwhelming coercive force applied; and, 2) the obvious and desperate need of the majority of Haitians.

The United States and the UN effectively took the side of the *Lavalas* party when it agreed with Aristide that the professionalization of the FAdH meant its destruction. The international community guaranteed the interests of Aristide's government. Nonetheless, the *Lavalas* government has proven to be no rubber stamp for Aristide. Schulz (1996:44) reported that even Aristide does not have control over *Lavalas* party deputies as illustrated by their rejection of the Prime Minister's budget and of Aristide's nominee for national police chief. The hypothesis is therefore rated positively. Despite its one-party make-up, the present government has not become another totalitarian state but exhibits characteristics of democracy. In this situation the new elites have demonstrated not only a willingness to cooperate with the intervening force, but a willingness to govern responsibly.

The next proposition concerns actions at the CMOC. Hypothesis 9.2 states that if clear roles and responsibilities for civilian relief organizations and the military are outlined at the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), then the plan will offer the commander a

greater chance for success. Bingham (1996) explained "coordination was essential. Our goal was to get the aid to where it was needed." O'Dell (1996) explained of the Somalia case, that when you combine the Operations Shop and the CMOC, you must have another organization where non-military can meet to prioritize the work load. For Haiti this organization was the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). Despite an added level of bureaucracy, the proposition is confirmed.

Hypothesis 9.3 states that if the coordination efforts of the military help the individual civilian relief organizations to continue their operations, there is a greater chance for mission success. Illustrations from the civil defense activities in Hinche and Jacmel are good examples of this kind of organizational behavior. As with the previous proposition, this proposition is confirmed and receives a positive (Yes) rating.

Hypothesis 9.4 states that if a priority of support for civilian organizations is established, then the hierarchy established (or supported) by the intervening force will be accepted since the individual groups desire to continue operations. As with the Somalia case, prioritizing limited assets was essential in Haiti. Bingham (1996) explained that the revolutionary concept in Haiti was the HACC (Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center). "PVOs, NGOs could get retail, store-front access to CA planners. We set up in the USAID building. It was open-door, walk-in, outside-the-wire access to the CA planners. They could request assistance and coordinate. Sometimes, say, the Red Cross would have transportation available, but no mission, and sometimes there would be a mission with no transportation. Nothing could be worse than shipping several tons of supplies to some location then having an NGO show up in the same place with the same

kind of aid.” Hypothesis 9.4 therefore receives a positive rating. Ultimately, the hypotheses offer us mixed results and an overall negative rating must be assessed.

4. Democratic Elections

Hypothesis 10. If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian rule are increased.

The ultimate goal of the transition perspective is the democratization of the country. As we have seen, the operation in Haiti was not an issue on upholding or restoring democracy but one of starting from scratch. The first step toward holding an election is registering voters.

According to Niblack (1995:18) the process of registering voters for the often-delayed legislative and municipal elections of June and July and the presidential election of December 1994 went “relatively smoothly.” On the other hand, Schulz (1995:6) calls the elections a “near disaster.” Fischer (1996) explained the problem “probably depends on your definition of ‘free and fair’.” Regardless of definition the registration and voting processes were well monitored.

The processes were monitored by US Special Forces soldiers; UNMIH; UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL); Haiti’s Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), which was formed of “migrants” from GTMO; and, Organization of American States officials. These monitoring agencies provided security at the departmental and communal electoral offices, called BEDs (*Bureau Electoraux Departmentaux*) and BECs (*Bureau Electoraux Communaux*), as well as at the BIVs (*Bureau d’Inscription et de Vote*), the registration and polling sites.

Despite this formidable array of monitors, Niblack (1995:18) explained that there was potential for wide-spread fraud since some 800,000 blank voter registration cards were unaccounted for. Schulz (1995:6) focused on organizational chaos and occasional violence. Fischer said, "It was a situational approach. If 51 percent of the districts reported free elections, then they were fair. This was Haiti. Don't link Haitian standards with US standards. I don't think anyone in America would agree that if 26 states had free elections, the overall election was fair." Ultimately, opposition parties repudiated the vote and the result in both the municipal and legislative elections was an overwhelming *Lavalas* victory. The next elections were the December presidential elections when Aristide's hand-picked successor, Rene Preval, won with 87.9 percent of the 28 percent of the population who voted. Elections by themselves are not enough to guarantee democracy. The intervening power must be prepared to support the new government.

Bingham (1996) explained that the MAT worked to support the new government. Where many commands considered that once elections occurred the mission was complete, "the Civil Administration function was really just beginning. We had to make assessments and determine whether the ministry could accept assistance. Some were staffed with professional diplomats, others were run by political appointees. We had to make suggestions on how we might complete the task." Successful governmental actions had to be credited to the new order. As Special Representative to the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi said, the acceptance of the new order by the wealthy elite depended, at least in part, on Washington giving its unqualified support to the government that emerged after the elections. At the bottom of Brahimi's statement is the real issue: to what extent

do the elites and publics believe in the value of the democratic system? To answer the question one must look to education and the changing of political culture. These conditions are considered in the discussion on Hypothesis 12.

Ultimately, the hypothesis can be neither be confirmed nor refuted. Elections are one thing, but popular and international support for the elected government is another. Brahim was right: only time will tell whether the *Lavalas* party will revert to the opportunism and abuses of power which are Haitian tradition. The score assessed to the transition perspective is No.

5. Building Economic Capabilities

Hypothesis 11. If a substantial sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.

If the task in Haiti is assisting the country to build democracy from scratch, then the same can be said for the Haitian economy. In both situations there were only the most basic of foundations. Because there is a high correlation between the level of economic development and the existence of democratic regimes, building economic capabilities is the concern of both the intervening military and its nation's policy makers. Bingham (1996) said, "the PVOs and NGOs were to be involved in 'business incubation'." In other words, the Army does not build the economy and building the economy is Bingham's definition of how to build the nation. But the civilian relief organizations were slow to deliver. With this in mind, the CA planner must consider the effects of the intervening force on the supported country's economy. This said, it is imperative that the intervening force not become the essential component of the supported country's economy. Planners must

consider the paths which foster an adequate level of sustainable economic activity to support the indigenous population with subsistence, jobs and income. Because each country is unique, it will have different ways to achieve self-sufficiency. Since the area of interest is not the consolidation of economic self-sufficiency, but rather the initiation of economic growth.

According to Michel-Rolf Trouillot (1995), peasant productivity today is less than it was in 1843. The trend toward economic devolution was made worse by three years of international economic sanctions. During this time, the wealth of the country was further consolidated in the hands of relatively few who profit at the expense of the majority of Haitians. The FAdH both protected these elites and was a component of the predator society which profited through monopolies, an unfair tax system and coercion. The overall resulting general economic performance was dismal. Estimates of per capita GDP ranged from \$250 (Schulz, 1996:11) to \$350 (Niblack, 1995:20). Unemployment reportedly stood at 80 percent. These indicators place Haiti on a level with sub-Saharan Africa. Building economic capabilities was a necessary variable in either upholding democracy or maintaining a safe and secure environment. The underlying assumption is that growth in one sector of the economy will spur growth in other sectors. Simultaneous growth in a number of sectors is even better. The question a CA planner should ask himself is: which economic sectors can provide sustainable growth during the coming social and political change?

Besides the massive injection of donor capital and technical assistance, Aristide (1994:4-5) suggests one appropriate path toward economic self-sufficiency might be a

return to a source of high peasant productivity: industrial agriculture. -His plan includes the removal of tariffs on all items save basic grains (rice and sorghum). Of direct importance to the commander of the intervening force is the fact that the economic sector could not have been used to sustain the force. As described before, the sector had been reduced to the subsistence level.

The 358th's Ministerial Assistance Teams focused not only on assessing Haiti's food production problems but on the state's mechanisms for getting crops to market and the country's environmental problems in which the teams were instrumental in implementing efficient "cold chain" repairs and rehabilitation and in securing trees from Washington state. Bingham's MATs assessed not only agriculture but, finance and, commerce and industry. According to Bingham (1996) the commerce and industry MAT focused on private sector trade associations such as the Association of Haitian Industries, the Association of Haitian Entrepreneurs and the Haiti Hotel and Tourism Association. They also reviewed the USAID proposal, which called for the introduction of working capital to reestablish Haitian industry. The Finance and Central Bank MAT assessed the central banking system and made recommendations on: 1) improving the quality of currency; 2) improving government check cashing procedures and processing; and 3) new tax collection organization.

The functions of both MATs affect the following exercise in speculation. Let us consider that the intervening force contracted for two well-known Haitian services. Two possible methods of supporting the intervening force and thereby spurring economic growth are: 1) the opening of an armed forces recreation area; and 2) the employment of

the Haitian garment industry to produce the uniforms for the new police force.⁵⁵ These actions would perform two functions: 1) the commander would have an in-country rest and relaxation area that could stimulate other local business (banking, food industry, tours) which could be transitioned to tourist use as forces redeployed; and 2) the need for uniforms substantially different from those worn by the FAdH could be met while, at the same time, the garment assembly industry would get a kick start. But, the same questions remain: will aid to the *Lavalas* government change or perpetuate Haiti's socioeconomic conditions? Are the same powerful business interests controlling all sectors of the economy the only ones to profit from these endeavors? Doubtlessly, this kind of endeavor is far-reaching and requires the engagement of Civil Administration and Department of State advisors. In the final analysis, an apparently sound hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor refuted. The transition perspective is therefore assessed with a No.

6. Legitimate Government Structures

Hypothesis 12. If the government addresses the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for smooth transition to civilian control are increased.

Legitimate governmental structures relate to three central functions of government: 1) rule; 2) education; and, 3) taxation. The legitimate government structures variable is anchored in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, previously discussed in Chapter III. Functioning governments provide for the first three levels in Maslow's hierarchy: 1) physiological needs; 2) safety; and, 3) social needs. The three governmental

⁵⁵Since the FAdH was the police force, the khaki uniform came to represent a symbol of oppression to Haitians. The Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), made up of migrants from GTMO, was clothed in bloused, khaki pants and t-shirts. Their resemblance to the FAdH was unmistakable.

functions related to Maslow's hierarchy are: 1) public works; 2) public safety; and, 3) governmental structures.

One of current doctrine's strong points is civil engineering, doctrinally known as Military-Civic Action. Its immediate objectives are clean water, sanitation, sewage. Where public works addresses the citizen's basic physiological needs, public safety addresses the need for security. Public safety is theoretically more complicated than public works. It has a legal basis. There are six steps in establishing the rule of law. They are: 1) selection of the appropriate system of law; 2) creation of a police force; 3) separation of police functions from the military; 4) provisions for the local control of police forces; 5) separating the police forces from the judiciary; and, 6) insuring the prison system is adequate.

Aristide's 18-point Strategy for Social and Economic Reconstruction (Republique d'Haiti, 1994) describes army and police reforms. "The key feature of the new democratic order," Aristide writes (1994:2), "must be the professionalization of the armed forces. The government will reduce the current apparatus to a small (no more than 1,500 officers and men) professional force based outside of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Existing personnel will be divided into three categories: a) those who will be incorporated in the reformed army; b) those who will transfer to the new police; and c) those who will return to civilian life." The "vetting" process, the determination of who among the FAdH were to remain, be transferred or released, also was initially assumed by the military. But, as discussed earlier, Aristide later decided that the military should be disbanded rather than just downsized.

When the military government collapsed in September 1994 the FAdH largely disappeared, abandoning their positions as police and prison officials. Since the Haitian police force no longer existed, the UN's force of 1,000 International Police Monitors (IPMs) was forced to assume duties policing some seven million people. The Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) was formed at GTMO to augment the IPM. The IPSF was largely ineffectual because: 1) it was hastily trained and poorly equipped; and 2) Aristide promised to disband it when the new Haitian National Police (HNP) was formed. The HNP was trained by the US Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and monitored by UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL). The police forces were backed by the UNMIH military until February 1996. As with the police force, the justice system had to be built from the ground up.

According to Niblack (1995:17) the administration of justice was shoddy and corrupt. Judges were undertrained and, as Fischer (1996) explained, "sometimes illiterate." Prisons were overcrowded and inhumane⁵⁶ with only 10 percent of the inmate population actually serving a sentence. Realizing the problem, the US Department of Justice undertook a five-year, \$18 million program to help improve the administration of justice. According to Bingham (1996), the 358th Justice MAT contributed to this effort as it embarked on a three-task program of: 1) developing a short-term plan, based on assessing the prisons, land claims and civil legal procedures; 2) coordinating a training

⁵⁶For a graphic example see Fischer's interview with Capt. Robert Bevelacqua, 20 October 1994, transcript, USASOC History and Archives, Fort Bragg, NC. Six reporters accompanied Bevelacqua's ODA into a small prison building where they discovered inmates living in excrement and afflicted with life-threatening medical problems. The FAdH officer guarding the facility explained that the police were only responsible for guarding the jail and the Red Cross was to feed and clothe the inmates.

program, by integrating USAID needs, setting goals and objectives and planning mentor relationships; and, 3) developing and implementing a judicial mentor program. The intended changes for Haiti's justice system were designed to meet the people's social needs. USAID's Haiti Briefing Book (1995:8) asserts that for the "average Haitian, the transformation of the role of the military, police and courts from control *of* the people to control *by* civilian authority and service *to* the people will be the single most striking change in Haitian life." (Emphasis added.)

Education is the key to changing Haiti's civil society. Several conditions apply to the changing of political culture. Among them are: 1) a history of democracy; 2) a demonstration of the inadequacies of the former rulers; and, 3) a change agent willing to invest in a long-term program. The first condition is not met: Haiti has no history of democracy. The second condition was made obvious to Haitians and the world when three years of embargo spurred an exodus from the half-island state and eventually brought Cedras to the bargaining table. The question still remains: will aid to the *Lavalas* government change or perpetuate Haiti's socioeconomic conditions? Finally, is there a change agent willing to invest in a long-term program? One element in such a program is education designed to change the Haitian political culture. One might argue that the MATs and various local governance and institution initiatives sponsored by USAID⁵⁷ are, in fact, education programs, but such programs appear to be nation building. Although USAID and Justice Department programs as well as the MAT innovations, including those

⁵⁷See USAID, *Haiti Briefing Book*, (Washington, dated January 1995), for specific information on the 14 USAID programs ongoing in Haiti.

to develop the Budget and Tax Offices, may be considered as education programs, there is no program designed specifically to change the political culture of Haiti as there was in post-war Germany. Demonstrations and proclamations of how well democracy works for Americans will not change a 200-year-old *caudillo* culture. The common people need to be economically empowered.

Fischer's (1996) report that unemployed men complained at polling sites, "Down with elections, we need jobs." According to Schulz (1996:17), the USAID job creation program has failed to produce results, the GOH has not created jobs, and those trained will end up on the streets. This situation indicates that the physiological base of Maslow's hierarchy has yet to be embedded in the Haiti case. Likewise, the safety and security needs of the people have not been met. Niblack (1995:14) reported that the campaign to disarm Haiti met with limited success. Haitian society remains potentially violent and dependent on foreign aid.

The USAID Assistant Secretary for Latin America and the Caribbean, Mark Schneider (USAID, 1994) explained that one point in Haiti's recovery was to restructure its foreign debt and implement a functioning tax system. Aristide's recovery plan also addresses the problem. Haiti is dependent on donations from civilian relief organizations and government agencies. A MAT has worked on the problem associated with taxation, but, no little information is available on Haiti's tax system. Haiti's dependence on donations further indicates that it has yet to meet the physiological needs of its citizens. According to Schulz (1996:15), Haiti's GDP grew three and a half percent and inflation was cut by more than half largely because of foreign aid. The Haitian Economic Recovery

Program promised \$1.8 million in aid over the five-year period beginning in 1994. Most of the money thus far has gone toward loan payments and government payrolls. Only in the early part of this year did funds for infrastructure repair begin to be disbursed. To make matters worse, the United States is already downsizing its commitment. In 1995 the US donated some \$235 million to Haiti. In 1996 the commitment was cut by more than half to \$115 million. For 1997 the donation will be \$80 million and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has challenged this figure.

Some analysts (Schulz, 1996) report that living standards have barely improved and that popular frustration is growing. It is not clear that, even with millions of dollars in donations and assistance from governments and civilian relief organizations, the Haitian political culture can change from predation to responsible governance. But, without continued aid, a change in political culture will have no chance at all. A transformation in political culture requires the internalization of new ideas and values. However, a lack of change in the physiological well-being of the majority of a country's citizens will prevent this internalization from taking place. Moreover, such changes will take decades to complete. Nonetheless, the defined end of the transition period occurs with the first democratic election. Legitimate structures have been stood up to address the rule of law, education and taxation. In the short term, this hypothesis is confirmed and the transition perspective is assessed with a positive rating (Yes). The long-term problem of changing the political culture and consolidating democracy rests in the hands of other governmental agencies and civilian relief organizations.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Introduction

This essay dealt with Operation Uphold Democracy. I analyzed the CMO plans and actions of the US-led UNMIH. This section is comprised of: 1) an analysis of current doctrine; 2) an analysis of the transition perspective; and, 3) conclusions and recommendations.

2. Current Doctrine

Current doctrine fared better in this case than it did in Somalia. The initial shortcoming of current CMO doctrine was its failure to consider transitions to civilian control, a major requirement of intervenors in small wars. It must be said that the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade anticipated the need for transitioning to civilian rule, and their efforts may be considered as models for future PSOs. Nonetheless, this doctrinal concern is a reminder that the world situation has changed and that doctrine must change with it. This said, the case demonstrated two points: 1) in-theater control of civil affairs planning and unity of effort was poor; and, 2) individual efforts at the tactical and strategic levels were good. Table 5-1, Outcome coding of CMO hypotheses, graphically describes the relative explanatory power of current Civil-Military Operations doctrine for the Haiti case. Four of six of the hypotheses were confirmed.

CMO Mission Activities	Hypotheses	Measure
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)	If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his goals are increased.	Yes
Population and Resource Control (PRC)	If the US military is able to control displaced civilians (DCs) and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives.	Yes
Foreign Nation Support (FNS)	If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's CSS shortfalls by using host country service and supply, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance of success.	No
Military Civic Action (MCA)	If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host nation will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.	Yes
Civil Defense (CD)	If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance for attaining his/her goals.	No
Civil Administration	If civil administration is employed to support the host government by the US military, the legitimacy of the government will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased.	Yes Positive

Table 5-1 Outcome coding of CMO hypotheses.

3. Transition Perspective

The transition perspective assumes the following conditions: 1) the country that is supported aspires to democracy; 2) prioritizing is essential; and, 3) that guaranteeing democratic expansion is this nation's ultimate goal. The transition perspective characterizes the condition of Haiti's infrastructure as low and the environment as cooperative. (See Chapter III for a description of Civil Administration functions in PSOs.)

The results of the analysis of the hypotheses derived from the transition approach indicate that two of the six were confirmed and four could neither be confirmed or refuted and rated negatively. The results are displayed in Table 5-2:

Transition Approach	Hypotheses	Measure
The social terrain	If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.	Yes
Public opinion	If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.	No
Negotiations on the rules for transition	If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.	No
Democratic elections	If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian control are increased.	No
Economic capabilities	If a significant sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.	No
Legitimate government structures	If government institutions address the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.	Yes Negative

Table 5-2 Outcome coding of Transition Approach hypotheses.

4. Conclusions

This case study represents the second testing of the transition perspective. The Haiti case was a tougher case since current doctrine was actually applied to the situation. The value of the perspective is its ability to bring certain features of the intervention into focus. Let us start with some general comments.

- First, the people I interviewed all agreed that Haiti was in need. The question was, how best to help them?

- SOF is particularly well-suited for PSO missions. The USAID Briefing Book on Haiti (January 1995) mentions DOD three times. SFODAs are mentioned twice, once for assessing prisons and once for their assistance in rural Job Creation Programs. The other mention of DOD reports the on-site assessments of the justice and prison system made by the Army Civil Affairs Brigade and the Haitian Ministry of Justice. There was no mention of conventional forces, indicating USAID's appreciation of the value of SOF in small wars. A larger issue on interagency cooperation is also embedded in this observation: the agencies of the US government should begin thinking of themselves in terms of "jointness."
- Planners for future PSOs must prepare for the slow reactions of civilian relief organizations and other donors. The military may be the only organization available to render assistance for several months.
- A source of funding like Title 10 is needed to support CMO activities. Such funding should come from the DOS, not DOD.
- A lesson from the Korean War is valuable here. The unity of command and unity of effort problems first surfaced in Korea (See Chapter II). Perhaps the regionally aligned CA brigade commander should become the general in charge of civil affairs for the JTF. The chain-of-command problem must be addressed.
- The lack of CA staff for regional CINCs is an ongoing problem. The 358th now has a full-time CA planner on the ACOM J5 staff. A second full-time CA slot is under consideration on the J7 staff for CA input into training plans. Other CA Brigades should follow this lead.

Next are two innovations the 358th CA Brigade brings to current doctrine. These innovations make two comments on current doctrine: 1) it is flexible enough to accept innovation; and, 2) it may be time to institutionalize some changes. The first is the Ministerial Assistance Team and the second is how to staff these types of operations:

- In 1994, the 358th coined the term MAT when it assessed operations and made recommendations to the DOS and to the GOH. "A MAT is a team with deliverable skills," Bingham explained. There are five necessary

conditions for a MAT to work: 1) an enlightened ambassador; 2) a receptive host nation; 3) a CA unit (professionals) with the requisite skills; 4) the 'interagency concept'; and 5) funding.

- Next, manning issues are critical to CA. First, one of the basic assumptions of every plan is that Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) will be authorized. Bingham says, "PSRC should be for 90 days -- max, 120 days."⁵⁸ Ninety day rotations are not impossible. We're doing it in MAT V with no PSRC. The key is planning. When you have some continuity and a good hand off, the mission won't suffer."

This chapter began with the idea that coercive diplomacy was the key that opened the door to American success in Haiti. As the chapter progressed that success came into question. Ultimately, the possibilities for success are these: 1) continued financial and technical aid; 2) redefining the terms for success; or, 3) a combination of the two. However, the effectiveness of the operation is indisputable. For the Haiti case was current doctrine was applied to the problem. It showed us organizational and financial concerns and also showed its strong points. The technical skills the Reservists bring to the operation and the Special Forces style of hands-on demonstration of what democracy can do are indispensable for PSOs. In the final analysis, this intervention threatened the application of the tenets of big war but was handled as a small war.

⁵⁸ By law Reservists can be involuntarily activated for 179 days. Bingham (1996) says, "The villains are the 'iron majors' in the Pentagon. They want to force Reservists to serve for six to nine months. Someone should do an attrition study. As thousands of Reservists are activated for periods beyond 90 days and they return to their wives and jobs, where they're forced with a choice: either civilian life or an uncertain Reserve career. A lot of them will choose civilian life. Because of their patriotism and willingness to do something for the country, they serve -- it's certainly not for the money."

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In a time of turbulence and change, it is more true than ever that knowledge is power -- John Fitzgerald Kennedy

A. INTRODUCTION

As stated in the introduction to this paper, post-Cold War political pressures are likely to cause the US government to intervene in the domestic affairs of states. The United States will intervene as a component of a United Nations force. In the two cases examined the United States led the interventions. With the end of superpower rivalry there no longer exists the need for one superpower to intervene in the affairs of states to deny the influence of a rival. Consequently, the domestic political climate has changed. US political leaders have shifted their attentions from threats to US vital interests abroad to domestic issues. Interventions are now undertaken for humanitarian, democratic and world leadership reasons and they must be successes.⁵⁹ Politicians have found that capitalizing on initial public support for such interventions is often easier than sustaining it. If the past is any indicator of the future, there is a greater likelihood of engagement in small wars to enlarge democracy rather than in big wars to safeguard it -- at least for the time being. With this in mind, the transition perspective offers a model for change.

Current Civil-Military Operations doctrine does not consider the military's requirement in small wars to: 1) intervene; 2) stabilize the situation; and, 3) extract itself,

⁵⁹Fischer (1996) explained that in the JTF headquarters briefing room, on 4 November 1994, the CINCACOM Gen. John J. Sheehan told his staff, "The US Congressional elections are coming up which are, naturally, of importance to the administration. Keep news from here to a positive spin.... Haiti has to be a success story. Factions around the beltway are ready to pounce."

allowing other agencies to consolidate democracy. It does however, consider the aftermath of a big war when a military government would impose the will of the victor on the defeated country. The contrasts between big and small war was used throughout the paper. I illustrated how the US military has learned lessons from its small wars, some of which may be appropriate for peace support operations (PSOs). The thesis addressed the civil-military operations (CMO) planning for PSOs with emphasis on getting the military back to the barracks as soon as possible. I suggested that current paradigms are incomplete or need change. This study addressed a key element which has been left out of CMO planning: working toward the transition to civilian control from the outset of intervention planning. In conclusion, I offer a short recap of what has been said. This chapter performs five basic functions. It restates: 1) the research question; 2) the paper's arguments and position; 3) the methodology employed; 4) the analysis; and, finally, 5) makes recommendations on how the US military might perform better in PSOs. This work's ultimate value is as an incentive to spur more research into the area.

B. THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Is the current CMO planning framework capable of handling PSOs? This puzzle calls for exploration. The next question is, if current doctrine cannot, what is a planning framework which can handle them? This question calls for theory building. The cases and illustrations have shown that the commander of an intervening force may be better served if current CMO planning doctrine incorporates the transition approach. Current Civil-Military Operations planning needs a synchronized, long-term outlook combining the applicable elements of both current doctrine and the transition perspective.

C. THE ARGUMENTS

My argument has been that current doctrine is in need of change. This argument revolves around this condition: following military interventions which provide "a stable and secure environment" the United States must provide for a follow-on policy which promotes self-sufficiency in the supported country which is acceptable to US domestic, the host nation domestic and the international publics. To back up this claim I have made several lesser, supporting arguments.

Among them are: 1) The world has changed and there is a greater likelihood of small war than big war. Understanding this, short term tactical victories cannot be poorly finished. If they are, they will become strategic failures. 2) Post-strike force actions must be integrated with the operations plans from the outset. In other words, transition planning should be a component of the strike plan. 3) The literature on transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule offer a model to be followed: externally monitored transition to democracy. Nuances to this method are for the intervening military to occupy, initiate self-sufficiency programs and to extract itself. In short, the occupation periods for PSOs should be shorter than the occupation periods following big wars. Five milestones of the transition process are the conditions which favor the transition to civilian control. They are: a) understanding the social terrain; b) positive public opinion; c) negotiations on the rules for transition; d) democratic elections; e) economic capabilities; and, f) legitimate government structures. 4) Lessons from the past offer some valuable guidelines. 5) Definitions of Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations are used imprecisely. Also, in another definitional concern, for all intents and purposes,

intervention equals occupation. 6) Finally, in the realist tradition, I argue for a close coordination between the elements of national power: military power, economic power, and power over public opinion.

According to some analysts (Schultz, 1996; Oakley, 1995) Washington did not send troops to Somalia or Haiti just for the sake of those countries. While not trivial, the ending of human suffering in Somalia and the restoration of democracy and human rights in Haiti were secondary concerns. What appears to have triggered the deployments was a convergence of domestic political pressures, national strategy and military experience. The upshot of these pressures was a short-term interventionist demand with a no-casualties caveat. Is this too hard to do under current national strategy -- enlargement and engagement -- domestic political pressures and current doctrine? To avoid this question, in light of the perceived failure in Somalia, the NSC began setting short-term definitions for success. I tested current CMO doctrine and its key variables on their ability to explain and predict the outcomes of interventions.

The quotation from Clausewitz at the head of the Chapter I tells us two things. First, war is designed to further political objectives. Second, it must be governed from the first to the last by political objectives. I have shown that these interventions were tactically effective in the short term, and speculate that they are probable long-term strategic failures. With the short-term use of the military to occupy the country, initiate economic and public opinion programs with long-term follow-on programs by other agencies, the United States can enjoy both tactical and strategic success. Long-term success was defined as the consolidation of democracy and economic self-sufficiency.

Considering this, the transition perspective emerged from this exercise with some credibility. Although this analysis affirmed the utility of current doctrine, it suggested that unique conditions may require some or all of the mission activities of current doctrine in support of those of the transition perspective. In the final analysis, a transition perspective framework combined with current Civil-Military Operations and Civil Administration mission activities appears to be a better way of planning for CMO in peace support operations.

The literature on transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule offered several important components. The first one was negotiations for rules of transition. The second was democratic elections. Both components assumed the inclusion of moderate members of the subject country's opposing political elites, who are willing to act with reciprocity and mutual commitment toward the progress of the country. The components I brought to the model are: understanding the social terrain, positive public opinion, building economic capabilities and legitimate government structures. These ideas are not new. The understanding of language and culture has long been seen as a key to intercultural relations. Positive public opinion among the three audiences who see the intervention: 1) the supported country's population; 2) the US population; and 3) the world population, as suggested by both the Weinberger and Schultz doctrines, is also favorable to a successful outcome. The same case was made for building the supported country's economic capabilities. Finally, legitimate government structures which meet the physiological, safety and social needs of the people are required. Throughout this work I applied theories generally employed to explain strategic concerns at the tactical level. Balance of power

theory, for example, was applied to the local level. Negotiations on rules for transition occur at both the state level and the local level. The key is employing CMO as a tool to influence a country's citizens toward democracy.

The United States learned some valuable lessons from its past interventions which are applicable to PSOs. Among them are the lessons of small wars: 1) using military force in areas not of vital interest to the United States will occur; 2) military operations cannot be conducted in isolation from political guidance; 3) winning the hearts and minds of the foreign population is essential to effectiveness in small wars; and 4) understanding the culture of the foreign population is essential for effectiveness in small wars.

D. METHODOLOGY

The objective of this paper was theory building. The scientific process for this thesis progressed from the hypothesis: If CMO planners approach the planning for PSO in terms transition to civilian control, then their plans will adequately support the CINC. Following from this hypothesis, I followed a four-step method in preparing this paper: 1) I explained current doctrine and inferred an hypothesis for each of its five mission activities; 2) I developed an alternate theory and derived an hypothesis for each of its six mission activities; 3) I employed the hypotheses to "structure" the case studies; and, 4) I used "focused" comparisons to show the relative explanatory power of each of the theories. The determination of relative explanatory power was based on a comparison of how well the inferred and derived hypotheses held up over the two case studies. The comparative case studies provided four things. First, they provided a deeper understanding of the individual situations of the countries examined. Second, the studies sought patterns and

trends across the cases. Third, the cases provided a vehicle to test the relative explanatory power of the competing theories. Lastly, the trends developed through comparative analysis have been identified in the following section for possible policy implications.

E. ANALYSIS

1. Current Doctrine

Current doctrine did not fare well in these cases. The initial concern regarding current CMO doctrine was its failure to consider transitions to civilian control, a major requirement of intervenors in small wars. This failure is a reminder that the world situation has changed and that doctrine must change with it. This said, the cases demonstrated two points: 1) pre-occupation planning was poor; and, 2) individual leadership at the tactical level was good. Table 6-1, Outcome coding of CMO hypotheses, graphically describes the relative explanatory power of current Civil-Military Operations doctrine. The cumulative score of measures from the two cases was negative (five of 12 were assessed as positive).

CMO Mission Activities	Hypotheses	Measure Somalia/ Haiti	
		Yes	Yes
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)	If the US force is capable of providing immediate, short-term subsistence to affected persons, then the commander's chances for attaining his goals are increased.	Yes	Yes
Population and Resource Control (PRC)	If the US military is able to control displaced civilians (DCs) and refugees, then the commander has a greater chance of attaining his/her objectives.	No	Yes
Foreign Nation Support (FNS)	If FNS is considered only as a short-term action to make up the intervening force's CSS shortfalls by using host country service and supply, then the commander's overall objective has a lesser chance of success.	No	No
Military Civic Action (MCA)	If MCA are employed by the host country and the US military to build infrastructure, then the legitimacy of the host nation will be enhanced and the commander will enjoy a greater chance for attaining his/her objectives.	No	Yes
Civil Defense (CD)	If the host nation government can control and care for its citizens, the populace is more likely to consider it a legitimate government. With these programs established, the commander will have a greater chance for attaining his/her goals.	No	No
Civil Administration	If civil administration is employed to support the host government by the US military, the legitimacy of the government will be enhanced and the commander's chances for attaining his/her objectives are increased.	No Neg	Yes Pos
Total		Negative	

Table 6-1 Outcome coding of CMO hypotheses.

2. Transition perspective

The transition perspective assumes the following conditions: 1) the country which is supported aspires to democracy and integration into the international economy; 2) prioritization of support is essential; and, 3) guaranteeing democratic expansion is this state's ultimate goal. The results of the analysis of the hypotheses derived from the

transition approach indicate that all but one of the hypotheses, the one for the public opinion variable, were confirmed at least once during the tests. The results are displayed in Table 6-2.

Transition Approach	Hypotheses	Measure Somalia/ Haiti	
		No	Yes
The social terrain	If the supported country has a history of democracy, the chances for a successful transition are increased.	No	Yes
Public opinion	If a clear statement of goals and priorities is publicized at the outset of an intervention, the chances for positive local and world opinion are increased.	No	No
Negotiations on the rules for transition	If the intervening force includes the local elites and civilian relief organizations in decisions concerning local government, then the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased.	Yes	No
Democratic elections	If free and fair democratic elections occur, then chances for a successful transition to civilian control are increased.	No	No
Economic capabilities	If a significant sector of the host nation economy is used to support the intervening force, then the chances for the country's self-sufficiency are increased.	Yes	No
Legitimate government structures	If government institutions address the physiological and safety needs of its citizens, the chances for a smooth transition to civilian control are increased	Yes — Neg	Yes — Neg
Total		Negative	

Table 6-2 Outcome coding of Transition Approach hypotheses.

As Tables 6-1 and 6-2 show, neither the transition perspective nor current CMO doctrine was decisive in explaining and predicting the conditions favoring the successful outcomes of the two PSOs considered for this work. The total at the bottom of each table indicates that each perspective is valuable to the CMO planner and operator. In the case

of Haiti, the hypotheses inferred from current doctrine were able to predict and explain outcomes more accurately than they had in the Somalia case. This is true because doctrine was actually applied in the Haiti case. Nonetheless, the hypotheses derived for the transition perspective were able to explain some outcomes of both cases.

This said, the transition perspective cannot be discounted. First, it is clear that current doctrine is for big war, but some dynamics of small war and limited war require Civil Affairs functions doctrinally required of forces who win a general war. If intervention is considered as occupation, then the intervening power, having displaced the former power in a country, has the obligation to provide the citizens of the country with a working government. If there is no government, standing one up which meets the needs of the country's citizens is beneficial to the intervening power(s). One of the two missions of Civil Affairs, Support to Civil Administration, provides this capability. A functioning government must be enabled or provided. This means that intervening powers must assume the duties of a functioning government when an indigenous one is missing. Finding and teaching indigenous leaders is the next step. Civil Administration mission activities can assist in the transition to civilian control.

Next, it must be said that not every situation requires every mission activity of CMO. This flexibility is a strong point in current doctrine. It is not an all-or-nothing approach. Because a variable was not confirmed over the two cases it does not mean it is not valid. Therefore I do not advocate that Foreign Nation Support or Civil Defense be deleted from current doctrine. A vigorous use of FNS seems to contribute to the building

of economic capabilities and CD applies to the meeting of the physiological and safety needs of a supported country's people.

Turning to the transition approach, the public opinion and democratic election variables were not confirmed by either case. The findings on public opinion confirm Schultz's proposition that US foreign policy cannot be tied to public opinion. However, it appears important in causing interventions. Democratic elections are the preferred method of determining leaders and is therefore an essential component in the nation strategy of democratic enlargement. This said, more research is indicated. In the final analysis, the transition perspective employs many of the tools already in current doctrine. It is therefore, more a complementing perspective than a competing one. The dimensions which have been focused on are valuable to the CMO planner and operator. The following section suggests some lessons learned from looking at the two PSOs from the transition perspective.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS

Whether CMO doctrine needs a new framework revolves around the differences between big war and small war. Big war employs the rhetoric of power rather than negotiation while small war employs increased awareness and understanding to implement change, with only the limited use of force. The question then becomes: which is the proper strategy for the successful completion of PSOs? The question is not easily solved.

Several observations regarding PSO and civil-military operations may be made:

- Although PSOs, especially those in the midst of ethnic conflict, have received much new attention by the military and the media, the United States is no stranger to these types of operations.

- US forces have learned lessons in past peace support experiences, have forgotten, or worse, ignored them, and have suffered in recent operations because they have failed to apply the lessons.
- The World War II-vintage CA planning frameworks are basically sound but need adjustment to support US operations in the post-Cold War period.

With these points in mind, I have suggested that, the decision makers and planners were operating with a faulty perceptual map when they assumed impartiality in the studied interventions. When the United States or UN uses force, it is engaging in a power strategy. Power Strategy is a win-lose proposition used by one side when the ability to control rewards and punishments is perceived. Is power strategy a good PSO strategy? I have argued that there are least two ways of looking at this question. One way suggests that intervening powers are practicing progressivism -- "We are doing this for your own good." The other perspective is the hearts and minds approach -- "will you help us help you?" -- which we learned to hate in Vietnam. Progressives are proponents of big war and they consider force as the answer to international questions. Hearts and minds types are proponents of small war and prefer the participative resolution of problems. Of course, force remains an option in the hearts and minds approach.

Nonetheless, big war's tenets of firepower, manpower and industrial power cannot correct a failed state. A strong arm may keep the lid on a situation in the short run but, when it is lifted, the underlying problems will resurface. Examples show that the Somalia intervention took on the worst characteristics of occupation -- arrogance and disregard for the country's citizens -- those of a conquering force. Moreover, the Somalia case

indicated that there may be a false lesson to be learned from the application of overwhelming force. Perhaps the short-term nature of the intervention prevented the military from employing the hearts and minds lesson drawn from Vietnam was not used. The transition perspective provided another lens through which the cases were explored. The perspective allowed a method for the recovery of and the derivation of lessons. Several lessons to be drawn from the Somalia and Haiti case studies which will be relevant to the future.

- First, the competing paradigms present us with two choices: short-term welfare or long-term self sufficiency. The planners from the 10th Mountain Division understood the value of CMO planning at the operational and tactical levels, but in the absence of political guidance, efforts were reduced to local band aids. Two lessons from small war are applicable: 1) US forces will be committed when interests are less than vital to the United States; and, 2) political guidance is needed for the successful conclusion of an operation.
- Next, the study revealed there were no formal guidelines for the Johnston/Oakley relationship. In organizational terms this means defining a hierarchy. Like problems occurred in Haiti. In military terms this was a failure to define the chain of command. The unity of command and unity of effort problems first surfaced in Korea. Perhaps the regionally aligned CA brigade commander should become the general in charge of Civil Affairs in a theater. This recommendation may be an over-simplified approach, but the chain of command and unity of effort problems need to be addressed.
- SOF is particularly well-suited for PSO missions. The USAID Briefing Book on Haiti (January 1995) mentions the DOD a total of three times (SF, twice and CA once). There was no mention of conventional forces. This indicated USAID's appreciation of the value of SOF in small wars.
- A larger issue on interagency cooperation is also embedded in this observation: the agencies of the US government should begin thinking of themselves in terms of "jointness." At the most general level there is a need to recognize that post-intervention requirements are an important and complex mission for the DOD and the DOS which must be planned with

the strike plan. National strategy in war or peace requires a coordination of the agencies which execute that strategy. Organizational rivalries may imperil national strategy, and the role of each agency must be kept in proportion to the objectives. This is often heard but seldom practiced. Simply said, there must be a coordinated effort.

- The regional CINCs need to have a full-time Civil Affairs staff to contribute to these plans. Contracting the planning of a CMO may avoid manning issues, but it causes other problems. With the addition of a full-time planning cell, or even a single senior representative from the regionally-aligned CA Brigade, in the J5 or J7, the CINC can receive timely input to his OPLANS.
- Funding is important. First there needs to be an account like Title 10 to support CMO activities. This money may be transferred from USAID and used by the military until USAID can manage the jobs or construction programs. This arrangement would do two things: 1) it would tie the DOS and DOD to the same effort; and, 2) it would guarantee continuation of DOD initiated programs after the troops are redeployed. Next, there needs to be money available to pay the Reservists who bring their civilian skills to bear in assisting the supported country.
- Questions on manning are critical to CA. Bingham explained that Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) should be for 90 days to 120 days. Technical experts can rotate on a three-month basis with a one-month overlap period. "The key is planning," Bingham says. "When you have some continuity and a good hand off the mission won't suffer."
- In planning for the transition to civilian control, the military must begin with a clear understanding of both the immediate and basic problem which caused the immediate situation and the historical and cultural context of the country involved. Continuing with planning concerns,
- Taw and Peters (1995:22) suggest that mission creep, the requirement of different missions from those the intervening force initially planned, and mission swing, mission changes to met the deterioration or improvement of the operational environment, are situations that planners should plan for. The transition approach requires that planners develop multiple courses of action so that commanders have ready-made options to choose as the situation changes. In other words, planners should continually update the perceptual map they are drawing.

- US military and civilian relief organization relations must be based on mutual appreciation of how each conducts its missions. Recommend the inclusion of civilian relief organizations and DOS representatives at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The next two lessons are somewhat related to the last. They deal with organization and communication.
- Planners for future PSOs must prepare for the slow reactions of civilian relief organizations and other donors. The military may be the only organization available to render assistance for several months. Next,
- The deletion of the CMOC seems to have struck hard at military/civilian relief organization coordination and may have contributed to the UNOSOM II failure. As long as the military and civilian relief organizations must interface, the CMOC is needed. Finally,
- A formal mechanism to capture lessons learned should be stood up. Realistically, this is a US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command function and may be considered under the archives and history functional area.

In Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, E. A. Cohen and John

Gooch explain that failure to adapt is one of the five causes of military misfortune. Failure to adapt CMO doctrine to the post-Cold War environment may not cause failure, but by keeping the state assistance capabilities of Civil Affairs buried in annexes of operations plans, future interventions will be impacted. One point is certain, CMO is a useful tool in the transitions from military to civilian rule. Ultimately, the problem is not to write a better CA or CMO annex, nor to write a different CA/CMO plan. The challenge is to influence how the basic concept of the operation is written. Everything else is just checking the box. Where appropriate to the mission, CA has to breakout of the "Annex G ghetto" to assume a position as a key facilitator in the national strategy of enlargement and engagement.

APPENDIX A. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The following are ACE (1995:3-3 through 3-8) peace support operations definitions:

- **Conflict Prevention.** "Includes different activities, in particular, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, ranging from diplomatic initiatives to the preventive deployment of troops, intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can include fact finding missions, consultation, warning, inspections and monitoring. Preventive deployments normally consist of civilians and/or military forces being deployed to avert crisis."
- **Peacemaking.** "Diplomatic actions conducted after the commencement of conflict, with the aim of establishing a peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic isolation and sanctions."
- **Peacekeeping.** "Peacekeeping is the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of impartial third party Intervention, organized and directed internationally, using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace."
- **Peace Enforcement.** "Action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed."
- **Peace Building.** "Post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of reconstruction, and may require military as well as civilian involvement."
- **Humanitarian Operations.** "Missions conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate service support to the population. Humanitarian aid missions may be conducted in the context of a peace support operation, or as an independent task."

APPENDIX B. THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM

Beginning at the left of the spectrum, low intensity conflict (LIC) involves subversion and military action below the level of sustained combat between regular forces. Low intensity conflict is known as "small war." It often occurs in societies which are divided along communal lines -- where inherited attributes of race, religion, region, language and ethnicity sharply distinguish one part of a population from another. The conflicts revolve around issues that are thought to be of the greatest importance -- the communal segments' social identities, cultural values, most sought after material rewards and political rights. Besides the conflict issues themselves, the segments commonly exhibit invidious beliefs, unflattering stereotypes, long-standing jealousies, and deeply-rooted prejudices toward one another (Nordlinger, 1977:37). Small war is waged by a combination of means to include political, economic, informational and military instruments. Arthur Lykke (1989:433) describes limited war as a war in which one or more of the belligerents voluntarily exercises restraints in manpower, weapons, targets and geography. As with LIC, operations may involve some formations of regular forces as well as sophisticated weapons. For this and other reasons, such as the probable employment of political, economic and informational instruments, the difference between LIC and limited war isn't clearly demarcated. The shaded area between LIC and limited war on Figure B-1 represents this "blurriness." LIC is often localized but when not contained or terminated, LIC may escalate into more intense operations and affect regional and global security.




Figure B-1 The Spectrum of Conflict (Derived from Gann: 1966 and FM 100-1: 1986)

Joint Pub 1-02 defines general war as armed conflict in which the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. This term is often used to describe a conflict involving nuclear weapons. According to A. J. Bacevich, et al (1988:14) the US Army embarked on a cycle of doctrinal renewal following Vietnam focusing primarily on the challenges of high-intensity warfare to the "virtual exclusion of contingencies at the other end of the spectrum." Bacevich (1988:vi-viii) further explains that the Army considers general war as the issue of concern and that it denuded itself of any doctrinal basis for the kind of problems that small wars present.

The solid vertical line marks the difference between LIC and limited war on the one hand, and general or big war on the other. The probability of participation line, below which is shaded gray, indicates that the sub-categories; terrorism, unconventional and conventional warfare are present throughout the spectrum. Bacevich (1988:viii) concludes "As long as the United States remains a great power, American involvement in small wars will recur with some frequency. The important thing is to get it right." Here is where the bearing of a discussion on the conflict spectrum in a paper on CMO planning for PSO becomes clear.

At the trailing edge of high intensity conflict and other disasters, a CA mission called civil administration is specifically designed to take over government functions. Is there a role for civil administration in small wars? How can the United States get it right? These questions were addressed in the preceding chapters, but soldiers and statesmen must understand that however war is categorized, the Army's roles are defined as a politically directed act for political ends. The conduct of war, in terms of strategy and constraints, is defined by its political objectives.

APPENDIX C. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

According to Arend Lijphart (1971:683) the nature of the comparative method can be best understood when compared to the two other fundamental strategies of research: 1) the experimental method; and, 2) the statistical method. All three methods aim at scientific explanation, which consists of two basic elements: 1) the establishment of general empirical relationships between two or more variables; and, 2) the control of all other variables. The experimental method is the simplest form. It employs two groups: 1) the experimental group, which is exposed to a stimulus; and, 2) the control group, which is not exposed to the stimulus. The statistical method is an approximation of the experimental method. It involves the mathematical manipulation of empirically observed data and handles the problem of control through partial correlation. The comparative method resembles the statistical method in all but one crucial aspect: the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control by partial correlation. The comparative method is not the equivalent of the experimental method (Eckstein, 1975 and Lijphart, 1971) but only an imperfect substitute. Still, the method has its strong points.

An intensive comparative analysis of a small number of cases may be more beneficial than a superficial statistical analysis of a large number of cases. The great advantage of the case study is that it can be intensively examined. A single case, however, can neither constitute the basis for a valid generalization nor grounds for disproving an established generalization. Generally speaking, the greater the number of cases, the stronger a generalized statement will be. This said, comparative case studies can make important contributions to the establishment of general propositions and to theory building. The comparative case study method I employ is a combination of what Lijphart (1971:691) calls the theory-confirming and the theory-infirming case studies. This method entails the analysis of single cases within a framework of established generalizations or hypotheses. The conditions identified in the case studies are systematically compared in light of two theories. Let's look again at the strengths and weakness of the method. The comparative method allows: 1) the study of each case with intensity, paying attention to small details which would be overlooked in a large sample study; and, 2) the derivation of valid generalizations through the process of systematic comparison. On the other hand, the comparative method is weak in : 1) establishing credible controls; and, 2) standing as an adequate substitute for the experimental method.

APPENDIX D. HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS

The US military is involved in numerous HA programs around the world. Currently, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Sarah Sewall, oversees five humanitarian programs. The following table concisely shows these programs:

Title	Authority	Description
DOD Excess Property Program (DOD EPP)	Sections 2547 and 2551, Title 10, US Code (USC)	Authorizes the DOD to transfer excess, non-lethal property to the DOS for donation to foreign recipients
Denton Program	Section 402, Title 10 USC	Authorizes the DOD to provide no-cost transportation for privately donated humanitarian cargo to foreign countries on a space-available basis
Foreign Disaster Relief Program	Section 402, Title 10 USC	Authorizes the use of DOD resources to assist in natural or manmade disasters
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program	Section 401, Title 10 USC	Authorizes regional unified commanders to conduct DOS approved humanitarian and civil assistance activities in conjunction with military operations
Humanitarian Demining Program ¹	Section 401, Title 10 USC	Authorizes DOD to conduct demining operations in countries selected by the DOS
Operation Provide Hope (Assistance to the Newly Independent States [NIS] of the Former Soviet Union)	Sections 2547 and 2551, Title 10 USC	Authorizes DOD to provide transportation of privately donated and excess DOD non-lethal property to the NIS.

Table Appendix C-1 US Humanitarian Programs. (Source: ASDSOLIC)

¹ As of June 1996 the Humanitarian Demining Program, formerly under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, has been reorganized and is under the direction of Ambassador H. Allen Holmes Deputy Secretary of Policy and Mission (SOLIC).

APPENDIX E. TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN CONTROL

The figure describes the democratic progress of states. There are three categories: 1) the previous system; 2) the transition system; and, 3) the democratic consolidation system. The Y axis represents political evolution and the X axis represents time. The wave-like trend line represents the ups and downs over time of political evolution. The high and low limits of the line are determined by the maximum and minimum amounts of democratic behavior by the citizens which are tolerated by the governments of each phase. The broken line in the transition phase is the area of concern. This is the area directly influenced by military intervention.




Figure E-1 Transition to civilian control (Adapted from Huntington, 1991).

Under the trend line are the characteristics or descriptions of each system. The transition system is complete upon the holding of popular elections. The consolidation system is complete when the democratic government continues to function without direct State Department assistance.

Is there a model that explains what is happening in the trend line? Local commanders must interact with civilian relief agencies, local opinion leaders and the general population. If the strategy is to influence a country's citizens toward democracy, then a coordinated effort by the intervening force and the intervening power's government agencies along with civilian relief organizations must influence three publics: 1) ruling elites, 2) the country's citizens; and 3) opposition elites. The goal is a moderate position between the status quo and an alternate form of rule championed by the opposition elites. Figure E-2 offers a graphic representation of the process.




Figure E-2 Trend Model

The solid arrows indicate where the intervening force influences with intent. Influence is exerted through the six transition variables and those applicable CMO variables. The double solid line indicates the priority of effort. Recall that impartiality was not demonstrated in either case. Next, the dotted line indicates initial intent. Although this model may seem like an innovation, it was largely derived from the lessons of past interventions.

APPENDIX F. BACKGROUND ON SOMALIA

1. Overview

Somalia, which is located on the Horn of Africa, is a hot, dry, and sparse desert environment of nearly 250 million square miles, about the size of New England. The following section is composed of four parts: 1) disintegration of the government; 2) human suffering; 3) UN actions; and, 4) actions by the United States.

2. Disintegration of the Government

The collapse of Somalia fits Tainter's (1988:19) description of a failed state -- one exhibiting the total breakdown of authority and control. Quite often various factions contend for domination, so that a period of perpetual conflict ensues. The center no longer has prestige, power, or political clout. The downfall of President Siad Barre, a pro-Marxist but formerly US-backed dictator, in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. Following the defeat of Siad Barre, the Executive Committee of the United Somali Congress (USC) announced the formation of a new government and named Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the interim president. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions -- one supporting Ali Mahdi Mohamed, of the Abgall clan of the Hawiye clan-family, and the other supporting the chairman of the USC, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, of the Habar Gidir clan of the Hawiye clan-family (Metz, 1996:155).

Fighting spread from the capital as certain clans viewed Ali Mahdi Mohamed's Abgall clan as an upstart, since it had not joined the fighting against Siad Barre until 1989. The government failed to exercise control over the entire country and the continued fighting prevented the promised elections from occurring. As law enforcement deteriorated, marauding groups of bandits compounded the clan warfare problem. Politically, Somalia was in anarchy. It had no functioning government, no police force, no military and no social services.

3. Human Suffering

According to United Nations documentation (UN,1995:1) hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a desperate need for emergency humanitarian assistance. In addition to the civil war, drought struck and famine resulted. According to the UN Department of Public Information, an estimated 300,000 people died in the period between November

and December 1991.¹ Almost 4.5 million (more than half the estimated population) were threatened by malnutrition and malnutrition-related diseases. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that some 150,000 refugees scattered in the north-eastern region of Kenya, where famine began to spread, and 400,000 more ethnic Somalis had fled to eastern Ethiopia. (Metz, 1996:117) By mid-1991, the National Refugee Commission had ceased operation, as had many of Somalia's government institutions, including the army. (Metz, 1996:115). The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and the extent of the physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

4. United Nations Actions

The United Nations Department of Public Information (UN, 1995:3) reports that despite the turmoil following the overthrow of Barre, the UN continued humanitarian efforts and by March 1991 was fully engaged in Somalia. UN personnel were withdrawn several times, but with assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross and civilian relief organizations, aid to refugees continued. In December 1991 UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative to restore the peace in Somalia. By January 1992, the UN had brokered a cease-fire between the two clans of the Hawiye clan-family, who dominated the struggle for Mogadishu. To oversee this agreement, it dispatched a small group of unarmed observers led by Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat. The mission was called the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) and was executed from April through December 1992. Sahnoun spent several months negotiating directly with the leaders of the various factions, but the mission ultimately collapsed due to bureaucratic infighting and the inability to safeguard relief operations. According to John L. Hirsch and Robert Oakley (1995:22) Sahnoun's style of establishing personal contact with all the factions and consulting periodically with regional governments, largely on his own initiative, won the appreciation of many Somalis but eventually precipitated resentment at UN headquarters, where it was felt he was too much of an independent agent.

¹Andrew Natsios, assistant administrator for food and humanitarian assistance, US Agency for International Development, testified to the House Select Committee on Hunger, 30 January 1992, that more than 500,000 people had starved to death and that nearly a million more were threatened. Somalia's refugee problems did not begin with Siad Barre's ouster. Since the 1977-78 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia, the region had suffered from a refugee problem. In 1979, the Somali government estimated that more than 310,000 ethnic Somalis and Oromo occupied camps in western Somalia. By 1990 there were refugee camps in four of Somalia's 16 administrative districts. UN demographers estimated the number in the camps at between 450,000 and 620,000 people (Metz, 1996:113). The refugee burden on Somalia, a country which has to import food under normal conditions, contributed to discontent with Barre's regime. Somalia's first cry for help to the international community came in September 1979. Despite responses by a number of countries, refugees continued to suffer. In 1981, Barre organized the National Refugee Commission to manage the contributions by other countries and to try to enable the refugees to provide for themselves. But, there was widespread mismanagement and theft of food.

Despite his apparent lack of backing by the UN, Sahnoun's efforts met with success. He got the port of Mogadishu reopened and working so relief supplies could be delivered again. Sahnoun's diplomacy eventually brought him into conflict with UN leadership and he resigned in October 1992. Sahnoun's successor, the Iraqi diplomat Ismat Kittani, had a more conventional diplomatic style -- which, according to Roy Licklider (1996:18), did not work as well in the fractionalized environment.

In May 1993, following a six-month interlude where US forces provided the security needed to get relief supplies to those who needed them, the UN engaged in UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). It was executed through March 1995. The operation was characterized by 1) an overly ambitious state building phase (May - October 1993) and; 2) a truncated accommodative phase (November 1993 - March 1995).

5. Actions by the United States

In August 1992 President George Bush announced that the United States would use military aircraft to send relief supplies to Somalia. (See Humanitarian Assistance missions in Chapter II.) Subsequent planning meetings determined that the airlift of food would not be useful unless the supplies could be delivered to the needy. UNITAF was executed from December 1992 through April 1993. It quickly provided for the protection of relief organizations and maintained working relations with all Somali factions. According to Licklider (1996:18), Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the JCS, was in favor of a large-scale US military intervention. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) developed plans for the intervention by November. Since the UN was reluctant to assume responsibility for the operation, the United States took leadership of a multinational force which would coordinate with the UN, but would not be subordinate to it.

According to Hirsch and Oakley (1995:40-47) at least three disagreements between the United States and the United Nations remained unresolved: 1) the US plan was to commit a large force to deter resistance, while the UN preferred to use minimal force; 2) the United States considered it impossible to disarm the Somalis, while the UN considered it essential to success; and, 3) the United States wanted to hand over the mission to the UN after several months, and provide follow-on forces, but the UN did not want to do this. Analysts such as Lynn E. Davis (1993:16) explain that these differences were a consequence of two factors: 1) a lack of clear political objectives; and 2) the UN staff lacks individuals with expertise to plan and implement PSOs. There was general agreement that the situation inside Somalia was horrific as thousands starved to death. However, there was a good deal of disagreement about what the United States could do to resolve the problem in the long term. Nonetheless, in December 1992, the United States sent armed forces into Somalia. The intervening force had a complex structure. The United Task Force (UNITAF) was an American operation with more than 20 coalition states all commanded by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston. UNITAF was to

assist only in the delivery of relief supplies.² Negotiations with Somalis on their political situation were directed by Kittani and handled by the UN. Bush named the former Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, as his special envoy. Oakley's job was to coordinate all US civilian activities in Somalia, offer political advice to UNITAF and function as a liaison between the UN and civilian relief organizations (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995:48). Analysts agree that problems in Somalia began with UNOSOM II, after the hand-off from UNITAF.

The UN's political objectives included stability operations, state building, disarmament and humanitarian assistance. Communications between UNOSOM II commanders and Somali leaders, especially Aideed failed without the personal involvement of UN diplomats. Where UNITAF had negotiated with Aideed, UNOSOM II attempted to marginalize him. All attempts at impartiality were dismissed. In June 1993, Aideed's militia ambushed a Pakistani convoy in Mogadishu. The UNOSOM II command criminalized Aideed. The American forces left in country were support and security units. The security units conducted one raid in which a top Aideed aide was captured. On October 3, 1993, in a raid to capture Aideed, a US helicopter carrying Rangers and Special Forces soldiers was shot down. The "snatch-and-grab" mission degenerated into intense urban warfare, leaving 18 Americans dead. President Bill Clinton suspended the hunt for Aideed and set a firm date for American withdrawal.

Figure E-1 is a map of the Horn of Africa.

²According to Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), the mission statement from the National Command Authority to the United States Commander in Chief, Central Command (USCINCCENT) was: "When directed, conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major points, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces."




Figure E-1 Map of the Horn of Africa

APPENDIX G. BACKGROUND ON HAITI

1. Overview

This overview begins with a description of Haiti. Haiti, the western third of the Antillean island of Hispaniola, is about 600 miles from the United States and occupies an area roughly the size of Maryland. The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two-thirds of the island. Despite its relative compact size, different sections and peoples of the country have remained isolated. No part of Haiti is far from the sea and according to Robert Rotberg (1971:6) this explains why nineteenth-century Haiti could export coffee without roads. Without the requirement for roads, the port towns developed apart from the surrounding rural areas.

The character of the terrain has also made the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, such as roads, telephone lines and electric power, difficult. In 1969, outside the main cities there was less than 50 miles of properly serviced roadway. Today, Schulz (1996:16) reports that Haiti can claim only 300 miles of surfaced, all-weather roads. Poverty and neglect, the extent to which is only hinted at by the absence of modern infrastructure, puts Haiti at the bottom of Latin America and near the bottom of the global scale.¹ Rotberg (1971:9) explains that poverty and neglect conditions the direction of contemporary and future political development.

2. Disintegration of the Government

As is discussed in detail in later sections, Haiti has never really had a representative democratic government. Periods of stability have been afforded through foreign occupations and oppressive dictatorships. Following the five-year period of political instability after the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti held its first free elections in December 1990. A local parish priest and leader of the *Lavalas* party,² Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was elected President. Upon being sworn in on 7 February 1991, Aristide named Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras commander-in-chief of the FAdH. On 30 September 1991,

¹There are few reliable statistics on Haiti. Generally speaking a comparative sampling of several sources will provide a ball park feel for the situation. William W. Mendel's "The Haiti Contingency," *Military Review* (January 1994), p 50 and US Department of State, *Background Notes: Haiti 09/96* (http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/haiti_09_96_bgn.html) offer good starting places. The overall picture is bleak: Haiti has the lowest per capita income (\$360); the lowest life expectancy (48 years); the highest infant mortality rate (124 per 1,000); and, the highest illiteracy (80 percent) in the Western Hemisphere.

² *Lavalas* means flood or avalanche. The name comes from an Aristide speech where he called for the people to become "an avalanche" for change in Haiti. The movement, called for the mobilization of supporters from all classes and races. However, the greatest support was centered in the slums of Port-au-Prince where Aristide's Marxist and populist ideas found an attentive audience. From here Aristide began to urge his followers to employ the intimidation tactics well-known in Haitian politics. This approach to power politics triggered a backlash among Haitian elites, who supported and were supported by the military.

Aristide was unseated by a coup organized by the FAdH non-commissioned officer corps, and replaced by Gen. Cedras.

According to RAND analyst Preston Niblack (1995:4) the Organization of American States (OAS), acting immediately to condemn the coup, imposed a trade embargo on the *de facto* government.³ Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis failed to make much progress, but in February 1993, the Cedras regime agreed to the monitoring of civil rights by the OAS-UN *Mission Civil in Haiti* (MICIVIH). In June, frustrated by the failure of the regime to negotiate with Aristide's government, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose an international embargo on petroleum, petroleum products and arms, and to freeze Haiti's foreign assets. Unfortunately, Schulz and Marcella (1994:17) report, the international sanctions were a disaster, further devastating the Haitian economy without establishing democracy.

3. Human Suffering

Schulz and Marcella (1994:16) report that since the imposition of the embargoes other economic power groups, such as contraband and drug smugglers, had threatened the traditional oligarchy's markets. Despite the fact that the traditional, mostly mulatto elites risked losing their privileged position to newcomers, the common Haitian suffered more because of the OAS and UN embargoes. Where the elites, both old and new, were able to meet their needs, the common man was not.

The Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies (1993:15) reports that unemployment soared as labor-intensive export assembly industries, such as the apparel and leather goods, moved to the Dominican Republic. Hundreds of thousands of urban residents fled the cities for the countryside, where deforestation was already an advanced environmental problem. Now, because of the embargo on petroleum products, brush and saplings were the only fuel to provide for home energy needs. Moreover, farmers did not plant crops and Haiti lost what little agricultural self-sufficiency it had. Schulz and Marcella (1995:52) report that by November 1993, civilian relief organizations were feeding some 800,000 Haitians daily.⁴

³ According to Dr. Steve Brown, an intelligence analyst with the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the United States committed itself to a policy of supporting elected regimes through concerted diplomatic effort in the wake of the criticism the United States was subjected to for unilaterally acting against Manuel Noriega in Operation Just Cause. In June 1991, the Organization of American States, to which the United States belongs, decided with the Santiago Commitment to Democracy on collective action in the event that a democratically elected government were overthrown anywhere in the Americas.

⁴ In a speech 26 August 1994 to the World Bank Informal Donors Conference, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, US Agency for International Development, Mark L. Schneider, listed deficient areas within Haiti requiring "concerted action." One action was "a continuation of a USAID program feeding one meal a day for 1,000,000 to the most vulnerable Haitians," and providing health care access to 2,000,000. But, the humanitarian programs were not Haiti's most serious problem. First, a democratic government had to be installed, next, the country's economy had to recover, and finally, the tax system had to be overhauled to allow Haiti to pay off its international debt.

The United States Coast Guard began intercepting hundreds of Haitians who were braving the dangerous Caribbean waters each day and housing them in a holding camp in Guantanamo Naval Station, Cuba.⁵ The US government labeled these desperate people "migrants" rather than "refugees" and began a controversial policy of holding, then returning them. As described before, the "migrant" situation contributed to the eventual deployment of American troops.

4. United Nations Actions

The UN embargo was in effect only four days before Cedras agreed to meet Aristide and negotiate his return. The two met on 3 July 1993 at Governors Island, New York for a week of negotiations which culminated with an agreement for the return of Aristide by 30 October 1993 and to the presence of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to assist in Aristide's return to power. Additionally, amnesty would be granted to those involved in the 1991 coup and Cedras would be allowed to retire as other officers would be transferred to lesser posts. Most importantly, the FAdH was to be left in place. (Niblack, 1995:5) In return, just for signing the document, Cedras received removal of international sanctions and the resumption of foreign aid allowing him to: 1) prevent the sanctions from doing real harm to the military and its supporting elites; and, 2) begin preparations to delay the return of Aristide.⁶

Niblack (1995:5) reports that when the *USS Harlan County*, carrying 220 members of UNMIH arrived at Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993. FRAPH (the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti) forces, operating with the support of the police and army-backed thugs called "attaches" and waving Duvalier's black and red flag, threatened Aristide supporters and UN and OAS personnel who had assembled to greet the ship. On orders from the Pentagon, the *Harlan County* turned back. Schulz and Marcella (1995:28) report that the Haitian military and its supporters were ecstatic. As in Mogadishu several weeks before, the impression was unmistakable: The United States had been frightened away by a few hundred thugs.

5. Actions by the United States

According to journalist Howard French (1993), at the urging of the United States, the UN reimposed sanctions on Haiti the following day. President Clinton issued a statement

⁵ In November 1991, the US Navy opened a holding camp at Guantanamo. According to James McNaughton, "Half the Battle," Unpublished manuscript, 1995, the camp was home to more than 37,000 Haitians. To complicate "migrant" matters, in 1993 Cubans began fleeing the political and economic situation in their country for America. These people were intercepted at sea and relocated at a holding camp in Panama. Reserve Civil Affairs soldiers from the 361st CA Brigade and the 478th CA Battalion were called to active duty to operate the camps.

⁶ See "Necklacing Haiti" in *The Nation* (9-16 August 1993), pp. 159-160 for a perspective on the "fatally flawed" Governors Island Agreement.

over Haitian radio to anti-Aristide groups: The United States was concerned for the safety of those pro-Aristide government officials still in office. Shortly afterwards, UN personnel were withdrawn from Haiti for their own safety. Cedras was succeeding in delaying the return of Aristide. Washington policy makers began to argue over the value of backing Aristide. When Aristide rejected the compromises hammered out in Haiti by Prime Minister Robert Malval between the military and legislature, Malval resigned in frustration. Meanwhile, civilian relief organizations predicted starvation might soon break out in Haiti. The media began to speculate on the Clinton Administration's abandonment of Haitian democracy.

President Clinton declared on 31 July 1994 that all diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis had been exhausted. The Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing the creation of a US-led multinational force, empowered under Chapter VII of the UN Charter "to use all necessary means" to restore the democratically elected government of Haiti. (Niblack, 1995:5)

Lt. Col. Gordon Bonham (Bonham, 1995:9) says that military planning for an intervention in Haiti began way back in 1991, when the primary focus was the protection of Americans and third country nationals. By March 1994 the XVIII Airborne Corps had completed a plan to support the USACOM (US Atlantic Command) OPLAN 2370, the forcible entry to restore civil order, protect US citizens and reestablish the legitimate government in Haiti. Along with the forcible entry plan, a "permissive environment" plan OPOD (Operations Order) 2380,⁷ was directed to be developed by the 10th Mountain Division. (Bonham, 1995:10)

Bonham (1995:13) explained that the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, had suggested in July that he had two excellent plans but both lacked something: OPOD 2380 lacked the way of getting into an uncertain environment and OPLAN 2370 lacked the pieces to follow up after the "door had been kicked in." The JCS directed 2 September 1994 that another plan be developed. OPLAN 2375, the sequential deployment of Joint Task Force (JTF) 180, the initial door-kicking element, and JTF 190, the civil-military operations element, was envisioned and it is what the military did, but no one can find a copy of it" says, Army Special Operations Command Historian, Joseph Fischer (1996). By the middle of September the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was preparing an amphibious landing at Cap Haitien and two aircraft carriers, the *USS America*, with Army helicopters rather than Navy aircraft, and the *USS Eisenhower*, with its contingent of close air support (CAS) aircraft, were on station off Haiti.

⁷ The 11 September message from CINCUSACOM to ARSOF (111915Z Sep 94) refers to CONPLAN 2380 (Concept Plan).




Figure G-1 Map of Hispaniola

APPENDIX H. MINISTERIAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS

Ministerial Assistance Team	Time	Function
I	1 November -15 December 1994	1) Agriculture 2) Commerce and Industry 3) Education 4) Finance and Central Bank 5) Foreign Affairs 6) Information 7) Interior 8) Justice 9) Planning 10) Public Health 11) Public Works 12) Women's Affairs
II	15 December 1994 - 28 February 1995	1) Agriculture 2) Commerce and Industry 3) Finance and Central Bank 4) Foreign Affairs 5) Interior 6) Judicial 7) Public Health
III	May-July 1995	Emphasis on Judicial with other IG teams
IV	August-September 1995	Justice (Emphasis on Prisons, Police and administration)
V	October 1995-June 1996	1) Justice 2) Commerce and Interior 3) Finance 4) Agriculture 5) Public Works
VI	December 1996-February 1997	1) Justice 2) Interior 3) Public Work

Figure Appendix G-1 Ministerial Assistance Team (MAT) Timetable. (Derived from miscellaneous 358th CA Brigade Briefing Slides.)

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